



# AN INTEGRATED CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND EARLY RESPONSE SYSTEM

MANUAL FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS



The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND), also known as PIND, was established in 2010 with initial funding of US\$50million from Chevron Corporation as a regional 2010 to 2014 strategy for addressing deep-rooted socio-economic problems in the Niger Delta rather than symptoms by growing networks of international and local partners to collaborate in developing and implementing new solutions and reducing dependence on oil in the region. We are a Nigerian Non-Profit organization headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria with offices in Warri, Delta State and Port Harcourt, Rivers State.

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*This Handbook was written in collaboration with the Fund for Peace.*

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# ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review	IPDU	Integrated Peace and Development Unit
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project	KII	Key Informant Interview
CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework	KML	Keyhole Markup Language
CAST	Conflict Assessment System Tool	LGA	Local Government Area
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism	NDPI	Niger Delta Partnerships Initiative
CIEPD	Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development	NEEWS	Nigerian Election Early Warning System
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	NSRP	Nigeria Stabilization and Reconciliation Programme
CSS	Center for Security Studies	NYCOP	National Youth Council of Ogoni People
CWC	Conflict Watch Center	P4P	Partners for Peace
ECOWARN	Early Warning System of the Economic Community of West African States	PIND	Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	PREVENT	P4P Prevent Committees
ETH	Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich ( <i>Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich</i> )	PSN	Peace and Security Network
EW	Early Warning	SMS	Short Message Service ( <i>Text messaging</i> )
EWER	Early Warning, Early Response	SNA	Stakeholder Network Analysis
FFP	Fund for Peace	TMG	Transition Monitoring Group
FGD	Focus Group Discussion	UNLOCK	Universal Network of Local Knowledge
GIS	Geographic Information System	USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
		WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

# CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND EARLY RESPONSE SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW

**C**onflict Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) systems are critical tools in contemporary conflict prevention and peace building. For more than a decade, in the face of increasingly complex conflicts around the world, significant attention and resources have been devoted to the development and operationalisation of such systems. Many contemporary EWER systems are built to address the “if” but fail to answer the “how” and “when.” That is to say, early warning focuses on the collection and dissemination of early warning data and information to stakeholders with the intention of informing decision makers on *if* an intervention is called for, but the process often fails to include guidance on *how* (and *when*) that information should be used for preventive interventions. The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) has reimagined what EWER could be and has determined that the measure of effectiveness of their system should not be its ability to *predict* conflict, but rather its ability to facilitate the *prevention* of conflict through timely and relevant response.<sup>1</sup> Timely and relevant response, in turn, requires effective linkages between information dissemination and appropriate response mechanisms, but more importantly, it designs early warning products in such a way as to trigger and facilitate response at both the strategic and operational levels, depending on conflict dynamics and the capabilities and mandates of responders. The system also includes a feedback loop whereby results and information from interventions can inform and improve the overall EWER system itself.

This task of designing an effective EWER system is made more challenging by the fact that conflict is systemic, involving social, economic, political, and security dimensions and multiple risk factors. Also, conflict is often expressed at the local, state, national, and transnational levels, and can manifest as communal, political, and criminal violence. Finally, conflict is not always linear or able to be divided into discrete phases or timelines, nor is it always contained to easily delineated geographical designations. Considering the dynamic nature of conflict, a segmented or inflexible approach cannot effectively address the varied drivers, triggers, vulnerability and risk factors of a particular conflict system. Therefore, effective prevention — as well as proactive conflict management and resolution — must be informed by an equally dynamic and integrated early warning system. Such a system should include government, community, and civil society actors as part of a systematic and multifaceted process of data collection, information sharing and verification.<sup>2</sup> All too often, this is not the case, and key stakeholders who may have both the necessary information and skills to anticipate and respond to a conflict before it escalates into a crisis are left out of the process. PIND’s EWER system accounts for all of these factors.

## LINKING EARLY WARNING TO EARLY RESPONSE

As noted above, one of the greatest challenges in the design of

contemporary early warning systems has been the difficulty in ensuring that early warning information leads to timely and effective response. Although the challenge is largely a result of a disconnect between the two processes, the solution is not a plug-in which would close the gap. Rather the solution is about strategically reimagining the entire EWER process whereby early warning information is analysed, formatted, and disseminated to stakeholders in the system who are positioned (or pre-positioned) in such a way as to receive and act upon that information. Additionally, while many early warning systems may be designed to inform and encourage response, rarely are response systems designed to systematically utilise early warning data and information to guide analysis and plan policy or action.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, many early warning programs and initiatives have failed to lead to effective response not because of the shortage of early warning information, at least for those who want to be informed, but largely because those early warning programs may not rigorously and systematically track indicators of conflict risk,<sup>4</sup> or present the information in a way that can be used by actors ready to use it.

The African continent has been a leader in the development of EVER systems. These have had varying degrees of effectiveness. First, in East Africa, the Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN) developed in 2002 by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has seen some successes in linking early warning to response, particularly on cross-border pastoral conflicts. It also makes use of incident reports as well as perception-based situation reports, submitted by local monitors at regular intervals. However, recent attempts to reorganise the system to simplify and streamline its functionality have resulted in some unintended and complicated consequences. A USAID-commissioned 2016 evaluation highlights some of the inherent challenges in regard to data aggregation and interpretation that have persisted.

*Recent attempts to change the CEWARN system may not have considered incorporating and consolidating past successes. While the new system does simplify both incident and situation reporting, it appears to complicate the administrative aspects of data handling and analyses (e.g., by moving from one to five National Research Institutes per member state) and appears to promote an academic or textbook approach rather than local functionality. It is also of concern that even the 'simplification' of raw data collection under the proposed new system remains reliant on responses to subjective ordinal (rating) scales, rather than on verifiable criteria.*


Reliance on donor funding has also resulted in the system occasionally coming to a halt until funding can be secured, according to the report. In addition, most pastoralist conflict in the region takes place in areas that are largely devoid of government presence, and inadequate or sporadic funding has also led to a decreased capacity to engage local civil society actors and organisations. As such, the capacity to respond on the part of both government and civil society to the conflict data that is gathered is also significantly hindered.<sup>5</sup>

In West Africa, ECOWARN, the early warning system of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is one of the most advanced and integrated systems on the continent, utilising different data streams, a comprehensive indicator framework, and on-the-ground weekly incident and situation reporting from field monitors in each of the 15 ECOWAS member states. However, although ECOWARN utilises an integrated system which includes the collection of information from local communities in the sub-region, it has not been able to consistently engender proactive response to the various conflict drivers in the sub-region.<sup>6</sup> In some cases, this appears to be an institutional shortcoming, as there are few formalised mechanisms for ensuring data gathered and analysed by the ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate reaches other Directorates within the sub-regional body that are mandated to respond. Each Directorate or Division within ECOWAS also routinely or occasionally gathers its own early warning and post-intervention data, and there are limited processes in place for ensuring a feedback loop between the various units, or protocols which stipulate the use of early warning information in the decision-making cycle, workplans, proposals, and budgets. Thus, while these early warning systems represent some of the more advanced efforts to date, challenges in regard to data aggregation and interpretation, as well as process and protocol have been observed to constrain effective and timely response to issued warnings.<sup>7</sup>

The inherent problem of translating early warning to early response is further hampered by a number of additional operational-level factors, including difficulties in conveying information to responders, delay in response between when information is analysed and when it is acted upon, and the formation of inadequate or inappropriate response plans. The delay or inability to send warnings to the appropriate stakeholders at the right time greatly diminishes the value of conflict early warning information. In improving the linkages between early warning and early response, it is therefore necessary to prioritise response mechanisms through conflict analysis and crisis mapping,

## ENHANCING THE PROCESS OF EARLY WARNING TO RESPONSE

Figure 1.1



joint planning, and development of strategic response options. Conflict analysis and crisis mapping can lead to a better understanding of conflict drivers and where conflict manifests as “hotspots” which allows stakeholders to anticipate likely outcomes and determine the most appropriate responses. Joint planning allows for all stakeholders to analyse the data at hand and provide further contextual information, leading to better informed, and more strategic, response options. Getting all relevant stakeholders around the table also promotes a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between various conflict drivers and structural vulnerabilities and is more likely to lead to solutions that address the systemic drivers of conflict, rather than treating each manifestation separately or as a “one-off.”

## TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

The ultimate utility of an early warning system is not only determined by the capacity to collect and process information, but more importantly by the capacity to inform timely and relevant response by linking early warning information to the right responders for timely conflict mitigation. It is, however, not sufficient to assume that response will automatically follow once the right information is disseminated to the right persons. For early warning to translate to early response, there must be a systematic process that should include the following components:

- 1) Quantitative and Qualitative Data Collection;
- 2) Data Analysis;
- 3) Assessment of Early Warning Information;
- 4) Formulation of Action Plan(s); and,
- 5) Early Response.<sup>8</sup>

This ensures that early warning does not stop with intervention, but

maintains a feedback loop – moving from information gathering to analysis to action planning to early response, which, in turn, feeds back into the early warning information gathering process.<sup>9</sup>

The essence of this approach is to ensure that data collection and dissemination is done as part of a systematic and integrated structure that efficiently links early warning information to an effective early response mechanism.<sup>10</sup> Such a model also ensures that the various components of the system are integrated and linked. In this way, early warning information can effectively be used to identify indicators of potential conflict and catalyze timely response by local, national, and international stakeholders.<sup>11</sup> As *Figure 1.1* illustrates, an effective early warning system must involve an integrated process of moving from early warning, data analysis, and planning to response.

The model is built around specific mechanisms that directly link early warning with actual response initiatives. As the *Figure 1.1* illustrates, the three elements of this model – early warning, analysis, and joint planning – are systematically linked to ensure relevant and actionable response. This approach helps to ensure that analysis of early warning information is simultaneously directed at understanding the context in which conflict is occurring in order to anticipate events, understand potential causal linkages, and formulate appropriate intervention initiatives.

In the following chapters of the Handbook, each component on the continuum of effective early warning to early response will be looked at in more detail. This includes “how-to” sections for operators who are responsible for the technical aspects of the process, such as raw data gathering, data coding, data collation, uploading data to a platform, integration of data sets for early warning, and ensuring

effective gender mainstreaming in data collection. The following section provides a brief descriptive overview of each part of the process.

### Empirical Analysis

While data should be collected and catalogued systematically and consistently, an effective early warning system cannot be static or “one-size-fits-all.” Early warning products should not use the same indicators and data sets in the same way to track and analyse every risk factor every time. Instead, researchers should apply critical thinking in the research design underlying every early warning product they publish. For effective early warning, it is critical to specify the problem set (risk factor or vulnerability) that the early warning project wishes to mitigate and articulate the research questions in such a way as to understand what needs to be known in order to address the identified problem. Analysis should always begin with the formulation of specific research questions and hypotheses about potential or actual conflict.<sup>12</sup> This should be followed by identification of an appropriate indicator framework, as well as primary and secondary data sources from those available in the early warning system. This process helps to develop an empirical baselines which serves as the foundation to inform qualitative inquiry and prognosis of why, where and when conflict is likely to break out, and how to mitigate it.<sup>13</sup>

### Qualitative Analysis


Qualitative interpretive analysis can provide contextual narrative to the empirical analysis.<sup>14</sup> Given the potential gaps in empirical data, qualitative techniques should be used to cross-check, qualify, and contextualize the empirical findings and extrapolate potential scenarios and implications. This helps to provide a deeper understanding of the social, economic, political, and security dimensions of a particular conflict, and anticipate changes that can be initiated by local actors.

### Joint Planning and Response

For early warning to catalyse relevant and actionable response, it is critical to understand the “conditions, motivations and reasons for response” as well as the relationship between early warning and response. This requires a participatory approach that involves multi-stakeholder collaboration to address complex systemic problems. The

### CYCLICAL PROCESS OF RESPONSE LEADING BACK TO EARLY WARNING

Figure 1.2



inclusion of diverse stakeholders in the analysis process contributes to “richer analysis, and builds trust, confidence and the potential for mutually supportive action.”<sup>15</sup> Joint planning also helps to identify and prioritise options for response, find the right combination of short-term, medium-term and long-term response initiatives, and provide guidelines for actionable interventions.<sup>16</sup>


### AN INTEGRATED EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE SYSTEM: THE PIND MODEL

PIND’s approach to early warning and response does not stop with intervention, but contains a process by which information feeds back into the data collection process and, where necessary, provides critical information to update and adjust the current and future response.<sup>17</sup> This requires that the design and management of early warning systems be closely connected with the process of understanding what types of response mechanisms exist in the overall system.<sup>18</sup> As such, PIND’s integrated approach is designed specifically to link known responders - from the community to the state to the national level - to relevant early warning data and analysis. Overall, the PIND EWER model comprises five integrated mechanisms. These core components include:

- 1) Peace Map;
- 2) Incident Reporting Platform;
- 3) Field Monitors;
- 4) PREVENT Committees; and
- 5) Research/Analysis.

Utilising these five core components, the PIND system collects early warning information and then identifies and mobilises appropriate actors and resources for preventive interventions. The ultimate goal is





to provide stakeholders with real-time conflict early warning information and catalyse timely response.


Thus the model ensures that early warning information from an SMS platform layered against secondary data on a Geographic Information System (GIS) map is further supported by context-specific information from responders, allowing for cross referencing and validation of data. In addition, the outcome of interventions is further assessed through joint planning, shared knowledge and best practices amongst stakeholders. Through social network analysis, the model helps to identify stakeholders, map their inter-connectedness and bring them together to address various issues affecting conflict dynamics in their communities.

### 1. Peace Map

The Peace Map is a platform that brings together multiple data and information sources on peace and conflict in one location. It features functions that allow the user to search by specific and customizable parameters and visualise where and when conflict incidents are occurring, as well as the types of incidents themselves. Specifically, the Peace Map contains a database of conflict incidents across Nigeria and enables the user to triangulate and validate data collected by different organisations. It enables the user to better understand the peace and security landscape for peace and conflict sensitivity. Also, unlike many

other online early warning data platforms, the Peace Map also lists information on available response capacities by type and location. These responders, called Peace Agents, comprise local as well as national and multinational initiatives. Organizations can register not only to be listed on the platform, but also to receive regular conflict alerts and updates — a further step towards linking effective early warning with appropriate response.

The map is highly interactive, allowing the user to test hypotheses and relationships between dozens of indicators, and to create their own customized indicators, and to juxtapose areas of conflict risk against



**INCIDENT REPORTING PLATFORM**

Figure 1.5

S/N		Flagged	Trusted	Message	Reported
81				BY, Yenagoa LGA, Agbura, 11/11/2017, A man died of a heart attack.	Saturday, 11th November 2017
82				Dear customer, your 500MB Internet Plan will expire on 2017-11-14. Auto reneweal & rollover of unused data do apply. Text help to 229 for purchase info.	Saturday, 11th November 2017
83				IM, ISIALAMBANO, IBEME, 8/11/2017, A NOTORIOUS RMINAL FROM THE COMMUNITY WAS APPREHENDED BY THE COMMUNITY VIGILANTES BY 11PM FOLLOWING A TIP OFF. HE HAS BEEN HANDED OVER TO POLICE.	Thursday, 9th November 2017
84				CR LGA IKOM community Abankkok Date 9/11/17 the community has ask a Fulani to relocate with his cattle on or before 31 day if December 2017.	Thursday, 9th November 2017
85				The galant men of nigeria police force gunned down five kidnappers who tried to kidnappe a recent prominent widow woman in Ikom cross river state by 12.37am this morning	Friday, 10th November 2017
86				CR/Yakurr.2/11/17. Adadama comm. Of Abi LG in Cross River State, faced another threat as group of Amaou youths-Ebonyi State launced an	Friday, 10th November 2017

An example of the Incident Reporting Platform, demonstrating data collected and flagging for trustworthiness, current status, and/or for follow-up.

the locations of self-identified Peace Agents. It includes a dynamic heat map that shows the intensity of violence over a period of time in specific locations. Organisations that are registered on the map as Peace Agents can network and receive alerts when there is a spike in conflict risk factors in their location.

**2. Incident Reporting Platform**

The Incident Reporting Platform is an online and SMS-based platform that collects, analyses and disseminates early warning information to targeted stakeholders for preventive interventions. The platform receives early warning reports from trained community-based field monitors through a dedicated mobile telephone line. Once a report is received, the platform verifies and disseminates the information to relevant responders, including members of the PREVENT Committees. Reports are anonymised and sensitive information is flagged or redacted to ensure that reports that can potentially escalate conflict are properly sensitised. The platform also has a web-based bulk SMS feature that enables it to send peace and advocacy messages to sensitise people about peace and security issues in their area.

**3. Field Monitors**

The community-based Field Monitors are trained to use local resources at the grassroots level to identify early warning signs of conflict and report incidents and information to the SMS platform. Their insight into community life and social dynamics helps them to generate specific information that is not apparent to outsiders. To ensure quality control, field monitors receive periodic training from PIND on how to identify conflict issues and track local conflict trends and dynamics and on how to report relevant information in a specified format for easy collation, coding and analysis.

**4. PREVENT Committees**

The PREVENT Committees are 10-15-member committees of conflict mediators established in each of the nine states of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Members are drawn from traditional councils, religious associations, women groups, youth groups, and representatives of security agencies. The committees work as influencers, meet monthly within their respective states, and identify and respond to identified potential precursors to violence and instability. They receive early warning alerts from the SMS-based platform as well as monthly conflict trackers. Once they receive conflict alerts, the committee mobilises

members, engages with relevant public and private sector stakeholders, and embarks on preventive interventions.

### 5. Research/Analysis

Information from the Peace Map and incident reports are integrated and used to produce monthly and quarterly conflict trackers at the state level, which in turn, are used by PREVENT Committees and other Peace Agents for early warning analysis on the ground, as well as deeper thematic briefs to inform policy and planning. The conflict trackers and bulletins, as well as other research and analytical products, are disseminated to Field Monitors and PREVENT Committee members for situational awareness, stakeholder analysis, conflict analysis, and further incident mapping. This process ensures that early warning and early response planning is supported by research findings.

## HOW ALL THE COMPONENTS FIT TOGETHER

The components of the PIND EWER model are integrated through a cyclical process that closely links early warning and analysis with response. Following the identification of a research question, objective, or a problem set to be examined, the process begins with quantitative analysis of early warning data, which is then followed by qualitative inquiry that serves as a foundation for the prognosis of why, where and when conflict is likely to occur. The participatory interpretative analysis helps to cross-check, correlate and validate the empirical findings. The next step is joint planning to catalyse relevant and actionable response. The planning process involves diverse stakeholders who contribute to richer analysis and identify and prioritize options for preventive response. Based on the outcome of the analysis and the joint planning, the initial objectives and research questions are reviewed and further refined to develop more appropriate presumptions about the conflict situation. The new or refined set of research questions and presumptions are then used to determine what data to collect next. This process allows for a continuous learning cycle that ensures early response leads back to the planning, analysis and data collection process.

The model ensures that early warning information from the SMS platform and secondary data sets is further supported by context-specific information from responders, allowing for cross referencing and validation of data. In addition, the outcome of interventions is

further assessed through joint planning, shared knowledge and best practices amongst stakeholders. Through stakeholder network analysis, the model helps to identify stakeholders, map their interconnectedness and bring them together to address various issues affecting conflict dynamics in their communities.

## HOW TO USE THIS HANDBOOK

The *PIND EWER Handbook* is envisioned to be a tool for scholars, practitioners and operators that provides a step-by-step overview of how to employ a data-driven approach to early warning and response, using the PIND model as an example of such an approach. In each of the next three chapters, readers will find a section dedicated to outlining the theoretical approach and underpinnings to a specific component of the process, as well as a section that addresses action steps, templates, and examples of documents that highlight each component of the PIND integrated EWER system, as well as a narrative case study based on a real event which will serve to illustrate the approach and the process.

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# A DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH TO CONFLICT EARLY WARNING: THE PIND MODEL

## PART I: THE APPROACH

**T**he Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) aims to reduce conflict as a key constraint to economic development in the Niger Delta. This is done by enhancing the impact of local Peace Agents and catalysing and leveraging the power of the peaceful majority. Recognizing that local actors with a stake in peace, may lack the information or capacity, PIND provides them with Platforms, Data, Skills, and Resources, in order that they can take their efforts to scale. The ultimate aim of this approach is to ensure that interventions are locally owned and driven in order to address the current realities on the ground in contextually appropriate ways, as well as to promote sustainability and effectiveness.

A data-driven approach to early warning is a central component to the PIND model, and it has several key advantages.

- First, data is critical for identifying relative levels of risk and vulnerability across the geographic areas being examined and facilitates the early identification of hotspots.
- Second, a data-driven approach is fundamental in identifying patterns and trends, or the sudden or gradual changes in risk and vulnerability over time.
- Third, it allows the analyst or researcher to compare patterns and trends with other data sets, an essential step in validating

information and filling gaps.

- Finally, data-driven approaches to conflict early warning facilitate and enhance understanding of the local context, and lay a foundation for an analysis of what is behind the patterns and trends identified.

Connecting data on patterns and trends in conflict risk factors with training and capacity building for response can make a real difference in peace and security at the local, state, regional and national levels. As a core component of the PIND Peacebuilding architecture, the Integrated Peace and Development Unit (IPDU) collects and collates data from across the region so that Peace Agents can better identify hotspots and trends to prioritise their efforts. PIND also provides support to the Partners for Peace Network (P4P), a Niger Delta-wide platform of over 7,000 local stakeholders who engage with one another on an ongoing basis for conflict early warning, assessment and response. The P4P Network is organised into nine State Chapters and dozens of Sub-Chapters. Each P4P Chapter also has its own PREVENT Committee, tasked with the management of urgent conflict issues as they arise. The PREVENT Committees are represented by civil society organisations with knowledge of armed groups, those connected to the security services, traditional rulers, and other key stakeholder groups, including women, youth and the disabled.

To further facilitate an integrated approach to early warning that is data driven, the IPDU utilises an SMS Early Warning and Early Response System — an online platform that collects, collates and analyses data on incidents of conflict. The SMS Early Warning and Response System also enables PREVENT Committee members and trained field monitors to send in regular incident reports, which, along with other data sources then informs the production of monthly, quarterly and annual conflict trackers and thematic reports.

Data on conflict patterns, as well as the location of Peace Agents, are collated and uploaded to an interactive online Peace Map, which directly informs the ongoing qualitative analysis by the P4P Chapters, PREVENT Committees, and other local stakeholders. As noted in the Introduction, the Peace Map is a digital platform that brings together multiple data and information sources on peace and conflict in one location, and features functions that allow the user to search by specific and customized parameters and visualise where and when conflict incidents are occurring, as well as the types of incidents (details) themselves. Overall, it represents the largest integrated database of conflict incidents across the Niger Delta, enabling the user to triangulate and validate data collected by different organisations to better comprehend the peace and security landscape. Also, unlike many other online early warning data platforms, the Peace Map also lists information on available response capacities by type and location.

Finally, qualitative analysis of data from the Peace Map can inform the planning and implementation of locally owned peace building interventions and activities. In Nigeria, many organisations are gathering data on conflict drivers and fatalities, with a focus on

different issues, locations, and time periods. The Peace Map integrates these data sources on a single platform, which allows for cross-validation and triangulation to better identify hotspots and trends which, in turn, leads to more informed monitoring and intervention strategies. Data sources integrated on the Peace Map include: P4P (IPDU SMS Early Warning), WANEP Nigeria, Fund for Peace’s UNLOCK, NEEWS2015/TMG, NSRP Sources, Council on Foreign Relations, Nigeria Watch, ACLED, and CIEPD (datasets are described in detail below). New sources are added as they become available.

## TYPES OF DATA USED


The data-driven approach to early warning employed by PIND makes use of four data/information streams, namely: Quantitative Data, Qualitative Data, Geographic Information System (GIS)/Event Data and Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA). As different data sets have different strengths and weaknesses, using multiple sources allows for triangulation, validation, and the filling of gaps. What follows below is a brief summary of each type of data utilised by PIND in its conflict early warning system, their strengths and weaknesses, and an example of a representative dataset.

### Quantitative Data

Quantitative datasets (including event data as well as data on social, environmental, demographic, or health factors, etc.) are used to understand anything that can be measured numerically, such as the number of reported conflict incidents or fatalities. Quantitative data is excellent at establishing patterns and trends over time, as well as

## COMPARISON OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS

Figure 2.1



identifying hotspots. It can also be useful in both cross-validating sources (e.g., identifying correlations or divergences) and triangulating sources in order to fill gaps and reduce duplicates. In conflict early warning, it can be used as a foundation to posit or infer the story behind the data and identify leverage points to help influence the ending of that story (e.g. finding and empowering Peace Agents to respond). Quantitative data is also very useful in establishing baselines that can then be layered with qualitative data in order to better understand the context and how the trends express themselves in the real world.

### Qualitative Data

Qualitative data is useful for putting quantitative data into context, by filling gaps and validating findings. It is most often based on interviews, evaluations and/or observations. Qualitative data allows the analyst or researcher to qualify and contextualise the information derived through quantitative research and baseline analysis. Qualitative research methods include conducting Key Informant Interviews (KIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with participants in the field or in the given area of interest, which allows for a richer and more nuanced understanding of the factors that may be accelerating (or decelerating) conflict. It can also help the researcher to test assumptions and initial findings. Ideally, qualitative methods are employed after a baseline analysis has been performed using quantitative data.

### Geographic Information System and Event Data

A Geographic Information System (GIS) allows the user to visualise, question, analyse, and interpret data to understand relationships, patterns, and trends. GIS is used to identify hotspots and trends to determine how conflict risks are becoming evident over space and time (for example: communal tensions, political tensions, criminality, etc.). Event data is inherently “noisy” and should be triangulated against multiple sources to fill gaps and cross-validate findings. After triangulation, data can then be analysed at the state, regional and national levels and calculated on a per capita basis to control for population size. This is critical when comparing a very populous area (e.g. Rivers State) with an area that has fewer people (e.g. Bayelsa State). Otherwise, the populous area will always appear to be at higher risk regardless of indicator or trend. For example, it might appear that there are high levels of reported incidents in a populous urban centre like Lagos – but when calculated as per capita, these numbers may be put in a more useful context. Data is then disaggregated/mainstreamed by gender across all indicators using a key word search function of the Peace Map platform.

### EVENT-DRIVEN RISKS: GIS FUNCTIONS

- Search by source, compare sources, reduce duplicates
- Search by country, province, or locality
- Search by indicator and sub-indicator
- Search by cross-cutting themes (Incidents affecting Women and Girls, customized key word searches)
- Monthly, quarterly, or annual trends by number of incidents or fatalities
- Compare countries, provinces, or localities by indicator, sub-indicator, number of incidents or fatalities by raw tally or per capita
- View static or dynamic heat map showing change over time
- View table of incident descriptions based on the parameters of your search
- Register as a Peace Agent, publicly endorse organisations that perform good work
- Add KML (Keyhole Markup Language) layer for deeper analysis
- Download data to Excel for off line analysis
- Mainstreams Gender across all indicators

### Stakeholder Network Analysis

Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA) is a method employed to better understand social networks and determine where there might be leverage points, spheres of influence or social capital that can be used for early warning and response. The first step in conducting an SNA is to send out a scoping survey to all identified stakeholders who work on issues related to conflict early warning and response in the target

### APPLYING STAKEHOLDER NETWORK ANALYSIS

IDENTIFYING	Leverage points, spheres of influence, social capital (using quantitative methods)
ASSESSING	Gaps in the network that should be filled
OPTIMISING	Impact of activities based on specific objectives and stakeholders engaged (eg. ensuring high eigenvector, reach, and betweenness in grantees, partners, participants)

area of interest and asking with whom they each have partnered. This data is then uploaded to an SNA platform and is analysed quantitatively to discover which organisations are best positioned within the network to function as conveners (high “betweenness”), implementers (high “eigenvector”) or communicators (high “reach”).

Applying SNA further allows for the identification of gaps in the network that may need to be filled, as well as the impact of activities based on specific objectives and stakeholders engaged (e.g. ensuring high eigenvector, reach, and betweenness in PIND and P4P Network grantees, partners, and participants). Based on this analysis, PIND then determines the optimal mix of stakeholders to be targeted for further engagement. SNA can also be used to identify which organization may be best positioned to help PIND engage another organization or sets of organizations that it may not currently be connected with.

### DATA COLLECTION

PIND’s Early Warning and Response System makes use of real-time conflict incident reports from the IPDU SMS Early Warning system and pre-existing data sets from verified P4P sources. PIND integrates both the SMS data and the secondary data sets on the Peace Map for

cross-validation and triangulation, for better informed response decisions. This section provides a brief summary of the P4P online and SMS-based Early Warning data and the secondary data sets from other verified sources, as well as a brief description of the data collection processes.

### IPDU SMS Early Warning System

The IPDU Early Warning System is an online and SMS-based platform that collects, analyses and disseminates early warning information to targeted stakeholders for preventive interventions. The platform receives early warning reports from trained community-based field monitors through a dedicated mobile line. Incident reports are sent daily and in real-time. Once a report is received, the platform verifies and disseminates the information to relevant responders, including members of the PREVENT Committees. Reports are anonymised and sensitive information is flagged or redacted to ensure that reports that can potentially escalate conflict are properly sensitized. To ensure quality control, field monitors are trained regularly, and receive follow-up through weekly calls to encourage regular reporting of incidents to the SMS platform.




Figure 2.2



Conflict incidents sent to the P4P SMS and online based Early Warning platform are downloaded monthly in Excel for data cleaning and collation. The collated data is then formatted and coded according to specific indicators using a template, and then uploaded onto the Peace Map for cross-validation and triangulation with pre-existing data sets, including ACLED, Nigeria Watch, CIEPD, and VAWG sources.

#### *Armed Conflict Location Event Data*

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) collates data on protests, political violence and armed conflict in developing countries. The Data contains information on the date, location, types of incidents, groups involved, and reported fatalities. The data has a wider geographical coverage (international), is comprehensive, regularly updated, and easily disaggregated for conflict analysis and crisis mapping. The data is also very useful in tracking and mapping non-violent and non-fatal incidents. Data is downloaded monthly from the ACLED database (<https://www.acleddata.com>) in an Excel document (please see appendix). The downloaded data is then re-coded based on specific indicators and formatted for upload to the Peace Map. PIND triangulates ACLED data with other data sets to produce conflict trackers and policy briefings.

#### *Nigeria Watch*

The Nigeria Watch database monitors, compiles and cross-checks data on violent fatalities from several media sources in Nigeria. The database is updated daily based on a thorough analysis of the print and online media in Nigeria. The data is downloaded monthly from the Nigeria Watch database (<http://www.nigeriawatch.org/>) through subscription. PIND codes and formats the data onto the Peace Map where it is triangulated with other sources to produce monthly conflict trackers and periodic briefings. The Nigeria Watch database is very useful for tracking conflict dynamics and violence geographically and periodically and contains detailed information that provides useful context to data analysis.

#### *Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development*

Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development (CIEPD) crowdsources conflict data from targeted communities in the Niger Delta through a dedicated Conflict Watch Center (CIEPD-CWC). Conflict incident reports are sent to the CIEPD-CWC by community-

based stakeholders in real-time, mainly through Twitter and Facebook. Data is collected mainly from specific hotspots of conflict. At the end of every month, PIND manually collates data from the CIEPD crowd map<sup>1</sup> into Excel for coding. The coded data is then formatted onto the Peace Map for cross-validation with other sources.

#### *Violence Affecting Women and Girls*

Violence Affecting Women and Girls (VAWG) is a strategic focus of PIND's peacebuilding work, both as a cross-cutting issue, and as a critical priority in its own right. PIND partners with other organizations to collect data specifically on issues of VAWG. Data is collected daily and every incident report that is collected coded, and uploaded to the Peace Map is automatically flagged when referencing women or girls, for disaggregated analysis.

## DATA AGGREGATION

Data aggregation refers to the process by which information across multiple datasets or databases is gathered together and presented in a combined or summary form, whether directly on the platform itself, or off-line utilising a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. All the datasets utilised by the PIND Early Warning and Response System are coded in an Excel-based template and then formatted onto the Peace Map for cross-validation and triangulation in order to fill gaps and reduce duplicates. In *Part II: Operator's Instructions* presented below, PIND's process of coding, formatting and integrating the various datasets onto the Peace Map is described in detail.

## HOW THE DATA IS USED: PIND PRODUCTS


The PIND and P4P Peacebuilding Teams use the coded and aggregated data described in the above sections to produce three main products: Conflict Trackers, Policy Briefs, and Automated Alerts. The early warning and integrated analytical products that PIND produces help inform key stakeholders at various levels - local, state, and national - of the prevailing conflict trends in the Niger Delta in order to increase situational awareness, enhance participatory analysis, inform policy, and plan response.

PIND POLICY BRIEFS

Figure 2.3

### Rise in Cult Violence and Insecurity in Rivers State

briefing: November 2015




This briefing outlines the background and current significance of cult violence in Rivers State, Nigeria. It details the rise in cult violence and insecurity in Rivers State, Nigeria, particularly in the northern and southern parts of the state. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

**Background**

Cult violence has been a regular feature in the state since the late 1990s, with a notable increase in the early 2010s. According to a report by the Panel for Peace in December 2012 (the Panel Report), cult violence in Rivers State has been a major cause of insecurity and instability in the state since the late 1990s. The Panel Report also noted that cult violence in Rivers State has been a major cause of insecurity and instability in the state since the late 1990s.

### Renewed Potential for Violence: Bayelsa Gubernatorial Elections

briefing: October 2015



This briefing outlines the background and current significance of the renewed potential for violence in Bayelsa State, Nigeria, following the gubernatorial elections. It details the political context, the role of the military, and the potential for violence in the state. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

**Background**

The 2015 gubernatorial elections in Bayelsa State were held on October 11, 2015. The incumbent governor, Abba Kyari, was re-elected for a second term. The elections were held in a context of renewed potential for violence in the state, particularly in the northern and southern parts of the state. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

### Resurgence of Militancy in the Niger Delta: Update on the Niger Delta Avengers

June 2016



This briefing outlines the resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria, following the 2015 general elections. It details the role of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

**Drivers of the Militant Resurgence**

The resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta region is driven by a number of factors, including the impact of the 2015 general elections, the role of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), and the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

### The Street Kids of Calabar: A Punitive Approach is Not Enough

briefing: February 2017



This briefing outlines the evolution and transformation of street children in Calabar State, Nigeria. It details the background and current significance of the issue, the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation, and the role of the government in addressing the issue. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

**Evolution and Transformation**

The phenomenon of street children in Calabar State, Nigeria, has evolved over time. It details the background and current significance of the issue, the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation, and the role of the government in addressing the issue. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

### Ogoniland: Remediating a Troubled Region

Conflict Briefing: June 2017




This briefing outlines the remediation of Ogoniland, a region in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. It details the background and current significance of the issue, the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation, and the role of the government in addressing the issue. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

**Background**

Ogoniland is a region in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, that has been severely affected by oil pollution. It details the background and current significance of the issue, the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation, and the role of the government in addressing the issue. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

### Conflict Briefing: Rise in Communal Conflict and Gang Violence in Cross River State

August 2017



This briefing outlines the rise in communal conflict and gang violence in Cross River State, Nigeria. It details the background and current significance of the issue, the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation, and the role of the government in addressing the issue. The briefing also discusses the impact of the 2015 general elections on the situation and provides recommendations for addressing the issue.

**Figure 1: Trends in Conflict Incidents and Fatalities in Cross River (Q1 2009-Q3 2017)**

Year	Communal Violence	Gang Violence
2009	10	5
2010	15	10
2011	20	15
2012	25	20
2013	30	25
2014	35	30
2015	40	35
2016	45	40
2017	50	45


**Conflict Trackers (Monthly and Quarterly)**

Data from the map is regularly aggregated in the form of monthly and quarterly Conflict Trackers, which are used by the P4P Chapters, PREVENT Committees, and others in their conflict assessment and mitigation planning workshops. The Conflict Trackers provide a background of the main issues affecting peace and security in each of the nine Niger Delta states. In addition to highlighting the main patterns and trends observed, they also detail specific incidents that have occurred at the LGA level. The Conflict Trackers also provide a prognosis of what was observed during the given time period and

suggest potential recommendations for deescalating or mitigating the identified conflict triggers. The Conflict Trackers also list questions to consider in the analysis of the current conflict dynamics, including any data or significant information that may not be reflected in the publication. Overall, the Conflict Trackers aim to encourage local analysts to consider possible Peace Agents who are able and willing to intervene as well as potential short-, medium-, and long-term strategies to mitigate the conflict drivers. Data used to generate the Conflict Trackers comes from the Peace Map as well as through the IPDU SMS Early Warning Platform.

**AUTOMATED ALERTS**

Figure 2.4



**Policy Briefs**

In addition to the monthly and quarterly Conflict Trackers, PIND also produces periodic Policy Briefs to inform local, national and international stakeholders of key issues and themes arising from PIND’s research and data analysis. The Policy Briefs also utilise multiple data sets and information sources and allow for a deeper level of analysis than is possible with Conflict Trackers, often employing Key Informant Interviews to gain more insight into the issue being explored. PIND Policy Briefs often contain recommendations or suggested ways forward based on that analysis for consideration by stakeholders who have an interest in generating more informed or targeted policies, as well as those who have a mandate to respond. Although Policy Briefs are not produced on a set time schedule like the Conflict Trackers, they intend to inform stakeholders of key issues for monitoring and, if warranted, early response and are thus produced regularly throughout the year. Some topics covered in past Policy Briefs include: an analysis of the current crisis in Ogoniland; the security and social implications of the growing phenomenon of street children in Calabar State; the resurgence of the

pro-Biafra independence movement; the interrelated and reinforcing dynamics behind the new wave of militancy in the Niger Delta; an analysis of rising communal tensions in Delta State; the growing wave of cult violence in Rivers State; as well as special election-related briefs.

**Automated Alerts**

Finally, in order to keep Peace Agents informed about the current and changing dynamics in each state, the Peace Map has an automated alert function that sends emails to Peace Agents in states where spikes in violence and/or fatalities are reported (see Figure 2.4). These alerts allow Peace Agents to not only monitor the current situation on the ground, but also can help inform whether a particular mitigation strategy is working to deescalate conflict dynamics, or whether a different approach might be warranted.

**CHAPTER ENDNOTES**

- 1. CIEPD URL located at: <https://ciepdwc.crowdmap.com/>

## PART II: OPERATOR’S INSTRUCTIONS

A Step-by-Step Guide to Coding, Formatting and Uploading Data to the PIND Peace Map

**EXAMPLE EXCEL SHEET WITH DATA CODED FOR UPLOADING TO PIND PEACE MAP**

Figure 2.5

Source	Event Date	Latitude	Longitude	Sub-Indicator 1	Sub-Indicator 2	Sub-Indicator 3	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3	State	Country	Geo-level 1	Geo-level 2	Details
ACLED	10/01/2017	11.84644	13.16027							Borno	Nigeria	Maidugi	Maidugi	The Bama Initiative fo
ACLED	10/01/2017	7.43780	5.89870							Ondo	Nigeria	Akoko S	Isua	Ondo State police forc
ACLED	10/02/2017	12.10000	13.70000							Borno	Nigeria	Mafa	Mafa	No fewer than four so
ACLED	10/03/2017	7.15000	3.35000							Ogun	Nigeria	Abeokut	Abeokut	Students of Moshood
ACLED	10/04/2017	11.52210	13.68558							Borno	Nigeria	Bama	Bama	Military forces kill fou
ACLED	10/04/2017	6.44258	7.50220							Enugu	Nigeria	Enugu E	Enugu	A suspected thief is be
ACLED	10/04/2017	13.09778	7.22250							Katsina	Nigeria	Jibia	Jibia	Three suspected robbi
ACLED	10/05/2017	6.45306	3.39583							Lagos	Nigeria	Lagos Isl	Lagos	NLC airline workers pr
ACLED	10/05/2017	7.80236	6.74301							Kogi	Nigeria	Lokoja	Lokoja	Gunmen kidnap a ma
ACLED	10/05/2017	4.80754	6.97380							Rivers	Nigeria	Obia/AK	Mgbuos	Gunmen (suspected 'c
ACLED	10/06/2017	11.52210	13.68558							Borno	Nigeria	Bama	Bama	Military forces neutral
ACLED	10/06/2017	4.77742	7.01340							Rivers	Nigeria	Port-Har	Port Har	Hundreds of NDNyla
ACLED	10/06/2017	9.08333	7.53333							Federal Ca	Nigeria	Abuja M	Abuja	NLC holds a demonst
ACLED	10/06/2017	11.84644	13.16027							Borno	Nigeria	Maidugi	Maidugi	Islamic State claims to
ACLED	10/08/2017	11.50320	11.93670							Yobe	Nigeria	Gujba	Gujba	Military forces kills a E
ACLED	10/08/2017	12.54148	13.77661							Borno	Nigeria	Mongun	Madari	Military forces kill thre
ACLED	10/08/2017	7.62100	5.22150							Ekiti	Nigeria	Ado Ekit	Ado-Ekit	Students of a Polytech
ACLED	10/09/2017	9.08333	7.53333							Federal Ca	Nigeria	Abuja M	Abuja	Indigenes of Edo State
ACLED	10/09/2017	7.62100	5.22150							Ekiti	Nigeria	Ado Ekit	Ado-Ekit	NURTW protesters enj

### DATA CODING

Figure 2.5 is an example of an Excel sheet with data coded for uploading to the PIND Peace Map. While PIND utilises “Incident

Reports,” as described in the above section, the term can mean any incident or detailed description of an event. A “data source code” designates which source or dataset that the information is coming from (i.e. ACLED, Nigeria Watch, P4P SMS, etc.).

### CODING DATA — PART I

1. Copy and paste the main incident report (description of incident) in the ‘Details’ column.
2. Enter the data source code (e.g. P4P SMS, ACLED) in the ‘Source’ column and draw down auto-fill the other columns.
3. Enter the date of incident as provided in the report in the ‘Event Date’ column. This is the date the incident occurred and not when it was reported. Ensure that they are written in the mm/dd/yyyy format.
4. Enter the geographical coordinates of the incident in the ‘Longitude’ and ‘Latitude’ column as provided in the report.
5. Enter the state and country where the incident happened into the ‘State’ and ‘Country’ columns.
6. Indicate the local government area (LGA) where the incident occurred in the ‘Geo-Level 1’ column.
7. Indicate the place (town or community) where the incident occurred in the ‘Geo-Level 2’ column.
8. Indicate number of fatalities in the incident report in the ‘Fatalities’ column.

Once the details of each incident report (Details, Data Source, Event Data, Longitude/Latitude, Town/LGA/State/Country, and Fatalities) have been entered into the appropriate column, the next step is to

code the incident according to specified indicators/sub-indicators. Each incident can be coded with up to three indicators and three sub-indicators.

**CODING DATA — PART II**

9. Begin with indicator 1, then sub-indicator 1.
10. Then indicator 2 and sub-indicator 2, and indicator 3 and sub-indicator 3, if applicable.

- There are 8 indicator categories (see list below), then different sub-indicators fall under each of these:
  - Demographic Pressures
  - Refugees/IDPs
  - Economic Pressures
  - Group Grievance/Collective Violence
  - Insecurity
  - Governance/Legitimacy
  - Public Services
  - Human Rights

Spread out the three categories across as many Indicators as possible. For instance, if you can choose between two Group Grievance categories, or a Group Grievance and a Governance category, select the latter. For example:

	E	F	G	H	I	J
LONG/TITLE	Sub-indicator 1	Sub-indicator 2	Sub-indicator 3	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3
Shootings/Kill				Insecurity		
Abductions						
Terrorism						
Vigilante/Mot						
Violent Protes						
Armed Clashes						
Abuses by Pul						
Arms Prolifera						

	F	G	H	I	J
Indicator 1	Sub-indicator 2	Sub-indicator 3	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3
			Demographic		
			Refugees/IDP		
			Economic Pre		
			Group Grieva		
			Insecurity		
			Governance/L		
			Public Service		
			Human Right		

	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
LONG/TITLE	Sub-indicator 1	Sub-indicator 2	Sub-indicator 3	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3	State	Country	Geo-level 1	Geo-level 2	Details	Summary	Fatalities	Region	Line/Distributor	Secondary Source	Notes
Shootings/Kill	Domestic Vio	Child Abuse	Insecurity	Insecurity	Human Right	Lagos	Nigeria	Ojo	Ajangba	2 male corpses of	Reported: 2 male corpses of newly born	2					Repo
Shootings/Kill	Crime		Insecurity	Insecurity		Plateau	Nigeria	Mangu	Kaduna	2 students of the F	Reported: 2 students of the Faculty of H	2					Repo
Shootings/Kill	Crime		Insecurity	Insecurity		Anambra	Nigeria	Idemili	Our Line	A 24-year-old boy w	Reported: A 24-year-old boy was shot d	1					Repo
Shootings/Kill	Crime		Insecurity	Insecurity		Lagos	Nigeria	Ojo	Ifufe jun	A 23-year-old trade	Reported: A 23-year-old trader was kill	1					Repo
Shootings/Killings			Insecurity			Benue	Nigeria	Gboko	Staff que	Dr. Aondoso Tono	Reported: A lecturer with the University	1					Repo
Shootings/Killings			Insecurity			Ogun	Nigeria	Ijebu No	Awa Are	A man, Victor Olatu	Reported: A man was murdered by a tra	1					Repo
Shootings/Kill	Abuses by Public Security		Insecurity	Insecurity		Rivers	Nigeria	Port-Hari	Port-Hari	A policeman attach	Reported: A policeman attached to a n	2					Repo
Shootings/Kill	Gender-base	Domestic Vio	Insecurity	Human Right	Insecurity	Oyo	Nigeria	Ibadan	Sango-Ai	A 19-year-old unde	Reported: A 19-year-old undergraduate	1					Repo
Shootings/Kill	Riots/Protes	Land Compet	Insecurity	Governance/	Demographic	Rogt	Nigeria	Ofu	Umomi	Two were shot dead by policemen when youths were protesting the arrest and detention of some residents, including a retired police	These people were arrested after some Fulani herdsmen reported that their cows had been killed by some of the residents.						
Shootings/Kill	Domestic Vio	Domestic Vio	Insecurity	Insecurity	Human Right	Edo	Nigeria	Esan Nor	Uromi								

- For fatalities due to violence, always put 'Insecurity' > 'Shootings/Killings' as Indicator/Sub-indicator 1
- Do not code fatalities due to natural disasters, accidents, or disease as Shootings/Killings

	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
LONG/TITLE	Sub-indicator 1	Sub-indicator 2	Sub-indicator 3	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3	State	Country	Geo-level 1	Geo-level 2	Details	Summary	Fatalities	Region
Shootings/Kill	Ethnic/Religio	Inter-Commun	Insecurity	Group Grievan	Group Grievan	Kaduna	Nigeria	Jemaa	Kafanch					
Shootings/Killings			Insecurity			Abia	Nigeria	Isiala-N	Ura Nta	After attacking the previous week, unidentified gunmen regroup and				
Shootings/Kill	Insurgency/Co	Terrorism	Insecurity	Group Grievan	Insecurity	Borno	Nigeria	Maidugi	Maidugi	again attack Uratta Umuoha, killing three.				

- After prioritizing shootings/killings, identify if there are any group-based factors in the incident. If so, please code under the relevant sub-indicator for "Group Grievance/Collective Violence." For example:

Shootings/Kill	Inter-Communa	Tension or Vi	Insecurity	Group Grievance/Collective V	Delta	Nigeria	Ndakwa	Emu-Ebe						
Shootings/Kill	Ethnic/Religio	Inter-Commun	Insecurity	Group Grievan	Group Grievan	Kaduna	Nigeria	Jemaa	Kafanch	Fulanis attack Goska, near Kafanchan over two days, killing eleven.				

**KEY CODING RULES AND TIPS**

- Remove names and other confidential information from the incident description to ensure confidentiality.
- Correct misspellings and typographical errors. This is especially important for key word searches on the Peace Map.
- When coding an incident, spread out the indicators in as many categories as possible to capture as many dimensions for each incident as possible.
- Delete duplicate entries when incident descriptions are the same, or when descriptions of the same incident are different. Ensure that all relevant details are integrated into a single incident report.
- Delete irrelevant incidents such as traffic accidents, accidental fire outbreaks, etc.
- Insurgency is not necessarily ‘terrorism’. An incident should only be coded as ‘terrorism’ if civilians are indiscriminately targeted by insurgents in order to create chaos and inflame sectarian violence, e.g. suicide bombings, etc. For example:

Shootings	Ritual Killings	Insecurity	Insecurity		Ogun	Nigeria	Ado-Oti Ijako/CA corpse without	Reported: A corpse without a head w	1			
Shootings	Sexual Violence	Child Abuse	Insecurity	Human Right	Human Right	Rivers	Nigeria	Port-Harcourt A kiosk owner d	Reported: A kiosk owner defiled a 10-	1		
Shootings	Tension or Violence	Intimidation	Insecurity	Group Griev	Governance	Oyo	Nigeria	Egbedi Alakia A member of Oyo	Reported: A member of Oyo State Ho	1		
Shootings	Terrorism	Insurgency	Insecurity	Insecurity	Group Griev	Borno	Nigeria	Dambc Mosqu A Boko Haram s	Reported: A Boko Haram suicide bomber blew up himself at a mosque, killing 6 worshippers and others. It was reported that the attack happened in the early hours of the day when worshippers were in the mosque.	1		
Shootings	Terrorism	Insurgency	Insecurity	Insecurity	Group Griev	Borno	Nigeria	Dambc Dambc 2 male suicide b	Reported: A middle aged man, Puga	1		
Shootings	Terrorism	Insurgency	Insecurity	Insecurity	Group Griev	Borno	Nigeria	Askira, Dile vii A man, identifi	Reported: An armed robber was set a	1		
Shootings	Vigilante	Crime	Insecurity	Insecurity	Insecurity	Benue	Nigeria	Ukum Kundey 5 members of a	Reported: 5 members of a Civilian Tai	5		
Shootings	Vigilante	Crime	Insecurity	Insecurity	Insecurity	Benue	Nigeria	Ukum Atso vi A middle aged	Reported: A middle aged man, Puga	1		
Shootings	Vigilante	Crime	Insecurity	Insecurity	Insecurity	Delta	Nigeria	Uvwie isoko (An armed robber	Reported: An armed robber was set a	1		
Shootings	Vigilante	Crime	Insecurity	Insecurity	Insecurity	Delta	Nigeria	isoko s Emede A mob set a sus	Reported: A mob set a suspected ar	1		
Shootings	Vigilante	Crime	Insecurity	Insecurity	Insecurity	Imo	Nigeria	Owerri Umezu An angry mob b	Reported: An angry mob burnt 2 unid	2		
Crime	Vigilante	Mob Justice	Insecurity	Insecurity		Lagos	Nigeria	Ifako-I Orobiji A 22-year-old ta	Reported: A 22-year-old tailor slump	1		
Shootings	Vigilante	Mob Justice	Insecurity	Insecurity		Lagos	Nigeria	Ikorod Ibese An angry mob ca	Reported: An angry mob caught a m	1		

- Note that for the sake of this framework “Gang Violence” is nested within the broader category of Group Grievance. As such, incidents coded as Gang Violence should not refer to any and all interpersonal or criminal incidents perpetrated by a gang member, but rather an incident of explicitly group-based violence, such as a clash between “cult groups,” “hoodlums,” or “thugs,” usually over supremacy or gang wars, etc.

14	Nigeria	7/30/2016	Insurgency	Vigilante	Crime	Insecurity	Insecurity	Insecurity	Democr	Nigeria	Okorin Kofe A 2 members of a	Reported: 2 members of a Civilian Tai	2		
15	Nigeria	7/30/2016	Shootings	Domestic Violence	Child Abuse	Insecurity	Insecurity	Human Right		Akwa Ibom	Nigeria	Ikot Abi Ikot Abi A 2-year-old girl	Reported: A 2-year-old girl was killed	1	
16	Nigeria	8/1/2016	Shootings	Land Comp	Inter-Comm	Insecurity		Demograph	Group Griev	Adamawa	Nigeria	Demse Kodum			
17	Nigeria	7/29/2016	Shootings	Gang Violence		Insecurity		Group Grievance	Collect	Lagos	Nigeria	Ikorod 24 Ros	As cult members attacked a community, 4 people were killed including a 63-year-old native doctor, identified as Rasheed Yusuf, aka Low Banger his wife Falilat, and a 2-year-old girl. Kehinde were shot and survive the attack, Yusuf Cisco and Lukman Apetu, who were returning from work on a motorcycle were killed also a yet to be identified	4	
18	Nigeria	7/29/2016	Shootings	Plots/Protes	Education	Insecurity		Governance	Public Servi	Nasarawa	Nigeria	Lafia Lafia			
19	Nigeria	7/29/2016	Shootings	Insurgency	Arms Prolif	Insecurity		Group Griev	Insecurity	Borno	Nigeria	Gwoza Pulka,	Reported: A Mathematics teacher of	1	
20	Nigeria	7/28/2016	Shootings	Gang Violence		Insecurity		Group Grievance	Collect	Benue	Nigeria	Makun Arounc	Reported: A pregnant woman was kill	1	
21	Nigeria	7/28/2016	Shootings	Insurgency	Counter-Insu	Insecurity		Group Grievance	Collect	Ogun	Nigeria	Obaferi Arepo resident.	Reported: 2 policemen were killed an	2	
22	Nigeria	7/28/2016	Shootings	Abductions	Vigilante	Insecurity		Insecurity	Insecurity	Benue	Nigeria	Gboko Gboko A kidnapper wh	Reported: A kidnapper who abducte	1	
23	Nigeria	7/28/2016	Shootings	Abductions	Ritual Killing	Insecurity		Insecurity	Insecurity	Kaduna	Nigeria	Igabi Dani N 5 ritualists abdu	Reported: 5 ritualists abducted and k	1	
24	Nigeria	7/28/2016	Shootings	Crime		Insecurity		Insecurity		Sokoto	Nigeria	Sokoto Yauri f A Mathematics	Reported: A Mathematics teacher of	1	
25	Nigeria	7/28/2016	Shootings	Inter-Comm	Gender-bas	Insecurity		Group Griev	Human Right	Zamfara	Nigeria	Maru Kanom A pregnant wom	Reported: A pregnant woman was kill	1	
26	Nigeria	7/27/2016	Shootings	Armed Clash		Insecurity		Insecurity		Lagos	Nigeria	Alimos Igando 2 policemen we	Reported: 2 policemen were killed an	2	
27	Nigeria	7/28/2016	Shootings	Violent Protest	Crackdown	Insecurity		Insecurity		Nasarawa	Nigeria	Lafia Lafia/2 students of Na	Reported: 2 students of Nasarawa St	2	

- If a child dies during a clash/insecurity, code as child abuse in addition to other relevant indicators.
- Allegations of abuses by public security forces do not necessarily amount to coding as ‘Security Forces Abuse’ – an incident should only be coded as ‘Security Forces Abuse’ if the report indicated that the perpetrator had been convicted of the crime.
- “Crime” should not be over-used. An incident should only be coded as ‘Crime’ if the violence is neither group based (political, communal, sectarian, insurgent) nor inter-personal (domestic dispute, argument, etc.).

### FORMATTING AND UPLOADING CODED DATA ONTO PEACE MAP

Once the data has been properly coded, it is now ready to be formatted and uploaded to the Peace Map.

1. Review and clean coded data to correct any misspellings and typos and remove any confidential information.
2. Ensure the date is in the right format (mm/dd/yyyy). Often incidents are reported with British date format (dd/mm/yyyy). All dates must be in the United States format (mm/dd/yyyy) and must be consistent, otherwise it will not be searchable on the Peace Map.
3. Format the 'Summary' column in the coding template using the formula '=V2&O2'. This is to ensure that each incident report is preceded by 'Reported'. (See screenshot below).
4. Copy the coded data and 'Paste Special' on the Peace Map 'Data Master Sheet'.
5. Color fill the pasted data in the 'Master Sheet'.

	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
1	Sub-indicator 2	Sub-indicator 3	Indicator 1	Indicator 2	Indicator 3	State	Country	Geo-level 1	Geo-level 2	Details	Summary	Fatality
2			Governance/Legitimacy			Borno	Nigeria	Maidugi	Maidugi	The Bama Initiative for Human	Reported: The Bama Initiative for Human	0
3	Inter-Insurgency		Group Grievance/Collective Violence			Ondo	Nigeria	Akoko Si	Isua	Ondo State police forces arrest a	Reported: Ondo State police forces arrest a	0
4	Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency		Insecurity	Group Grievance/Collective Violence		Borno	Nigeria	Mafa	Mafa	No fewer than four soldiers of O	Reported: No fewer than four soldiers of O	4
5	Education System		Governance/Legitimacy	Public Services		Ogun	Nigeria	Abeokuta	Abeokuta	Students of Moshood Abiola Poly	Reported: Students of Moshood Abiola Poly	0
6	Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency		Insecurity	Group Grievance/Collective Violence		Borno	Nigeria	Bama	Bama	Military forces kill four members	Reported: Military forces kill four members	4
7	Vigilante/Mob Justice		Insecurity	Insecurity		Enugu	Nigeria	Enugu E	Enugu	A suspected thief is beaten to de	Reported: A suspected thief is beaten to de	1
8	Vigilante/Mob Justice		Insecurity	Insecurity		Katsina	Nigeria	Jibia	Jibia	Three suspected robbers were ly	Reported: Three suspected robbers were ly	3
9			Governance/Legitimacy			Lagos	Nigeria	Lagos Isl	Lagos	NLC airline workers protest at La	Reported: NLC airline workers protest at La	0
10			Insecurity			Kogi	Nigeria	Lokoja	Lokoja	Gunmen kidnap a magistrate ne	Reported: Gunmen kidnap a magistrate ne	0
11	Crime		Insecurity	Insecurity		Rivers	Nigeria	Obia/Ak	Mgbuos	Gunmen (suspected 'cultists') ha	Reported: Gunmen (suspected 'cultists') ha	2
12	Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency		Insecurity	Group Grievance/Collective Violence		Borno	Nigeria	Bama	Bama	Military forces neutralize two m	Reported: Military forces neutralize two m	2
13			Governance/Legitimacy			Rivers	Nigeria	Port-Har	Port Har	Hundreds of NDNYLA protesters	Reported: Hundreds of NDNYLA protesters s	0
14			Governance/Legitimacy			Federal Ca	Nigeria	Abuja M	Abuja	NLC holds a demonstration agai	Reported: NLC holds a demonstration agai	0


6. Sort the new data by column 'F' and 'G' (Indicator 2 and Indicator 3) respectively and put a dash (-) in all empty spaces.
7. Sort all the data in the 'Master Sheet' by 'Geo-Level 1' and 'Geo-Level 2' (State and LGA) then scroll down to ensure that the spelling of the locations is consistent.

3014	12.58979	6.57791	Riots/Protest	Education Sys	-	Governance/	Public Services	Zamfara	Nigeria	Kaura-Nan	Kaura Nan	Staff at Fe	Reported: Sta	0	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3015	11.911603	6.953854	Shootings	-	-	Insecurity	-	Zamfara	Nigeria	Tsafe	Magazu vi	A hunter,	Reported:	1	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3016	11.911603	6.953854	Shootings/Kill	Inter-Commu	-	Insecurity	Group Grieva	Zamfara	Nigeria	Tsafe	Yan Ware	3 vigilante	Reported: 3 v	3	Northeast	crime, po	Reported:
3017	11.911603	6.953854	Shootings/Kill	Land Compet	-	Insecurity	Demographic	Zamfara	Nigeria	Tsafe	Yanware	29 people	Reported: 29	29	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3018			Shootings/Kill	Crime	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Zamfara	Nigeria	Maru	Maru	The corps	Reported: Th	1	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3019	11.95527	6.92232	Shootings/Kill	Crime	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Zamfara	Nigeria	Tsafe	Chafe	Unidentifi	Reported: Un	2	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3020	12.16278	6.66135	Labor Strikes	-	-	Economic Pre	-	Zamfara	Nigeria	Gusau	Gusau	Nigerian L	Reported: Nig	0	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3021			Shootings/Kill	Abductions	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Zamfara	Nigeria	Tsafe	Keta Divisi	2 civilians	Reported: 2 c	2	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3022			Shootings/Kill	Abuses by Pu	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Zamfara	Nigeria	Gummi	Gummi	Extra Judic	Reported: Ext	1	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3023			Shootings/Kill	Crime	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Zamfara	Nigeria	Tsafe	Tsafe	Federal Rd	Reported: Fed	2	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3024			Shootings/Kill	Domestic Vio	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Abia	Nigeria	Isiala-Ngw	Umuokiri	TA couple	Reported: A c	2	Niger Delt	crime	Reported:
3025			Shootings/Kill	Crime	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Abia	Nigeria	Aba South	Iheorji	4 persons	Reported: 4 p	4	Niger Delt	crime	Reported:
3026			Shootings/Kill	Vigilante/Mo	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Abia	Nigeria	Bende	Alayi	A middle-	Reported: A m	1	Niger Delt	crime	Reported:
3027			Shootings/Kill	Insurgency/C	Terrorism	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Adamawa	Nigeria	Madgali	Magar villi	2 female B2	2	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3028			Shootings/Kill	Abuses by Pu	Vigilante/Mo	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Adamawa	Nigeria	Girei	Digino villi	2 Police In	2	Northeast	crime	Reported:
3029			Shootings/Kill	Abuses by Pu	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Akwai Ibor	Nigeria	Uyo	Godswill #5	football	Reported: 5 f	5	Niger Delt	political is	Reported:
3030			Shootings/Kill	Domestic Vio	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Akwai Ibor	Nigeria	Uyo	Eda Stree	A woman	Reported: A w	1	Niger Delt	crime	Reported:
3031			Shootings/Kill	Crime	Child Abuse	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Anambra	Nigeria	Idemili No	Eziwelle	A man has	1	South Cen	crime	Reported:
3032			Shootings/Kill	Abductions	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Anambra	Nigeria	Idemili No	Obosi	2 kidnapp	Reported: 2 k	2	South Cen	crime	Reported:
3033			Shootings/Kill	Abuses by Pu	-	Insecurity	Insecurity	Anambra	Nigeria	Idemili No	Tarzan Jun	2 persons	Reported: 2 p	2	South Cen	crime	Reported:

8. Sort all the data in the 'Master Sheet' by 'State' and enter the 'Region' for the data (e.g. 'Niger Delta', 'Northeast', 'Southwest' etc.).
9. Again, sort all the data in the 'Master Sheet' by 'Cell Color', then copy the color filled data and 'Paste Special' in a new Excel document.
10. Save the new Excel document as 'Text (Tab delimited)', and then upload onto the Peace Map platform.

## GENDER MAINSTREAMING TIPS

- Data is coded according to relevant gender specific indicators and sub-indicators.
- Ensure that perpetrators and victims are disaggregated by gender and age.
- Ensure that identifiers such as ‘women’, ‘girl’, ‘sister’, daughter’, ‘lady’ etc., are included in the incident description. (e.g. instead of “Physical assault by her husband” add “Physical assault of a woman by her husband”. This will help them be picked up during VAWG filter on the Peace Map. When there are things like “step mum” change to “step mother”



- Code as ‘Gender-based Human Rights Violations’ for instances related to economic disempowerment – for example when a woman is financially disenfranchised by her family or husband.
- If a woman is a victim of violence it shouldn’t be automatically coded as “gender-based violence,” unless she was targeted because of her gender. For example, if a woman was killed in the cross fire of communal violence, it doesn’t mean that she was specifically targeted for her gender (though it helps to shed light on the impacts of collective violence on women and girls, which could come out during a later analysis phase). In this case you may not code it as gender based violence. By contrast, incidents of rape, defilement or domestic violence or other violence specifically targeting a person for their gender should be coded as such.
- For incidents of child abuse, always try to specify male or female when possible in the incident description. If the victim is under 18, always code as ‘child abuse’.

## GENERATING AUTOMATED ALERTS ON THE PEACE MAP

As noted above, PIND produces Automated Alerts to over 400 Peace Agents registered on the map to alert them of changing levels of conflict risk based on spikes in fatalities or incidents. The Peace Map platform calculates the change in fatalities from one month to the next within the search parameters, and if there is an increase of more than 10 fatalities in a given LGA *and* over 10% increase in fatalities *or* incidents, it is flagged as a spike. Based on this calculation, if the operator wants to send an automated alert:

1. Click on “Send Email” on the Peace Map Platform Display
2. Compose text of email stating the salient details and calling for constructive response
3. Hit “Send” to distribute email to all registered Peace Agents on the Platform.



# DATA ANALYSIS FOR EARLY WARNING

## PART I: THE APPROACH

The essential first step in conducting a comprehensive analysis of early warning data for early response is ensuring the proper research design that will guide the process. According to Anol Bhattacharjee in *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices*: “Research design is a comprehensive plan for data collection in an empirical research project. It is a ‘blueprint’ for empirical research aimed at answering specific research questions or testing specific hypotheses, and must specify at least three processes: (1) the data collection process, (2) the instrument development process, and (3) the sampling process.”<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, a research design checklist that flows from the essential components of setting up an experiment to conducting an experiment guides PIND’s early warning and response model.


Even if the researcher may be familiar with the environment and has a strong inclination or “hunch” as to what may be driving a conflict dynamic or trigger, or the factors underlying a structural vulnerability, it is crucial that this process of research design be undertaken each and every time an early warning product is to be produced. This is even more important when a researcher is very familiar with the conflict environment, as they may be vulnerable to making assumptions or susceptible to bias that may lead to overlooking certain aspects or elements critical to the analysis.

Although research design does need to be thought through carefully before any early warning product is produced, it need not necessarily be too time consuming, particularly when the product is extremely time-sensitive. However, the principles and practices are not optional.

### ENHANCING THE PROCESS OF EARLY WARNING ANALYSIS TO RESPONSE

Figure 3.1





## SCOPING AND DESKTOP RESEARCH

### Data Optimization for Quantitative Analysis

Data is the fuel that powers an early warning/early response system; without access to sufficient data, even the most sophisticated systems cannot effectively shed light on mitigating options or realistic targets. An effective early response to conflict begins with the collection of raw data which is then triangulated and integrated into the early warning system. Once the raw data has been processed into the system, early warning practitioners can utilise quantitative analysis to inform joint planning sessions that formulate recommendations for interventions. Finally, it is critical that any early response system also include mechanisms for conducting an after-action review to provide feedback to improve the system.

The efficient operation of this system requires not only sufficient quantity of data, but adequate quality of data as well. Furthermore, the degree to which the data is representative (by time, theme, and location) it must also be evaluated in order to ensure proper


interpretation and of the findings with scope and limitations clearly and transparently articulated. Thus an optimised early warning/early response system starts with practices that ensure both the high quality of the individual incident reports collected as well as a representative distribution of those reports if they are going to be used for trends or comparisons.

## SCOPING SURVEYS AND STAKEHOLDER NETWORK ANALYSIS

Ideally, after the identification of hotspots, patterns and trends through the use of quantitative datasets, the next step of any integrated research process should include a sampling of the target populations and stakeholders in the area(s) of interest who are working to mitigate the identified risks and vulnerabilities. This will also allow for a more targeted intervention strategy; facilitating understanding of where the key nodes of influence are in the society, how various actors interact (or do not interact) and where leverage points might exist that would not otherwise be apparent.

EXAMPLE STAKEHOLDER NETWORK ANALYSIS MAP

Figure 3.3



Deploying a scoping survey to identified actors in a target area is crucial in gathering local perceptions on potential conflict risks and vulnerabilities that have been identified. Based on information from the data, questions can be developed to elicit more information on known and identified conflict risks or triggers such as elections, pastoral-based or land disputes, or a controversial new piece of legislation. Vulnerabilities in the system — such as a history of ethnic-based polarization, gender disparities, the perception of endemic institutional corruption, etc. — can also be further fleshed out in a scoping survey. In addition, questions about societal resiliencies, or coping mechanisms, can also be added to a scoping survey or may become apparent through the answers to targeted questions about risk or vulnerabilities. Finally, through the use of targeted questions in a scoping survey asking respondents about partnerships, the researcher can begin to understand relationships that can be mapped and leveraged through the use of a Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA).

As described in Chapter 2: “SNA is a method employed to better understand social networks and determine where there might be leverage points, spheres of influence or social capital that can be used for early warning and response.” After sending out the scoping survey to all identified stakeholders who work on issues related to conflict

early warning and response in the target area of interest and asking with whom they each have partnered, information is then uploaded to a SNA platform (for example, Kumu) and quantitatively analysed to determine which organisations are best positioned to play the role of conveners (high “betweenness”), implementers (high “eigenvector”) or communicators (high “reach”).

For both donors and implementers, an SNA can also allow the researcher to identify potential gaps that need to be filled (e.g. roles, capacities, skills) and determine the ideal mix of grantees, respondents, partners, beneficiaries, or stakeholders to be targeted for engagement and/or potential intervention. An SNA can be an invaluable tool for identifying actors who may fall outside the more well-known networks or be based away from capital cities.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF AN HIGH QUALITY INCIDENT REPORT**

Creating an effective early warning/early response system begins with ensuring that the data collected is both accurate and usable. The use of a consistent reporting format is also necessary to ensure optimal early warning. An effective incident report format, utilised by trained observers and reporters, can greatly enhance the efficiency of an early

## PIND PRE-PRODUCTION CHECKLIST

Prior to the production of any PIND product, whether a monthly or quarterly tracker or a policy brief, PIND research staff begin by reviewing the following sets of questions:

1. What is our activity/project/brief seeking to accomplish?
2. What do we need to know to better accomplish it?
  - What is the broad research question?
  - How do different people think about the research question? (Checking assumptions)
  - Scoping (Stakeholder/Social Network Analysis)
3. Identify Research Structure, Framework
  - What are the key themes?
  - How do we approach and measure the research question?
  - What indicators could be relevant to the structure of the themes (Do we draw on existing frameworks or create a new one)?
4. What are the tools in PIND's toolbox? What is not in the toolbox?
  - Regarding the research question, framework, and indicators: What sources of information are available (i.e. people, pre-existing data sets available, software platforms)?
  - What are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing resources?
  - What are the characteristics of the data sets available? (Identify the sources of data, their individual strengths and weaknesses, and identify gaps and outline the approach to filling those gaps)
5. Information collection, organization and archiving
  - What are the processes for obtaining and organizing the information?
  - How to systematise the approach to data collection (i.e. methods for collecting, coding, formatting and archiving data sets)?

warning system. A suboptimal system will require significant effort by the operators of the early warning system before any usable trends or patterns can be identified. At the level of the individual incident report, for it to be useable, it must be timely and consistent, clear, specific, concise, and relevant:

### *Timeliness and Consistency*

The key to an effective early warning system is the ability to detect trends in conflict before they escalate. Achieving this 'early warning' requires timely reporting of the incidents. Incident reports should be made as close to when the actual incidents occur, with reports ideally being delivered within days of the event occurring.<sup>2</sup> It is important to acknowledge however that the earliest reports of a conflict are oftentimes the most inaccurate reports as well. Reports should be delivered as soon as the source determines that credible information is available about the details of the incident. Additionally, it is important that reports are consistent in their format and language, to avoid delays or inaccuracies due to the early warning system operator misinterpreting the data provided in the report.<sup>3</sup>

### *Clarity*

In order to contribute to an effective early warning, incident reports should clearly convey exactly what happened and who was involved. It is perfectly acceptable to present this information in summary form, rather than writing a complete narrative. The critical element is that the person reading the incident report can quickly and clearly identify the salient details of the incident, answering the empirical questions who, what, where, and when.


### *Specificity*

The timing, location, and sequencing of events can be critical in providing an early warning and formulating an early response. For this reason, the more specific and precise that a report can be, the better. Rather than merely reporting the LGA where the incident occurred, include details about the community, and if possible, where within the community the incident occurred (for example, in the market area, or a central plaza). Additionally, details about the time of an event can provide important clues for an early warning system, therefore it is important to be as precise as possible when reporting the time of incidents, even if the exact time is unknown (for example, "about 9pm on Saturday" or "on Saturday evening," rather than "on Saturday").

### *Concision*

A well-functioning early warning system will have a high volume of data to process. Maintaining a smooth and effective operation of the system requires its operators to process that information quickly.

**GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PIND'S INCIDENT REPORTS (JANUARY 2009-AUGUST 2017)** *Figure 3.4*



This task is significantly easier to achieve when the incident report is free of extraneous data. Optimal incident reports should contain only the details of the incident (time, location, actions, and participants) and brief analysis highlighting the relevance of the incident to conflict risk and vulnerabilities in the region. Again, it is perfectly acceptable to present this information in summary form, rather than drafting a comprehensive narrative. Copying and pasting the text of an entire news article, or writing a lengthy analysis of the incident only slows down the early warning system and hinders the capacity to formulate an early response.

**Relevance**

Given the limited snapshot provided by a concise incident report, it is important for the report to highlight the connections and relevance of the incident to conflict and early warning/early response. The

observer may have unique knowledge or insights about the ties between the incident and conflict that may not otherwise be apparent to someone analysing the data in another location. Sharing these insights, in a concise manner, can be critical to helping early warning analysts understand and prioritize the data contained in incidents reports.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF AN OPTIMAL EARLY WARNING DATA SET**

High quality incident reports are not sufficient for effective early warning. The data set as a whole needs to be optimal. However, an early warning data set does not need to be exhaustive to be useful. Rather, it is more important to ensure the representativeness of the data set in regard to the comparisons or trends you are trying to estimate from the data. For example, a dataset that only covered homicides reported in police reports in a particular city may provide insight into patterns and trends of violent criminality within that city. However, it may miss out on early warning signs for larger conflict trends within the region. In this example, the limitations on representativeness of the data need to be recognized for proper interpretation of that data. If your research question was broader than the city in question, you would need to qualify your findings or, where possible, layer additional data sets to fill gaps.

The incident reports contained within an optimal early warning data

**OPTIMIZATION PROCESS OF INCIDENT REPORTS LEADING TO REPRESENTATIVE DATA SET**

*Figure 3.3*



set should accurately represent the trends in conflict within the region, even if they do not document every incident that occurred within the region. An optimal early warning data set will be representative of the region through its geographic distribution, content/thematic distribution, and by time period, to effectively derive meaningful patterns and trends.

**Geographic Distribution**

A well-developed data set will accurately represent the distribution of incidents, both at a national and subnational level. Often times, suboptimal early warning data sets can be influenced by the clustering of observers or media sources, over-representing conflict trends in urban areas. Urban centres tend to have more extensive media

**PIND’S CUSTOMISED CONFLICT RISK INDICATORS AND SUB-INDICATORS**

Figure 3.5

<p><b>HUMAN RIGHTS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Child Abuse</li> <li>• Sexual Violence</li> <li>• Media Freedom</li> <li>• Unlawful Arrest</li> <li>• Other Human Rights Violations</li> <li>• Human Trafficking</li> <li>• Domestic Violence</li> <li>• Forced Marriage</li> <li>• Child Abuse — Female</li> <li>• Child Abuse — Male</li> <li>• Gender-Based Human Rights Violations</li> </ul>	<p><b>GROUP GRIEVANCE/COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hate Speech</li> <li>• Ethnic/Religious Tension</li> <li>• Intra-Communal Tension or Violence</li> <li>• Gang Violence</li> <li>• Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency</li> <li>• Separatism</li> <li>• Tension or Violence between Political Groups</li> </ul>	<p><b>INSECURITY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shootings/Killings</li> <li>• Abductions</li> <li>• Terrorism</li> <li>• Vigilante/Mob Justice</li> <li>• Violent Protests/Crackdown</li> <li>• Armed Clashes</li> <li>• Abuses by Public Security Forces</li> <li>• Arms Proliferation</li> <li>• Bank Robberies</li> <li>• Ambushes</li> <li>• Cross-Border Conflict</li> <li>• Crime</li> <li>• Domestic Violence Fatality</li> <li>• Ritual Killings</li> <li>• Attacks on Energy Infrastructure</li> <li>• Piracy</li> </ul>
<p><b>DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Land Competition/Cattle Rustling</li> <li>• Natural Disasters/Drought</li> <li>• Disease Outbreaks</li> <li>• Environmental Degradation</li> <li>• Alcoholism/Narcotic Abuse</li> <li>• Food Crisis</li> </ul>	<p><b>GOVERNANCE/LEGITIMACY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public Security Forces Corruption</li> <li>• Government Corruption</li> <li>• Riots/Protests</li> <li>• Election Irregularities</li> <li>• Intimidation of Political Opponents</li> <li>• Violent Political Rallies</li> <li>• Unresolved/Delayed/Disputed Elections/Impeached Officials</li> </ul>	
<p><b>REFUGEES/IDPs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Displaced by Violence</li> <li>• Displaced by Disaster</li> <li>• Displaced by Land Seizure</li> <li>• General Displacement Issues</li> </ul>	<p><b>PUBLIC SERVICES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health System</li> <li>• Education System</li> <li>• Power Supply</li> <li>• Prison System</li> <li>• Roads/Infrastructure</li> <li>• Water and Sanitation</li> </ul>	<p><b>ECONOMIC PRESSURES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inflation</li> <li>• Unemployment</li> <li>• Poverty</li> <li>• Labor Strikes</li> <li>• Illicit Economy/Corruption</li> <li>• Extortion/Racketeering</li> <li>• Insecurity Hurts Business</li> </ul>

coverage and a more accessible pool of citizens to train as observers, which leads to more comprehensive coverage of incidents occurring in these areas. An optimal data set will accurately represent the trends in conflict occurring in all areas within the region, both urban and rural. Practitioners should review the distribution of the data sources and seek to address any gaps in coverage through targeted trainings of observers or inclusion of new data sources.

### *Content/Thematic Distribution*

An effective early warning data set includes data on a variety of indicators, not just on the lethal violence occurring within the region. Providing an early warning requires analysing data that signals a trend towards conflict before lethal violence breaks out. Early warning data sets should include data covering the full range of social, economic, political, and security risk and vulnerability factors. Additionally, data should take into account the impact of gender on conflict and provide sufficient details to highlight how conflict affects both men and women.

### *Timeliness and Regularity of Reporting*

The timeliness of a data set is key to its use as an early warning mechanism that leads to an effective early response. When information is reported in a timely fashion, it gives response actors time to formulate and deploy an early response to address the conflict before it escalates.<sup>4</sup> While data reported well after incidents have occurred may be useful for post-facto research and in establishing patterns and trends, it does not support an early response that could have prevented conflict from escalating. For these reasons, it is critical that in addition to incidents being reported in a timely fashion, the incident reports are also inputted into the data set in a timely fashion, and that the aggregation of the data set is regularly updated. An effective early warning system should have clearly defined standards for how quickly incident reports must be entered into the data set, and how often the analysis/aggregations of the data set should be updated.

Beyond the timeliness of the reporting, however, the data should also be regular in order to ensure that it is representative across time. Otherwise, there may be spikes in the data that are not reflective of the realities on the ground.

## SOURCES

PIND's integrated early warning system collates data from 10 sources. Data from all the sources are formatted into the Peace Map for triangulation and cross-validation, and to identify areas of correlation and divergence in the data sources. From 2009-2017, the data collected is as follows:

- ACLED (8,484 incidents)
- CIEPD CWC (430 incidents)
- Council on Foreign Relations (2,358 incidents)
- CSS/ETH Zurich (67 incidents)
- NEEWS2015/TMG (300 incidents)
- Nigeria Watch (11,846 incidents)
- NSRP Sources (1,763 incidents)
- P4P SMS (852 incidents)
- UNLOCK (1,216 incidents)
- WANEP Nigeria (456 incidents)

*PIND's Integrated Early Warning Data Sources  
(January 2009-September 2017)*

### *Patterns/Trends*

Following the “garbage in, garbage out” principle<sup>5</sup> (bad input results in bad output), in an optimised data set, the patterns/trends it demonstrates should accurately represent the realities on the ground. If the reports inputted into the data set contain inaccurate information, then the analysis performed on the data set will also reflect those inaccuracies. Measures and steps should be taken to review the accuracy and precision of the data being inputted into the data set. This can include data triangulation to scrutinise the validity of the data contained within a data set.

## DATA TRIANGULATION

Triangulation involves cross-verifying data against other sources, methods, or theoretical approaches to scrutinise the information contained in your dataset.<sup>6</sup> When done correctly, triangulation can both mitigate the weaknesses inherent in any single dataset, and identify additional insights that complement the primary data set. Most importantly, triangulation ensures that the information and trends contained within a data set are adequate for use in quantitative analysis, or to choose to use the data qualitatively if the patterns and

trends cannot be quantified. Data triangulation can be a time and resource consuming undertaking; therefore, it is generally best to prioritise triangulating large-scale events that have occurred (e.g. a clash or protest) or trends, rather than small events (such as a case of domestic violence or sexual abuse). The primary forms of triangulation are data source triangulation, methodology triangulation and theory triangulation.<sup>7</sup>

**Data Source Triangulation**

Data source triangulation involves using different sources of data to verify both individual incidents that have been reported, and general trends that appear within a data set. Data source triangulation can be particularly important for verifying the number of people involved in conflicts, as primary source accounts and official records can have wildly different accountings of the victims and perpetrators of conflicts. Potential data sources that can be used for data source triangulation include: primary and secondary research or interviews, documents, public records, photographs and observations.

**Methodology Triangulation**

Methodology triangulation works by combining multiple methods of data collection to mitigate the weaknesses of any single data collection method. For example, quantitative data from a field survey could be juxtaposed against qualitative research methods like KIs or FGDs. This would allow the researcher to identify any key issues raised by the community that were not captured by the structured design of the field survey. Key methodologies that can be used for this form of


triangulation include: quantitative data measurements, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, direct observations, questionnaires & surveys. Additionally, when conducting primary research, methodology triangulation can be applied by conducting the research at different times and in different places.

**Theory Triangulation**

Seeking to avoid the fallacy of Maslow’s Hammer theory (“if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail”),<sup>8</sup> triangulation involves using multiple theories or approaches to analyse data. For example, social science researchers looking at conflict in a community could consult with city planners with backgrounds in civil engineering for alternative explanations of the conflict. This triangulation allows analysts to consider alternative conclusions that fall outside of the primary focus of the investigation. This form of triangulation is particularly effective at generating insights that complement and expand upon the findings of the primary data set.

**MOVING FROM EARLY WARNING DATA TO EARLY RESPONSE INTERVENTION: THE PROCESS IN ACTION**

The integrated early warning and response process illustrated in the case study ensures that the collection and dissemination of conflict early warnings is done as part of a systematic process that effectively links early warning information with appropriate response initiatives. The process also ensures that early warning leads to data analysis, planning, and response, as well as an After Action Review (AAR) to





## LIFE CYCLE OF A CONFLICT TRACKER

In early 2017, conflict early warning reports received from community-based field monitors across the Niger Delta region were collated, coded and formatted into the Peace Map. These early warning reports were triangulated with information from other data sources in the Peace Map, and were analysed to highlight conflict patterns, trends and dynamics in each state. This was followed by desk studies to validate findings from data analysis, and production of conflict trackers and periodic briefings for each state.

The conflict trackers and policy briefings were disseminated to stakeholders, including field Monitors and Prevent Committee members, for situation awareness and conflict mapping. Thereafter, a workshop was organized for stakeholders in each state to improve their knowledge and capacity in conflict analysis and planning, and to apply these skills to address pressing conflict issues in their communities.

With the help of the conflict trackers and policy briefings, participants were able to identify key conflict risk factors and hotspots in their state, and agreed on a priority conflict issue they want to address. Participants then undertook an analysis of the selected conflict to understand the root causes and the underlying drivers, and identify key stakeholders with influence on the conflict. Thereafter, participants identified capacities and spheres of influence among themselves with regards to the identified problem and stakeholders, and developed an action plan to address the conflict. The action plan includes a calendar of tasks, activities, roles, and responsibilities, which were later used for an After-Action Review to access the effectiveness of the intervention.

improve on the process. The integrated process followed a specified procedure to ensure consistency in the process. This process ensures that quantitative findings from data analysis are further cross-checked, correlated and validated through desk studies, followed by qualitative/participatory analysis, joint planning, and After-Action Review. This process ensures that any gaps in the quantitative data are identified and filled, and therefore contributes to richer analysis to identify and prioritise options for effective preventive response.

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# PART II: OPERATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS

## I. PERIODIC CONFLICT TRACKERS

Trackers at PIND are created on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis. These trackers use the data formatted on the Peace Map to identify conflict hotspots, patterns and trends in each of the nine Niger Delta states. The purpose of these products is for triage and prioritisation of conflict issues at the operational level, with the trackers provided back to peace and security actors on the ground for further analysis and planning.


### Niger Delta Monthly Trackers

The monthly trackers are two pages long and rely predominately on quantitative and qualitative analysis from the Peace Map. The two

<b>Product</b>	Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Trackers Analysis for triage and prioritization at the
<b>Purpose</b>	Peace and security actors with the mandate to respond (e.g. P4P State Chapters, Peace Clubs, civil
<b>Audience</b>	Online at <a href="http://www.p4p-nigerdelta.org/analysis">http://www.p4p-nigerdelta.org/analysis</a>
<b>Dissemination</b>	Circulated via email to P4P network and other

main components of the Trackers are the graphics (line graphs, bar charts and heat map), and the narrative text.

### MONTHLY TRACKERS: NARRATIVE SECTIONS — PART I



**Background Narrative**

This should state the scope and purpose of the tracker, in a concise opening sentence.

**Patterns and Trends Narrative**

This written section details key incidents that were reported using all sources on the Peace Map (e.g. ACLED, Nigeria Watch, NSRP, CIEPD, P4P). The narrative should be loosely organized by theme – for example Violent Criminality, Protests etc. The purpose of the narrative section is not to just quantify the incidents (i.e. “12 incidents were reported in Tai LGA”), but to provide context to the main conflict issues reported by LGA in recent months. (i.e. “In Ikwere in July and August, five were people were reportedly killed, including two women, in rival cult clashes”). For each theme, there should also be a line that highlights relevance to women and girls for purposes of gender mainstreaming.

**Recent Incidents or Issues Narrative**


This written section focuses on the most recent reported incidents by LGA in that state. As above, they can draw from all Peace Map sources and be organized by theme heading.

*Figure 1: Incidents and Fatalities*

In order to look at relative levels of violence over time, Figure 1 uses ACLED and Nigeria Watch data displayed as a combined line and bar graph.

- i. Download total # fatalities and # incidents by month for the state.
- ii. Take the highest number out of ACLED and NW for each month.
- iii. Create a mixed bar/line graph: fatalities as the line and incidents as the bars.

MONTHLY TRACKERS: NARRATIVE SECTIONS — PART II



Prognosis Narrative

Provide a concise summary in one to two sentences about the salient issues raised in the tracker’s analysis.

Questions for Peace Agents

Highlight key questions for Peace Agents that can guide their use of the information for further analysis, prioritisation of issues, and planning.



Figure 2: Conflict Fatalities by LGA (cumulative, by theme)

To analyse which are the most violent LGAs in the state, Figure 2 uses ACLED and Nigeria Watch data as a stacked bar graph to display fatalities by theme.

- Search the desired sub-indicators for the time period of concern in the state using the Peace Map.
- Using the bar chart function, toggle between ACLED and NigeriaWatch to select the highest number for each of the top 5 LGAs.
- Create a stacked bar graph which details the different number of fatalities by LGA, by theme.



Figure 3: Conflict Fatalities by LGA (over time)

In order to look at relative levels of violence over time by LGA, Figure 3 uses Nigeria Watch data.

- Identify the most violent LGAs in the period (ie. less than 10).
- Use the “By LGA” function from the line graph to track trends in fatalities over time broken out by LGA.




Figure 4: Heatmap

The final graphic shows the concentration of incidents geographically within the state, as well as Peace Agents mapped for potential response.

- Search incidents using All Sources on the Peace Map for the desired time period for the state.
- Under “Map Views” click “Get Intensity Map”, ensure “Time Lapse” is set to “Month ending: All” and adjust “Density Select” to the desired level. Then under “Search Parameters” select “Agents of Peace” to visualize the locations of peace agents as embedded in the conflict landscape.
- Take a screen shot of the map, and crop the image.

Niger Delta Quarterly Trackers

The quarterly trackers are typically about twelve pages long. They provide a deeper look at the conflict dynamics across the Niger Delta region, as well as patterns and trends from the quarter for each of the nine Niger Delta states. As with the monthly trackers, the purpose of

this product is for triage and prioritisation of conflict issues at the operational level, particularly for informing peace agent’s conflict mitigation planning.

QUARTERLY TRACKERS: NARRATIVE AND GRAPHIC SECTIONS — PART I



Introduction narrative (Page 1)

The first page provides a short background to the Niger Delta region (e.g. demographics, economy, historical grievances/issues), and outlines the scope and purpose of the document.

Heatmap (Page 1)

The graphic on the first page shows the concentration of incidents geographically within the region for that quarter.

- i. Search incidents using All Sources on the Peace Map for the desired quarter, selecting all Niger Delta states.
- ii. Select “Get Intensity Map” in “Map Views” and adjust “Density Select” and “Time Lapse”. Then select “Agents of Peace” under “Search Parameters”.
- iii. Take a screen shot of the map.

Regional Patterns and Trends in Conflict Risk (By Theme)

The second page provides a summary of the conflict patterns, trends and hotspots across the Niger Delta for that quarter. The narrative in this section should focus on higher level conflict risk issues by theme and state, for example prevalence of criminality and kidnapping, militancy in certain states, communal violence etc.

Graph 1: Incidents and Fatalities, Niger Delta (Page 2)

In order to look at relative levels of violence over time, this graph uses ACLED and Nigeria Watch data displayed as a combined line and bar graph.

- i. Search total # fatalities and # incidents by quarter for all states combined.
- ii. Take the highest number out of ACLED and NW for each quarter.
- iii. Create a mixed bar/line graph: fatalities as the line and incidents as the bars.

Graph 2: Conflict Fatalities, State Level (Page 2)


To analyse which states had the highest levels of reported lethal violence for the quarter, this graph uses ACLED and Nigeria Watch data as a bar graph to display cumulative fatalities for the quarter, by state.

- ii. Search total # fatalities for the quarter, for each Niger Delta state.
- iii. Take the highest number out of ACLED and NW for the quarter, by state.
- iv. Create a bar graph, by state. Sort the data so that the graph appears from highest to lowest fatalities.


Graph 3: Conflict Fatalities, LGA Level (Page 2)

To analyse which LGAs had the highest levels of reported lethal violence for the quarter, this graph uses ACLED and Nigeria Watch data as a bar graph to display cumulative fatalities for the quarter, by state.

- i. Search total # fatalities for the quarter, for each Niger Delta state.
- ii. Take the highest number out of ACLED and NW for the quarter, by LGA. Note that this can be done automatically on the platform rather than having to download the incidents and calculate the totals manually.
- iii. Create a bar graph, by state. Sort the data so that the graph appears from highest to lowest fatalities.



QUARTERLY TRACKERS: NARRATIVE AND GRAPHIC SECTIONS — PART II



**Regional Patterns and Trends in Conflict Risk (By State)**

The third section of the Quarterly Tracker contains a page each for the nine Niger Delta states, detailing key patterns, trends and hotspots from the quarter. The narrative is organized by theme (e.g. criminality, communal violence, labor strikes/protests, VAWG, etc.), focusing on key reported incidents across the different LGAs.

**Heatmap**

The graphic on the bottom left hand side of the page shows the concentration of incidents geographically within the state for that quarter.

- i. Search incidents using All Sources on the Peace Map for the desired quarter, selecting all the relevant states.
- ii. Select “Get Intensity Map” under “Map Views” and adjust “Density Select” and “Time Lapse”.
- iii. Take a screen shot of the map, and crop the image.

Figure 2: LGA Level Fatalities, State

To analyse which are the most violent LGAs in the state during the quarter, Figure 2 uses ACLED and Nigeria Watch data as a stacked bar graph to display fatalities by theme (e.g. Communal Violence, Militancy, Gang/Cult Violence, etc.)

- i. Search the select sub-indicators per category for the time period in question.
- ii. Use the bar chart and toggle between sources to identify number of fatalities per LGA. The highest number out of ACLED or NW should be used.
- iii. Create a stacked bar graph which details the different number of fatalities by LGA, by theme.

**Graph 1: Incidents and Fatalities, State**

In order to look at relative levels of violence over time, this graph uses LGA and Nigeria Watch data displayed as a combined line and bar graph.

- i. Search total # fatalities and # incidents by quarter for each respective state.
- ii. Take the highest number out of ACLED and NW for each quarter.
- iii. Create a mixed bar/line graph, with fatalities as the line and incidents as the bars.

## 2. THEMATIC POLICY BRIEFS

Thematic Policy Briefs at PIND are created on a periodic basis, usually arising from specific problem sets identified during the trackers and other interactions with P4P network. The purpose of these Policy Briefs is to provide a more in-depth context to an issue that has arisen – for example elections, cult violence, militancy, communal conflict, gender based violence. Through a process of using data to formulate a specific research question (e.g. What are the main drivers behind the new rise in cult violence in the Niger Delta?) and then test your hypothesis (e.g. the main drivers are political patronage during election cycles, and competition for resources between groups). The research should provide a background on the history and context of the issue, dynamics that emerge from your research, and a conclusion

<b>Product</b>	Thematic policy-level briefs
<b>Purpose</b>	Analysis of conflict dynamics at a higher policy level to inform structural level planning
<b>Audience</b>	Peace and security actors with the mandate to respond at the structural level (e.g. government agencies, policy makers, international partners)
<b>Dissemination</b>	Online at <a href="http://www.p4p-nigerdelta.org/analysis">http://www.p4p-nigerdelta.org/analysis</a> ; Circulated via email to P4P network and other partners

(with recommendations if relevant). Throughout the brief should be a clear and evidence-based argument. (See Figure 1 to see the Research Design process)

### THEMATIC POLICY BRIEFS — PART I



#### Introduction (Page 1)

The narrative section of the introduction sets up your argument, and should draw the reader in to read more. Use this first page to introduce the topic and the main dynamics your analysis with explore. An eye-catching graphic – such as a map or graph should also be included.

#### Background

The Background narrative should provide the reader with a summary of the context in which the problem set is taking place. For example, if the issue is a resurgence in militancy, this section would outline the different economic, political, ethnic and security dynamics that characterized the previous militancy. This section does not need to be extensive (less than a page), but this context is helpful for readers who may not be familiar with the history. Graphics such as historical event timelines, fatalities/incidents trendlines, and heat maps may be useful in this section. This section should clearly articulate the Thesis Statement that will be argued/defended in the next section. For example, the thesis statement might be that given simmering tensions between Ijaw and Itsekiri communities in Delta state, the 2019 election should be seen as a potential trigger that should be mitigated early.

THEMATIC POLICY BRIEFS — PART II

CONFLICT BRIEFING MAY 2017: OGDONLAND — REMEDIATING A TROUBLED REGION

return election in Rivers State, many were said to have switched sides and worked for the All Progressives Congress (APC) against the highest bidder at that time.

According to interviews with key figures from the area and from business received during workshops, it has become well-known in the region that the stronger and more well-armed the gang, the higher the chances that it will be employed by the political class.

Despite its a major driver of violence in Rivers State has a historical precedent from 1999 through to the 2015 general elections, and during the subsequent return elections in the state, there has been a demonstrated cycle of politically motivated violence, which usually peaks during elections, reaches its lowest point and then re-emerges at the next round of elections.

Additionally, some state security personnel are said to know the perpetration of politically-motivated violence but reportedly either receive financial incentives to tolerate these activities, or are afraid of being sidelined by the powerful figures who control them, such as being recommended for deployment to a hot region outside of the region. This fear is underscored by reported cases where security personnel have made arrests of known perpetrators of violence only to have politicians interfere in the case and facilitate the quick release of the perpetrators from custody. These perceptions of their "official" role often attempt to avert re-venge, further dissuading local security forces from getting involved in the process.

Similar to the effects of state-level politics on the security challenges in Ogoni, another contributing factor to insecurity at the community level is the quest for resources and influence among some community chieftains in the area. Cloning to the numerous chieftaincy suits occurring in the region, as well as broader state and international conflicts in Ogoni, some paramount rulers and chiefs have reported

to align themselves with armed groups, using the same manipulative and co-optive tactics as politicians to settle scores.

Compounding matters, it is reported by local stakeholders that many members of armed gangs in the area are drug users who often indulge in consuming alcohol, tobacco, and other illicit activities to raise money to fund their efforts. Quelling the reaction they experience through consumption and its impact on peace and security at the local and state level in Nigeria, a September 2016 report from International Alert titled, "Nigeria's Drug Policy from a Peacebuilding Perspective," notes that Ogoni identified this as a major barrier for the use and abuse of psychoactive substances.

**Insecurity and the Ogoni Clean-Up Project**

In interviews and dialogues held with local stakeholders, it was noted that the Ogoni Clean-Up project itself has become a part of the problem in being the cause of violence in the area. Right from the start, when the UNDP report on Ogoni was published, popular expectations of financial benefits were heightened. Many local communities believe that the clean-up project will come with a multitude of financial benefits in the form of contracts to local companies and businesses, more overall investment in the infrastructure, and the election of local power brokers to key positions of influence.

Many recall a reported case in Bodo, Ogoni State, where compensation was paid to the community by a multinational oil company and related locals to key positions of power with influence over the allocation of money and resources. Members of this case and others have reported competition among chiefs who feel they are stakeholders in the case and should be given a prime seat in the table when discussing aspects of the Clean-Up

**History of Insecurity in Ogoniland**

- 1996: Commencement of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)
- 2001: Main protest route in SABC pull-out region
- 1995: Creation of the State House and other Ogoni bodies for the Abia region
- 2006: Provision of Comprehensive Remediation (CPR) by Shell for environmental damage
- 2011: APCON selects political platform for Ogoni environmental issues
- 2013: Political class in fighting among Ogoni stakeholders
- 2016: APCON selects political platform for Ogoni environmental issues
- 2017: APCON selects political platform for Ogoni environmental issues

project in the region and how contracts and compensations are divided out. Clashes and other armed groups have continually become engaged and are perpetrating violence, trying to gain territories to themselves. They would later be in charge of further security, surveillance contracts or other opportunities that may arise from the project. To date, there has reportedly been insufficient efforts to manage the expectations of the Ogoni or mitigate the potential conflict risks arising from these false assumptions, either through investigations and the election of community dialogues and stakeholders forums.

As in other parts of the Niger Delta, and indeed in other conflict-ridden regions, world

Main arguments

This section should analyse the main dynamics in the thematic issue. Aiming for approximately three main points, set out your evidence-based arguments which seek to answer the research question at hand. For a brief focusing on cult violence, it may for example focus on 1) election cycles and the web of political patronage 2) linkages with organized criminality, and 3) inter-communal tensions between key cult groups. This section should be constructed based on qualitative and quantitative analysis, referencing sources such as news articles, specific Peace Map incidents, or academic literature as required; as well as graphics such as line and bar graphs, pie charts and heatmaps constructed from the Peace Map or other sources.

Conclusion

The conclusion should concisely summarize the main arguments in your article, as well as provide a path forward. This may involve specific policy level recommendations to stakeholder groups if appropriate, or it may highlight specific areas that policy makers and practitioners need to explore further to mitigate conflict escalation.

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CONFLICT BRIEFING MAY 2017: OGDONLAND — REMEDIATING A TROUBLED REGION




Figure 1: Reported incidents in Ogoniland from 2000 to 2017. The graph shows a significant increase in incidents starting around 2010, peaking in 2015, and remaining high through 2017. Fatalities also show a similar trend, with a sharp rise in 2015 and 2016.

Figure 2: Reported fatalities by USA in Ogoniland from 2000 to 2017. The graph shows a steady increase in fatalities over the period, with a notable spike in 2015 and 2016.

of Rivers State and other Ogoni activities by the military regime of General Abdulsalam Abacha in 1998, sparking international outcry.

In an effort to secure the environmental heritage and remediation in just 18 reported sites in Ogoniland, President Obasanjo's Administration in 2005 commissioned the UNDP to carry out an Environmental Assessment Study of the impacted sites in Ogoniland, which lasted from 2009-2011. In June 2016, the Federal Government published the final report, as recommended in the UNDP report.

In recent times, Ogoniland has once again become a theatre of violence caused by varying degrees of inter-ethnic, communal, and political factors. These issues are not peculiar to Ogoniland as they equally arise elsewhere in other parts of Rivers State. However, the situation in Ogoni presents a confluence of historic and present day factors that put it at a heightened risk for conflict in particular the underlying factors that have given rise to insecurity in the past are re-emerging alongside those of the Federal Government, in conjunction the process of restoring the impacted

accommodation in Ogoni to its original condition, which will help restore the national industrial activities, mainly farming and fishing, in the region.

**Intensified Dynamics**

**Fuelled Insecurity**

The increasing incidence of violence in Ogoni can be situated within the context of multiple inter-related and often overlapping dynamics, namely: ethnic, political, communal, political, and economic. Subsequent to the 2015 general elections, there has been a reported increase in the number of violent incidents in Ogoni, as well as the number of fatalities. These factors have varying degrees of impact on the overall environment of insecurity in Ogoni.

The origin of violence and gang violence in Ogoni can be traced to 1990 when the Village Community Council (VCC) following the state to establish the junior Village Community Council (JCC). Following this, the subsequent advent of the Delta State Government and Ogoni State Government also played a role in the rise of violence in 2015 general elections, as well as in the return election. However, during the last

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CONFLICT BRIEFING MAY 2017: OGDONLAND — REMEDIATING A TROUBLED REGION




Figure 3: Reported fatalities in Ogoniland from 2000 to 2017. The graph shows a steady increase in fatalities over the period, with a notable spike in 2015 and 2016.

Figure 4: A heatmap showing the geographic distribution of reported fatalities in Ogoniland from 2000 to 2017. The map highlights areas with higher concentrations of fatalities, particularly in the central and southern parts of the region.

wide, it is often those most responsible for the perpetration of insecurity that often come from its origin, the largest security contractors, claiming to protect others from the very chaos that they themselves have sown. Furthermore, and despite its origins, the current state of insecurity in the area will likely have direct impact on the Ogoni Clean-Up project. In fact, some have expressed fear that the current environment of insecurity will encourage thugs and excesses on the part of the government and others that the clean-up project cannot be implemented because of threats to the safety and security of those involved with implementation. Specifically, as the process of carrying out the project will include multiple complex technical aspects, it will be working directly with local community members, it is feared that thugs will target such an arrangement given the highly volatile environment.

As noted earlier, at the present juncture, armed groups have effectively established the Ogoni State, being claims to being claims to different territories and forcing some paramount rulers, who might be otherwise be effective in negotiating the issue, facing insecurity to be asked. Due to ineffective investigation and a degradation of traditional authority

structures, it is believed that at least 20 communities in Ogoni are currently without government services. The erosion of traditional authority structures also may contribute to decentralizing processes that are neither fair nor representative of wider community interests, as fatalities in those who have without control through violent means try to monopolize functions that were formerly within the purview of traditional rulers.

Finally, another potential problem given the structure of the armed groups and past actions in the region, factors such as kidnapping practices or using equipment for the clean-up project may come into play, discouraging future development initiatives in the area.

**Rivers State Assembly Programme**

The Rivers State Government in September 2016 released a special amnesty programme for returning soldiers and other combat actors in the state. There was a 60-day disarmament phase which lasted from September 16 to November 15, 2016. The initial attempt to encourage youths in Ogoni to embrace the exercise and lay down their weapons reportedly collapsed because of numerous to true reasons:

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CONFLICT BRIEFING MAY 2017: OGDONLAND — REMEDIATING A TROUBLED REGION

The Way Forward

1. The Rivers State Assembly Programme should be properly implemented in conjunction with a new strategy for broad-based community engagement in the process, designed in consultation with local stakeholders.
2. To enhance the sustainability of the Ogoni Clean-Up initiative and provide a platform for at-risk youth, the government should be supported to train returning soldiers in agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries and other viable skills, while establishing, improving facilities and cooperation to build and pool resources.
3. There should be a locally driven, robust, and locally implemented mechanism for dialogue and reconciliation at the community and local government levels. Examples of local reconciliation and mediation processes from outside and inside of the region should be examined to determine if some best practices in design and implementation could be relevant for Ogoni.
4. Local governments and other key stakeholders in Ogoni need to directly engage various communities to sensitize people on the Clean-Up project and their role and to manage expectations. Trusted local civil society networks could be key actors in this process.
5. In addition to the Amnesty Programme, there should be a robust and sustained effort aimed at removing small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta and Nigeria should be considered for potential relevance to the local context and assisted efforts. National and international governments and UNDP should be engaged to help in this effort.


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### 3. ALERTS

The Peace Map has a feature that will scroll through all the LGAs within the parameters of a given search and flag any spikes at the LGA level from one month to the next where there was an increase of over 10 fatalities *and* an increase by over 10% in fatalities or incidents during that same period. For example, in the screenshot below, there was a spike in Obio/Akpor, Rivers State in October 2017 where 15 people were killed in an attack by the Icelanders on a community. In September 2017 14 people were reportedly killed in Umuahia North, Abia State over clashes involving IPOB. In each of these cases, the user can click “Send Email Alert” on the right and then draft an email

<b>Product</b>	Automatic SMS alerts generated via the Peace Map
<b>Purpose</b>	To alert peace actors on the ground to spikes in conflict risk to enable real-time triage, planning and
<b>Audience</b>	Peace Agents in the P4P Network
<b>Dissemination</b>	Email

in the text box, which will be sent to all Peace Agents registered on the map in the state of concern (in this case Rivers or Abia).



#### Optimal Incident Reporting

As outlined in Part I, data collection must be optimised for usability and relevance at the analysis stage. PIND’s SMS-based reporting is a key pillar in the early warning and response system. The following box

outlines the key items that should be included in every incident report sent into the platform.

#### SMS-BASED INCIDENT REPORTING FORMAT

Please report any verified incident of conflict to the Integrated Peace and Development Unit (IPDU) SMS early warning system. Kindly include the following information in your incident reports:

- State (use the applicable acronym to indicate the State where the incident occurred),
- Local Government Area (LGA),
- Place (Community, Town or Village),
- Date (DD/MM/YYYY).
- Description of the incident (Be specific, clear and brief. Include age and gender of victims and perpetrators, if available).

Example:

*RV, Port Harcourt, GRA Phase 2, 18/09/2017. About 8am today, 5 young men shot dead and three others injured at the Waterlines Motor Park. Perpetrators suspected to be members of Creek Lords confraternity.*



# CONFLICT ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND MITIGATION

## PART I: THE APPROACH


As described in the previous chapters, PIND uses a variety of data sources to draft the conflict trackers and other products which are distributed to peace actors in the region. However, for these findings to be translated into preventative action, the trackers must feed into two other layers of analysis: 1) analysis for decision-makers; and, 2) analysis for implementers. These two layers are distinct. If the wrong type of analysis is produced for the wrong audience, the recipient may misunderstand the objective of the analysis and misapply it. At best, the analysis will be deemed irrelevant and left on the shelf. At worst, it will create more confusion.

When considering “analysis” it is natural to think of only a desktop product that people read. This chapter examines how to use a desktop analysis as a baseline to guide further participatory analysis with implementers or decision makers for the purposes of targeted planning and preventative action.

### PARTICIPATORY CONFLICT ANALYSIS

An in-depth understanding of the context and dynamics of conflict should underpin planning for conflict mitigation. Conflict analysis is the systematic assessment of conflict to understand the causes, profile the

**MOVING ANALYSIS FROM DESKTOP TO WORKSHOP FOR PLANNING, PREVENTATIVE ACTION** *Figure 4.1*



## EARLY WARNING ANALYSIS FOR DECISION-MAKING: VIOLENCE AFFECTING WOMEN AND GIRLS IN RIVERS STATE

In July 2017, PIND used data from the Peace Map to identify trends, patterns and hotspots of Violence Affecting Women and Girls (VAWG) in the Niger Delta. The data highlighted domestic and sexual violence were the most prevalent forms of reported violence affecting women and girls in the region, often perpetrated by people known to the victims. Utilising this information, and the predominant trends in the data, PIND organised a VAWG workshop in Port Harcourt, bringing together stakeholders from civil society organisations (CSOs), the media, the security sector, and government representatives from the health, judicial and social services sectors to discuss early warning and response efforts in addressing VAWG. During the workshop, PIND presented the Peace Map data, illustrating the prevalence of violence affecting women and children across key sectors. The workshop attendees also gathered by stakeholder group to discuss how to harness this early warning information to inform interventions to reduce VAWG at structural and policy levels. The workshop further sensitised stakeholders on general issues relating to VAWG and created opportunities for the formulation of ideas around preventive response. Key civil society actors were encouraged to strengthen efforts to mainstream gender into their data collection and analysis, as well as provide government stakeholders with concrete policy and procedural recommendations to reduce VAWG and enhance survivor support.

actors involved and their perspectives, and examine the dynamics of how these elements interact in the conflict environment.<sup>1</sup> It is only by analysing the causes, triggers, actors and dynamics of conflict that it can be effectively mitigated.

Conflict analysis is most effective when done through a participatory process. Desktop analysis (for example, the trackers and briefs produced based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of early warning data) is the precursor to this process. The next step involves contextualising those findings with key stakeholders and begin to plan for response.

This participatory conflict analysis should include different people with a mix of expert and contextual knowledge of the conflict.<sup>2</sup> This process can produce useful insights into the causes, underlying factors, and needs and interests of key actors in the conflict. It can also help to identify entry-points for stakeholder’s engagement and provides the basis for informed mitigation planning.<sup>3</sup> Collaborative conflict analysis is useful in setting objectives for mitigation planning.

### *Analysis with Decision Makers*

Often when people think of “early warning” they are implicitly thinking of analysis for decision making as opposed to analysis for planning. In other words, the assumption is that if decision makers had the right information they would make the right decision and would therefore be more likely to prevent conflict onset or escalation from occurring. Although this is only one aspect of the early warning spectrum, it is an important one. And as such, it is important to be clear on what decision makers actually need and do not need so that

this analysis serves its intended purpose. Decision-makers need analysis that will help them determine *if* an intervention of some sort is necessary. They need to know the intensity of the existing problem, the range of possible escalation scenarios, and the likelihood and impact of each, as well as possible consequences of action or inaction.

*Key items decision makers need to know during participatory analysis:*

- What is the problem?
- How bad is the problem?
- What are the stakes involved for action or inaction?

### *Analysis with Implementers*

Once it has been decided that an intervention is necessary, implementers need to know how best to intervene. For this, they need to know the underlying social, economic, political, and security drivers of conflict, potential triggers, as well as the stakeholder map (interests, capacities, mandates, and relationships). This analysis should be narrowly parameterised with a focus on the identification of available leverage points and viable options based on the roles of, and the resources available to, the implementers themselves. This is not an academic or theoretical analysis — it is analysis for planning. For example, it does no good to conduct a deep analysis of the pressures emanating from global warming if the implementer has no means of influencing carbon emissions. The first step of any such analysis, therefore, is to evaluate one’s own toolbox and one’s own stock of social, financial, and political capital which can be brought to bear.

## EARLY WARNING ANALYSIS FOR IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING: THE NEW YAM FESTIVAL IN ABIA STATE

In 2014, conflict data integrated onto the Peace Map was collated to produce conflict bulletins that showed the trends and patterns of conflict risk and violence for each of the nine states of the Niger Delta. The conflict bulletin for Abia State identified Umuahia North LGA as a hotspot of violence, with an elevated risk of political tensions, cult violence, kidnapping for ransom and shooting incidents. To better understand the conflict drivers captured in the quantitative analysis, the state chapter of the P4P utilized a local expert and carried out a conflict assessment in the state using FGDs, KIIs and town hall meetings. After gathering the qualitative information, which helped to fill gaps and provide context, a forum of stakeholders comprising traditional rulers, women's leaders, youth leaders, political leaders, and CSOs/NGOs, was organised to review the information. During the review, participants agreed that Umuahia North was a key hotspot where implementers could intervene to reduce potential for violence. Through a participatory process, they determined that the annual New Yam Festival in Ibeku community was a trigger event that needed to be mitigated through advanced planning and sensitisation campaigns as, in prior years, it had led to violence, including the destruction of lives and property. Based on the information gathered from both the quantitative data as well as a qualitative analysis of contextual risk factors, the group organised a successful intervention to sensitise the wider community against violence during the festival. The subsequent festival that was held was peaceful compared to previous years.

Conflict trackers, as described in the previous chapters, should feed into both types of analysis; both analysis for decision makers as well as analysis for planning.

Both types of analysis (for decision makers and for planning) should be done in a structured, qualitative, and participatory manner. When staging a participatory analysis session (such as a workshop or meeting), it is sometimes easy to lose sight of the objectives of the session – namely analysis for planning as opposed to analysis for analysis' sake. For example, if you bring together a range of key experts to discuss the identified problem of communal violence in a particular area, these will include relevant peace and security actors represented from community leadership, civil society groups, government, and the security sector. With such a dynamic mix of perspectives, it is easy for people to descend into the weeds about



specific issues, dispute different facts or postulate about solutions that are not within the resources/parameters of the group. Therefore, the way that the interaction is structured — from the meeting agenda, to templates for joint analysis, and clear action items — is crucial for optimal planning outcomes. (See *Section Two* for examples of workshop materials). Part of this should involve using the desktop analysis already done (for example the trackers of briefs), as a baseline for further qualitative interpretation by participants.

*Key questions implementers need to know during participatory analysis:*

- What are the underlying drivers of the problem? (i.e. social, political, economic)
- What are the potential conflict triggers?
- Who are the main stakeholders and resources?
- What are the main leverage points?

## PIND'S APPROACH

To build the capacity of local actors to undertake participatory conflict analysis, PIND delivers training to peace and security actors throughout the Niger Delta. For sustainability and effectiveness, PIND adopts an “Applied Learning” approach to conflict analysis training workshops. Rather than focusing on theory, the workshops include practical sessions with concrete outputs that will lead to meaningful activities on the ground. Applied Learning is learning by doing, learning by discovery. This puts a high level of responsibility on the facilitator who must have clarity of purpose and drive the process forward and must balance the imperatives of learning on the one hand, and application on the other. The essence of the training workshop is to improve the knowledge and capacity of stakeholders in conflict analysis and planning, and to apply the skill to analyse a specific, pressing conflict issue in their community or state. Participants learn the methods and tools by going through the full process of a Desktop Study, Validation Session, Qualitative/Participatory Interpretive Analysis, Joint Planning, and After-Action Review.



## MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS



There are a number of key tools and frameworks that can be adapted in the implementation of conflict analysis, including Onion, Tree, Iceberg, CAF, CAST, and SNA models. Depending on the type, scale and stakeholders involved in the conflict, there are a range of approaches you may take during the participatory analysis process. As noted above, when undertaking a participatory analysis with decision makers — they typically don't need to go into a deep dive of the drivers, triggers etc. Their interactions are more focused on the problem at hand and the stakes of action versus inaction. The tools herein are more geared towards participatory analysis for implementers — to help structure a deeper analysis for planning.

### *Onion Model*

The Onion Model is a tool for conflict analysis and resolution. The onion model compares conflict drivers to the layers of an onion. It provides insights into the positions, interests, and needs of the key actors in a conflict, and helps to identify possible areas of agreement between conflicted parties. Often, in a conflict situation, we make demands based on our positions which are presented in a zero-sum frame (either I win and you lose; or you win and I lose). This makes accommodation and resolution very difficult. But if we understand the interest and needs underneath our adversary's positions we may be more likely to find an amicable solution.

### *Conflict Tree*

This is an important conflict analysis tool that deals with the structural, manifest, and dynamic factors of conflict, and visualises the linkages between the underlying causes and the visible manifestation of conflict. It employs the roots, trunk, branches, leaves, and fruits of a tree, to illustrate the link between the immediate and root causes of conflict. It provides a visual understanding of conflict in terms of the causes and the effects.




**Iceberg Model**

The conflict iceberg model compares the dynamics of conflict to an iceberg – a greater part of an iceberg is under water and remains invisible. In conflict, we see only what is visible, but underneath are emotions, values, beliefs, past histories and other psychosocial factors that drive the conflict. The iceberg model is employed to illustrate the fact that only a small part of the dynamics of conflict are visible and there is the need to identify the underlying elements through analysis. The model is useful to identify the root causes of conflict.


**Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (CAF 2.0)**

CAF is a unique conflict analysis methodology developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)<sup>4</sup> to better understand the risk of armed conflict, how mitigation efforts interact with conflict risk factors, and how to support local efforts to manage conflict in a given context. CAF 2.0 is applicable at the regional and country levels. It is useful for the detailed analysis of conflict to identify key influencers and mobilisers, institutional resilience factors, and to better understand the dynamics and trajectories of conflict. The framework also helps conflict analysts to identify ‘Windows of Vulnerability’ in a specific context – moments when particular events (e.g. riots/protests, elections, ethno-nationalist agitations, insurgency, etc.) can trigger escalation of conflict.<sup>5</sup>

**CAST INDICATORS AND FRAGILE STATES INDEX HEATMAP** *Figure 4.6*



**STAKEHOLDER NETWORK ANALYSIS** *Figure 4.7*



**Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST)**

CAST is a methodology developed by the Fund for Peace (FFP)<sup>6</sup> for conflict vulnerability analysis. It uses both quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the vulnerability of states to collapse in pre-conflict, active conflict and post conflict situations. This analytical model processes data from multiple sources to create infographics that help identify key social, political, military, and economic trends that track the dynamics of conflict risk. The model is very useful to identify conflict risk factors as well as trends and patterns in conflict.

**Stakeholder Network Analysis Tool**

This is a methodology employed to better understand the social relationship between stakeholders in a given conflict context and determine where there might be social capital, spheres of influence, or leverage points that can serve as entry point for mitigation. The first step in conducting Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA) is to send out scoping survey to all identified stakeholders working on a specific conflict issue and asking them who they have partnered. The application of SNA helps to determine the optimal mix of stakeholders to be targeted for conflict mitigation.

## TRAINING FOR MITIGATION: REMEDIATING THE TROUBLED Ogoni REGION IN RIVERS STATE

In 2015, following reports from community-based monitors and P4P Network members of a rise in violent conflict and insecurity in Rivers state, PIND conducted a desktop analysis to better understand the incidents that were fuelling the conflict dynamics in the state. The study identified the activities of cult groups — including criminality, territorial clashes, kidnappings and abductions, as well as political violence in the aftermath of that year’s general elections — as key conflict drivers in the state. Findings from the desktop study were validated and triangulated with conflict incident data integrated onto the Peace Map, including a mapping of hotspots. Based on the findings from the study, in November 2015, PIND produced a policy brief entitled “A Rise in Cult Violence and Insecurity in Rivers State” that was shared and sensitised among stakeholders. In addition to identifying the activities of cult groups as key drivers of conflict in the state, the analysis identified the Ogoni region as one of the hotspots.

Throughout 2016, PIND used the policy briefing to identify and engage key stakeholders on the conflict situation in Ogoni through meetings of the PREVENT committees as well as one-on-one meetings, culminating in an “Ogoni Stakeholders’ Forum” organised in partnership with P4P and the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP). This forum included representatives of government security agencies, community vigilantes, youth leaders, and community-based civil society organisations (CSOs) in the area. During the forum, participants discussed and identified security issues and deliberated on how to address the situation. One of the outcomes of the forum was a meeting of security stakeholders in the Ogoni region, which brought together key security actors and established a platform for continuous engagement between formal and informal security actors in the Ogoni region. Another outcome was that participants identified skills necessary for the proper functioning of NYCOP’s peace and security committee so PIND could follow up with a training.

In 2017, in an effort to address the spate of violence in the area, especially in the context of the implementation of the ‘Ogoni Clean-up Project’ by the Federal Government of Nigeria, PIND collaborated with the Rivers state chapter of the P4P and NYCOP to organise a conflict analysis and mediation workshop to train thirty youth leaders from the four LGAs in the Ogoni region on conflict mitigation. The three-day training workshop included practical sessions on conflict early warning reporting, conflict assessment, communication in mediation, principles of negotiation, and advocacy.

Finally, in order to provide stakeholders with an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of conflict in the area, in June 2017, PIND produced a second policy brief titled “*Ogoniland: Remediating a Troubled Region.*” The brief provided policy and operational recommendations for addressing the conflict situation in and around Ogoni based on two years of data, desktop analysis, trainings, and stakeholder engagement.

## CONCLUSION

This Chapter moves beyond desktop research (which was covered in the previous chapters) and focuses on how to take that desktop research and incorporate in practical ways into analysis for decision makers on the one hand, and analysis for planning on the other, making a clear distinction between the two. Emphasised in the chapter was the need to be clear on the purpose of the early warning product and to focus parameters of the research accordingly. For effectiveness and impact, it is necessary that the analysis be done in a participatory way using models that help answer the key research questions regarding conflict drivers and potential triggers as well as the positions, interests, and needs of those impacted by conflict.

## ENDNOTES

1. USAID Conflict Assessment Framework Version 2.0, June 2012, pp. 9-15; available at: [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/pnady739.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf)
2. Saferworld, Conflict Analysis Handbook Chapter 2, pp. 1-8 (2016); available at: [https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/chapter\\_2\\_\\_266](https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/chapter_2__266)
3. Ibid.
4. USAID Conflict Assessment Framework Version 2.0, pp. 16-17
5. Ibid.
6. Fund for Peace CAST/FSI Methodology available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/>

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Fund for Peace FSI & CAST Methodology (2012-2019) Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/>

## PART II: OPERATOR’S INSTRUCTIONS

### IDENTIFYING KEY STAKEHOLDERS TO INCLUDE IN PARTICIPATORY ANALYSIS

Once you have used the EW products to identify specific problem sets, before you embark on the participatory analysis for planning process, you need to know who to bring into that process. Whether that is at the decision-making level, or at the planning level – doing an initial stakeholder mapping is a useful way to make sure the right people are brought to the table for conflict mitigation. To be more strategic and targeted in this mapping, you can use tools such as Kumu (<https://kumu.io/>) to see how different actors and organisations have influence, reach, and convening power within a network.

### BUILDING CAPACITY FOR PARTICIPATORY CONFLICT ANALYSIS: PIND TRAINING WORKSHOPS

#### Action Steps

In preparation for a conflict analysis training workshop, the PIND Peacebuilding Team takes the following steps:

1. Collation and analysis of conflict data to highlight trends and patterns in target states
2. Desk studies to validate findings from data analysis
3. Production of conflict trackers and special reports
4. Dissemination of trackers and conflict reports to stakeholders for situational awareness
5. Capacity assessment of participants
6. Training of Trainers (ToT) workshop participants
7. Conduct Stakeholders Network Analysis (SNA) to identify who should be included in the training workshop
8. Identification and familiarisation with relevant conflict analysis tools and frameworks
9. Organise and implement conflict analysis workshop
10. After Action Review (AAR)

Outputs of the workshop should include:

1. Agreement on a priority problem (by risk factor and location) to be addressed;
2. Agreement on the root conflict drivers underneath the identified problem that they want to solve or manage;
3. Identify key stakeholders with influence on those conflict drivers and their respective interests or mandates;
4. Identify capacities and spheres of influence of the Chapter members themselves with regards to the identified problem and stakeholders,
5. In light of the problem they want to solve, the analysis of the problem, and their own capacities and spheres of influence, to develop a specific action plan with regards to the identified problem.

### ACTION PLAN TEMPLATE

Objective	Tasks	Persons Responsible	Deadline	Necessary Resources	Expected Outcome	Potential Challenges	Result
What do we want to achieve?	What needs to be done to achieve the objective?	Who will complete this task?	When should the task be completed?	What do we need to complete this task?	What do we hope to achieve with this task?	What could possibly impede completion of this task? How can we overcome it?	Was this task successfully completed? Were any new tasks identified in the process?



## SAMPLE WORKSHOP LOGIC, AGENDA, AND OBJECTIVES

<i>Workshop Activity</i>	<i>Method</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	Explain the “Applied Learning” approach. Describe key outputs, outcomes, and deliverables of the workshop. Outline the agenda so that people see how everything fits together.
<i>Identify the Conflict Problem that they want to solve.</i>	Review trackers and briefs. Discuss urgent, emerging, or endemic conflict issues highlighted in the documents. Facilitate a discussion about which of those issues is a priority to the group. If there is consensus around a completely different issue, that’s okay too. But they need to explain clearly why they picked the conflict issue that they did. They should also describe clearly what their definition of success will be.
<i>Discuss Conflict Drivers and Identify Stakeholders with Influence on those Conflict Drivers.</i>	Based on the specific problem identified by the group, discuss Social/Demographic Pressures, the Economic Pressures, and the Political/Security Pressures. These categories of pressures need to be clearly defined by the facilitator. The facilitator can draw on the CAST framework to inform the discussion. For each conflict driver, the group should identify which stakeholders or stakeholder groups have the most influence on those pressures.
<i>Identify Conflict Dynamics and Trajectories</i>	Using a simplified version of the CAF 2.0, run the findings discussed so far through a conflict analysis framework so that there is agreement and clarity in the group as to the Grievances/Concerns, Social/Institutional Resilience Factors, Mobilizers, Trends, and Triggers.
<i>Identify Influence, Capacities, and Mandates of the participants</i>	These mandates and capacities should be tied specifically to the problem that they want to solve. In other words, if they say they want to address gang violence, they should identify their entry point. Perhaps they have influence with Mobilisers. Perhaps they have skills in media production or Town Hall facilitation, which can be used to convene and influence Social/Institutional Resilience Factors. The main point is that the action plan needs to flow from an honest assessment of what they are best positioned to implement, with regards to the analysis of the specific problem that they want to solve.
<i>Develop 2 Action Plans</i>	This includes a calendar of tasks, activities, roles and responsibilities. The first action plan is intended to address the problem at the state level, through media outreach. They need to think through the communication strategy (Intended Audience, Medium, Message, and Messenger). The second is an action plan to address the problem at the community level through a Chapter activity. This should focus on a specific hot spot (as identified above), timed for maximum impact based on the trajectory of the conflict, also as identified above. Facilitators should have clear and simple templates in place so that the action plans can be developed with a minimum amount of confusion.

<i>S/N</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Activities</i>
1	08:30 — 08:45	Introductions
2	08:45 — 09:05	Clarifying meeting objectives and outcomes, setting of ground rules, etc.
3	09:05 — 10:35	Introduction to Conflict Analysis
4	10:35 — 11:00	Tea Break
5	11:00 — 13:00	Group Exercises and development of action plans
6	13:00 — 14:00	Lunch
7	14:00 — 16:00	Plenary session and development of indicators
8	16:00 — 16:10	Closing and housekeeping

## APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS FOR DECISION MAKING

As noted in Section One, the focus on the analysis for Decision Makers should be on outlining the problem, consequences of action and inaction, and next steps. These next steps should be clear and actionable (see *Action Plan template above*). For example, rather than “the group recommends that the government build capacity of the police in area z to address the threat of cult violence” the action item should be “stakeholders x and y to meet with the Commissioner of Police in Rivers State to discuss additional deployments and training in area z.” Follow up to make sure those action items are completed is then crucial (which will be discussed more in future chapters). After a decision has been made that an action or intervention is necessary, then an additional analysis for planning can be undertaken, which can then be followed by analysis for operations, or real-time monitoring of the problem set being addressed for reaction and adjustment to changing circumstances on the ground.

### DATA ANALYSIS FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: THE STREET CHILDREN OF CROSS RIVER STATE

In 2017, PIND’s Niger Delta Conflict Tracker for the fourth quarter of 2016 highlighted a spike in gang violence and criminality in Calabar, the Cross River State capital. The majority of these criminal activities were attributed to street children, locally referred to as ‘Skolombo’ kids. A growing number of these children were involved in criminal activities including robbery, cult violence, election violence, sexual violence, drug abuse and petty theft. In order to address this problem, PIND, in collaboration with the Cross River State Government and the state chapter of the P4P, convened a multi-stakeholder forum in January 2017. The forum brought together relevant state Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and representatives from security agencies, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and relevant Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). The result of panel discussions indicated that the growing phenomenon of street children is a social problem that has assumed a criminal dimension in the state. Participants pointed out that criminal and gang-affiliated actors in the state have capitalised on the vulnerability of the children by initiating them into criminality, assuming a frightening dimension, especially with the increasing use of arms to fight gang wars and partake in criminality.

The forum stressed the need for collaboration among stakeholders to address this issue as it is cross-cutting, with security, human rights, and child welfare issues that all needed to be taken into account. Following the process of quantitative and qualitative analysis, followed by key stakeholder engagement, in February 2017, PIND produced a policy brief entitled “The Street Kids of Calabar: A Punitive Approach is Not Enough.” The briefing sought to not only highlight the main findings from the data and the subsequent stakeholder engagement workshop, but further sensitize a wider range of stakeholders, including those who potentially had information on best practices from other states or sectors to share. The brief also made policy and operational recommendations for addressing the current problem and ways to prevent it from worsening in the future.

The focus of participatory analysis for implementers must look at the specific problem set, and do a detailed qualitative analysis of the drivers, triggers, and stakeholders. Using the relevant conflict tools (see Section One) – select an approach that is suitable for the context of your participatory analysis. For example, the Onion is straight forward approach that looks at stakeholders’ positions, interests and needs. In a smaller scale and informal participatory analysis, this may be one of the approaches you use to structure your interaction. On the other hand, if you are holding a larger conflict analysis workshop, you may draw from the more in-depth approaches such as the CAST indicators or CAF 2.0 to guide the group discussion.

## **MOVING FROM DATA ANALYSIS TO AN INTERVENTION PLANNING WORKSHOP: RISING INSECURITY ACROSS THE NIGER DELTA**

In early 2017, following broad concerns about a rise in insecurity across the region, conflict early warning reports received from community-based field monitors across the Niger Delta region were collated, coded and formatted onto the Peace Map by PIND. These early warning reports were triangulated with information from other data sources on the Peace Map, and were analysed to highlight conflict patterns, trends and dynamics in each state. This was followed by desktop research and analysis to validate findings from data, and the production of conflict trackers for each of the nine Niger Delta states. Preliminary issues identified in the data analysis indicated a rise in communal violence, political tensions, and organised criminality. Incidents included militancy, piracy, cult clashes, election violence, land disputes, robbery, and kidnapping for ransom. The conflict trackers and policy briefings were disseminated to stakeholders, including P4P Field Monitors and Prevent Committee members, for situational awareness and conflict mapping.

Following the dissemination of the reports, a workshop was organised for key stakeholders in each state to improve their knowledge and capacity in conflict analysis and planning, and to apply these skills to address key conflict issues in their communities. With the help of the conflict trackers and policy briefings, participants were briefed on the data and desktop research which highlighted key conflict risk factors, as well as hotspots in their state. Following this presentation of the data, workshop participants agreed on which priority conflict issues they wanted to address and embarked on a planning exercise. Using the CAST and CAF 2.0 models, participants then undertook an analysis of selected conflict risk factors to understand the root causes and the underlying drivers, and, with the aid of a customized Stakeholder Network Analysis of the wider region, explored which individuals and organisations in the state would potentially be in a position to mitigate the issues, based on spheres of influence and connectivity factors. Utilizing this robust analysis, participants developed an action plan to address the conflict drivers in each state. The action plans were designed to include a calendar of tasks, activities, roles, and responsibilities, which were later used for an After-Action Review to assess the effectiveness of the intervention and make suggestions where improvements might be embarked upon in the future.



# RESPONSE

A successful early warning system will be able to inform timely, relevant and actionable response to prevent or mitigate conflict and its contributing or underlying drivers. It should also be able to differentiate between event-driven risks and structural vulnerabilities, allowing for the potential for rapid response in the first instance, to stem possible violence or loss of life, and to shore up systemic weaknesses in the second instance, which often entails longer-term planning and perspective. The process begins with the collection and consolidation of data for assessment (diagnostic), which then informs analysis (prognostic), which is then used to inform response (prophylactic). In many situations, however, early warning information may not lead to effective response. If there is a failure of effective response, most observers tend to point the finger at one of three possible culprits: 1) information failure, 2) lack of capacity to respond, or 3) lack of political will to respond. These three issues often do contribute to the failure of Early Warning/Early Response, (EWER) but more often than not, the real breakdown is one of process. Specifically, even if there is effective communication, response capacity and the political will to respond, early warning systems can still break down if there is no process to operationalize response actions.

First, however, it is useful to explore each issue more in depth to understand how it impacts the overall system.

## ***Problem 1 - Information Failure***

It is not enough for an early warning system to collect and process data, the system must possess the capacity to disseminate early warning information to appropriate stakeholders in an appropriate format for timely preventive action, which can sometimes be a challenge.<sup>1</sup> In particular, while the horizontal flow of early warning data may be adequate across multilateral institutions or even between or among multilateral institution and national governments, the vertical flow of information down to response actors who may have the ability or willingness to respond is often inadequate, if it occurs at all.

## ***Problem 2 - Lack of Capacity to Respond***

Beyond the challenges presented by poor information or inadequate lines of communication, there may also be limited capacity for effective response. Even if there is sufficient early warning information and relevant stakeholders on the ground are informed and willing to respond, they may lack the capacity to act effectively. Many civil society organizations may be well-positioned to drive a citizen-led conflict management process, and have the desire to do so. However, they may lack resources to implement, or critical skills and training in facilitation, negotiation, mediation, or project management, which are all necessary for effective response to early warning information.<sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, there can often be inadequate funding of government institutions and bureaucratic bottlenecks that hinder the ability of relevant institutions to respond as well as to play a coordinating and oversight role.

### *Problem 3 - Lack of Political Will*

One of the greatest pitfalls of early warning systems is a lack of political will when it comes to response.<sup>3</sup> This is particularly true in two cases. The first is when a multilateral or multinational organization, including the UN and other regional or sub-regional bodies (i.e. the African Union, IGAD, ECOWAS, etc.) has in place a functioning and reliable early warning system, but must gain member consensus or authority to respond, or otherwise must be mindful of political sensitivities. The second case is at the national level where the willingness of key stakeholder groups (e.g. government institutions, civil society, community leadership, and private sector) to cooperate with one another may be strained due to conflicting interests or priorities. Sometimes security institutions may perceive NGOs and civil society as having no role in resolving conflicts and see issues of peace and security as the exclusive domain of security agencies. In other cases, particularly in contexts where there has historically been a confrontational or acrimonious relationship between government and civil society, a lack of trust greatly hampers effective communication and willingness to work together to respond. Additionally, it is often challenging to simply gain the attention and interest of government bodies and officials in the creation or enactment of effective response mechanisms to early warning information. In the worst-case scenario, when a government itself may be party to the conflict itself, early warning information can be met with hostility or denial. On the other side of the equation, some NGOs and civil society organizations may not see intervention in violent conflicts as their responsibility, or they feel that their capacity for prevention is low. Overall, a lack of political will coupled with

inadequate resources and capacity make effective response difficult, even when the need is clear.<sup>4</sup>

### *Problem 4: Breakdown in Process*

As implied above, there is a common misconception about early warning, such that people tend to view it as fundamentally about products, be they alerts, memos, or briefs. Most observers tend to assume that the role of early warning is to wave a red flag with brilliant maps, graphs, and pie charts, informing decision makers of an elevated risk of impending conflict escalation. The implication of this assumption is that a failure of early response is either due to a breakdown of information, capacity, or will. But more often, decision makers already have good situational awareness and are willing to respond with the tools at their disposal. When they receive an alert, they file it away as important background information to take into consideration along with their other conflicting imperatives and short and long-term priorities and obligations. Consequently, the actual point of failure is not so much a lack of awareness, capacity, or will, but rather a breakdown in process.

This means that, at the end of the day, EWER is really about Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), budgets, work plans, proposals, Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E), and other project planning documents that present forcing functions and assist the decision maker in identifying and prioritizing options for operational and strategic response, and match the need with available resources in a manner that avoids unnecessary delay.

A successful early warning system will have mechanisms in place to optimize these procedures, working in collaboration with decision makers and planners/implementers to ensure that the information is systematically incorporated into the strategic, operational, and program documents on a sustained and ongoing basis.

## PART I: PIND'S APPROACH

PIND's integrated early warning model includes mechanisms that mitigate the pitfalls of many early warning systems as outlined above. Central to this model is the premise that rapid response, conflict management and interventions should involve multi-stakeholder engagement in order to create space for longer-term peacebuilding efforts. This strategy involves leveraging local peace building assets by first identifying key stakeholders, then filling gaps in their ability to analyze and respond to conflict, including gaps in platforms for collaboration, data and information, skills and technical capacity, and resources. The approach is further reinforced by the Theory of Change as follows:

*When data on patterns and trends of conflict risk factors are connected with training and capacity building for response and amplified by the use of peace journalism in the media, a positive impact can be made for peace and security at the local, state, regional and national level.*

This Theory of Change is predicated on a robust use of data as a cornerstone, and PIND strives to create common platforms and shared resources to encourage a crowding-in effect where more peace actors are attracted to the Niger Delta and are empowered through collaboration and information sharing.

Listed below are various factors incorporated in the PIND approach to address and mitigate the potential gaps in early warning and effective early response.

### *Approach 1 – Cultivate Robust Communication Channels*

PIND facilitates and promotes multi-stakeholder platforms to cultivate social infrastructure in the Niger Delta as a foundation for an effective and sustainable early warning system. This approach includes establishing and expanding networks, supporting these networks through the provision of information and skills, connecting peace actors, and forming partnership with diverse range of stakeholders to help ensure that early warning and response interventions are sensitive to the dynamics of conflict in the target states and communities.

One of PIND's most important efforts to improve social infrastructure and social capital in the Niger Delta since 2013 has been the development and support of the P4P Network; a region-wide platform of local stakeholders who engage with one another on an ongoing basis around conflict early warning, assessment, and response. It is a platform where people with different backgrounds and perspectives come together to understand and address the root causes of conflict and build sustainable peace. P4P facilitates grassroots conflict

### CASE STUDY I: P4P INTERVENTION IN GANG/MILITANT VIOLENCE IN IMO STATE

In 2016, the Imo State chapter of the P4P utilized a model that included a robust quantitative and qualitative assessment of key actors, conflict drivers, triggers, and historical patterns and trends to manage a violent conflict between cult and militant groups in the Awarra Court Area of the state. The state chapter also relied on multi-stakeholder engagement to obtain additional contextual, qualitative information. Based on this, they were able to pinpoint key constituencies and actors that needed to be engaged. Over the course of several months, the P4P facilitated meetings and exchanged correspondences with traditional rulers, local politicians and representatives of the State House of Assembly; cult and militant groups operating in the area; the police and other security personnel; youth groups; the church and other relevant CSO actors. In addition, a Peace Summit was organised which brought together key actors, including youths and traditional rulers, and succeeded in getting the two warring cult groups to sign a temporary ceasefire to allow for further conflict mediation and resolution efforts. Also, the efforts of the P4P resulted in the establishment of the Awarra Court Area Youth Council (ACAYOC) that created a formal linkage between the youth groups and the Awarra Court Area Traditional Rulers Council, two of the main conflict actors in the area. Finally, by the time the Imo P4P state chapter had concluded the intervention, locally displaced persons were beginning to return to the area. Overall, though challenges remain in the area, the efforts of the state chapter of the P4P in bridging some critical gaps and identifying an overarching strategy remains in place today as a model of multi-stakeholder engagement.

## CASE STUDY 2: BUILDING STAKEHOLDERS' CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE RESPONSE INTERVENTIONS

In 2017, PIND organized a training workshop for selected stakeholders in each of the nine states of the Niger Delta to improve their knowledge and build their capacity in conflict analysis, planning, and response interventions, and to apply these skills to address key conflict issues in their communities. With the help of the conflict trackers and policy briefings, participants were able to identify key conflict risk factors and hotspots in their state, and agreed on a priority conflict issue they want to address. Using the CAST and CAF models, participants then undertook an analysis of the selected conflict to understand the root causes and the underlying drivers, and identify key stakeholders with influence on the conflict. Thereafter, participants identified capacities and spheres of influence among themselves with regards to the identified problem and stakeholders, and developed an action plan to address the conflict. The action plan includes a calendar of tasks, activities, roles, and responsibilities, which were later used for an After Action Review to assess the effectiveness of the intervention and make suggestions for improvement in future interventions.

assessment, crisis mapping and early warning, and identifies and supports existing local initiatives and create new ones that address emerging conflict dynamics. The network has chapters in all nine states of the Niger Delta, and membership is open to individuals and organisations.

Since its founding, P4P Network interventions have been most aligned with the risk of communal conflict as well as the mitigation of election violence. However, in some states they have also responded effectively to gang and cult violence, as well as incidents of violence against women and girls (VAWG). In general, P4P response activities consist of two components – rapid response actions to mitigate rising tensions and conflict risk, and long-term peacebuilding interventions to help shore up vulnerabilities by building and expanding upon skills critical to societal resilience.

P4P's rapid response interventions include:

- Mediation
- Negotiation
- Town hall meetings with affected communities
- Direct appeal to conflict actors to forestall reprisal and to discuss alternatives to violence

P4P's long-term peacebuilding interventions include:

- Establishment of multi-stakeholder platforms to resolve intra/inter-ethnic conflicts and tensions,
- Capacity building to improve economic activities to promote peaceable livelihoods in local communities,
- Establishment and facilitation of Peace Clubs in schools, and

- Promotion of peaceful co-existence through peace messaging and advocacy for peaceful resolution of conflict.

In addition, PIND is a founding member of the Peace and Security Network (PSN); a Nigeria-wide platform that brings together international agencies, donors, local and international civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, and others working on issues of peace and security in the country. The PSN, which is described in more detail in the section below, has also formed regional networks in each of Nigeria's six geo-political zones to ensure that these types of collaborative platforms proliferate at the local level, as both conflict risk and vulnerabilities vary widely from one region to another, and there is no "one size fits all" approach to early warning and response, in Nigeria or elsewhere. The main value of these networks of peace actors with skills, information, knowledge, and robust channels of communication is to create an enabling environment for rapid dissemination of early warning information, and for targeted response to conflict issues. Collaborative platforms like the P4P Network or the PSN, and its regional level representations, also allow for and encourage the sharing of various perspectives, and the ability for organizations and individuals who might never otherwise collaborate, to fill gaps in capacities and facilitate the transfer of knowledge for effective response.

### *Approach 2 – Capacity Building for Effective Response*

A key element in initiating a timely and appropriate preventive intervention is the capacity to understand the context of the conflict situation by identifying and interpreting early warning signs of conflict and indicators of increasing tensions or violence.<sup>6</sup> PIND enhances the capacity of Peace Actors to be more effective in their conflict



management activities through capacity building.

The Integrated Peace and Development Unit (IPDU) is PIND’s strategy for providing operational-level support to peace actors and stakeholders in conflict mitigation and capacity building. The IPDU has three components; Research, Capacity Building, and Applied Learning, to allow for the early targeting and mitigation of potential drivers of conflict. The IPDU Capacity Building component promotes knowledge sharing, systematization of experiences, best practices and lessons learnt to support partners and stakeholders. This component conducts training of trainers and provides tools and resources for capacity building and mentoring to support peace actors and stakeholders.

The IPDU promotes collaboration and synergy among the existing local, regional, and national efforts of actors in both public and private sectors to address conflict early warning and response. This is done by building the capacity of those actors involved in the conflict management space, and developing and implementing projects designed to further promote peaceful resolution of conflict. PIND has provided technical and capacity-building support to the P4P Network and the Network’s PREVENT Committee members in regular training workshops. This capacity building and skills transfer takes the form of a wide variety of trainings and activities, including basic “Conflict 101”

introductory courses, SMS-based early warning reporting, conflict assessment and analysis, mitigation planning, and intervention management. As noted in prior chapters of this Handbook, PIND adopts an “Applied Learning” approach to the training of stakeholders. This includes workshops and trainings on facilitation, negotiation, mediation, and resource mobilization. PIND also provides training for other critical skills to help build the capacity of local groups and organizations such as budget management and reporting, work planning, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Rather than focusing on theory alone, the PIND model for training and capacity building includes practical sessions with real-life examples, often drawing on relevant local case studies and encouraging knowledge-sharing and skills transfer among participants. Overall, the key to PIND’s training approach is to not only improve the knowledge and capacity of stakeholders in conflict analysis, planning and effective implementation of intervention plans, but also the day-to-day management and evaluation tools that are equally critical to a robust and functioning EWER process.

### *Approach 3 – Coordinated Multi-Agency Response*

PIND facilitates and leverages networks of local, national and international agencies and stakeholders to coordinate early warning information sharing and response interventions. PIND is a founding

## **CASE STUDY 3: MANAGING ELECTION VIOLENCE THROUGH MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION**

The transition of gubernatorial power has historically been fraught with violence in Bayelsa state. During the 2012 gubernatorial election in the state, for instance, political tensions were elevated, with reported explosions at party secretariats, politically motivated cult killings, kidnappings, attempted assassinations, and general political thuggery. In 2015, early warning signs of conflict began to emerge after the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced 5th December 2015 for the gubernatorial elections in the state. Based on data from PIND’s early warning platform and examination of other datasets, it was apparent that the potential for conflict in the state was growing. Utilizing these multiple streams of information, PIND produced a Conflict Briefing highlighting the potential for election violence in the state. In November 2015, based on the findings and recommendations of the Conflict Briefing, and using a combination of Stakeholders Network Analysis (SNA) and P4P Network partnerships, PIND conveyed and facilitated a multi-stakeholders’ forum on mitigating violence during the election in the state, with participants including representatives of political parties, INEC, security forces, CSOs, ex-militants, youth groups, and media organizations.

At the end of the forum, participants issued a communique and signed a “Peace Pact”, where party representatives vowed to work closely with relevant stakeholders to ensure peace and security before, during, and after the elections. PIND also embarked on a non-violent election advocacy program through the media and bulk SMS peace messaging to respond to structural vulnerabilities and underlying drivers of election violence in the state. PIND also built the capacity of members of the Bayelsa state P4P chapter on early warning reporting, conflict analysis and mitigation planning to better respond to conflict issues in the state. After the elections, PIND followed-up with key informant interviews and regular monitoring of the prior identified conflict risk and vulnerability factors to determine the impact of the intervention and any unanticipated effects. This information was then shared with stakeholders to ensure that lessons learnt are applied in future interventions.

member of the above mentioned PSN, which was founded as the Peace and Security Working Group (PSWG) in 2013 to help coordinate multi-stakeholder early warning and response efforts leading up to the 2015 Nigerian general elections. The PSN is a vital networking, information-sharing and coordination platform for its members. One of the focus areas of the PSN is the prevention of election violence, and the network serves as a crucial hub for its members to share early warning information and analyses of likely scenarios, work plans and response activities to mitigate violence.

There are branches of the PSN within each of Nigeria six geo-political zones, in addition to the national body. PIND facilitates and coordinates the South-South (Niger Delta) branch of the PSN. In February 2016, PIND participated in the inaugural meeting of the Niger Delta Peace and Security Network (NDPSN) in Rivers state. The NDPSN was founded to specifically address the rising level of insecurity and violence in the region. In 2017, PIND expanded the NDPSN by establishing Working Groups in three more states - Bayelsa, Cross River, and Delta. These states were identified by PIND early warning data as experiencing the largest share of violence in the region. The Working Groups use PIND's early warning products for conflict analysis, stakeholder engagement, and intervention planning, as exemplified by a meeting of the Cross River state NDPSN Working Group in 2017 where they discussed the challenges of street children that were highlighted in PIND's policy brief for February of that year.

#### *Approach 4 – Process Optimization*

For early warning to be successful there must be a process for coordinating data collection and analysis, assessment of early warning information, formulation of action plan, and response actions.<sup>7</sup> An effective response intervention depends largely on effective planning and the ability to organize the various response activities into logical work plans. An intervention response plan should be able to determine how to transform early warning information into a plan to mobilize for response.

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, response planning is more of a process than a product or an output. An effective response plan should be able to articulate and integrate the procedures to be used in an intervention by assigning responsibilities to specific groups or individuals and ensuring that all stakeholders involved understand their roles.<sup>8</sup>

PIND early response strategy is centered on a process-driven approach for effective interventions. For this reason, PIND has established platforms for stakeholder collaboration and for data collection from different sources for visualization, to determine priorities, and used as a baseline before each intervention. Moreover, PIND has established PREVENT Committees in each state of the Niger Delta for rapid response to conflict incidents. This strategy involves leveraging local peace building assets by first identifying key stakeholders, then filling gaps in their ability to analyze and respond to conflict, including gaps in platforms for collaboration, data and information, skills and technical capacity, and resources.

#### CHAPTER ENDNOTES

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3. Richard H. Solomon and Lawrence Woocher (2010) Confronting the Challenge of "Political Will", United State Institute of Peace. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2010/03/confronting-challenge-political-will>
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5. Alexander, D.E. (2015) Disaster and Emergency planning for Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science. P.5. Available at: <http://naturalhazardscience.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.001.0001/acrefore-9780199389407-e-12>
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8. Ibid, Alexander, D.E. (2015), p.5.

## PART II: OPERATOR’S INSTRUCTIONS


PIND’s integrated early warning model is built around specific mechanisms and platforms that link early warning information with actual response initiatives. This approach ensures that analysis of the early warning data is simultaneously directed at understanding the context in which conflict is occurring in order to anticipate events, understand causal linkages, and formulate appropriate interventions. The essence is to ensure that interventions are locally owned and process-driven in order to address realities on the ground in the most contextually appropriate ways.

### INTERVENTION DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT

*Operational Level Response:*

*P4P PREVENT Committees & Small Grants Program*

Central to PIND’s process-driven approach to early warning and conflict management is the premise that early response should target real and emerging problems on the ground in order to create space for longer-term peacebuilding efforts. As a key response mechanism of PIND’s integrated early warning system, the PREVENT Committee’s interventions are implemented in response to PIND’s early warning information and products. The Committee receives early warning reports directly from PIND’s SMS-based early warning platform as well as quarterly and thematic conflict trackers for update and situational awareness.



Once they receive early warning alerts, the committee mobilises its members, engages with relevant public and private sector stakeholders, and embarks on preventive interventions. The PREVENT Committees work as influencers and mobilizers, responding to identified precursors to violence and instability within their respective states. The committees meet weekly, or as needed, and designate who would be responsible to respond to what situation, as well as how and when they would respond. The PREVENT Committee has a robust reporting template that allows PIND to track the outcome of their interventions for follow-up and accountability.


In addition to the rapid-response interventions by the PREVENT

### CASE STUDY 4: DESIGNING & IMPLEMENTING EARLY RESPONSE TO AVERT CONFLICT

In 2016, the PREVENT Committee of the Rivers State chapter of the P4P averted a communal conflict through rapid and inclusive response. Rumours that a suspected terrorist was traced to a Hausa/Fulani community in the state gave rise to an incident that had the potential to ignite communal crisis. A group of youths began planning an attack on the community in retaliation for suspected role in harbouring a purported terrorist, a situation that had the potential to be both catastrophic and very deadly within a short time. The Rivers State PREVENT Committee, upon hearing the news of the impending attack, knew that time was of the essence and mobilized for response quickly. After meeting to determine the best course of action, and one that would involve all aggrieved and suspicious parties, they called a meeting of the Community Development Committee (CDC) chairmen of the four communities that owned the settlement where the crisis was impending. After hours of tense dialogue, facilitated by the Rivers State P4P PREVENT Committee, the CDC chairmen agreed to talk with the youth of their respective communities and dissuade them from attacking the target group or anyone living in the settlement. The CDC chairmen emphasized the need for tolerance and understanding and warned of the dangers of rumours in an already charged environment. They also explained how the planned attack would trigger a series of crises that could quickly engulf the entire settlement. In the end, the youth were persuaded, and the planned attack was averted.

**RESULTS CHAIN**

Figure 5.2




Committees, PIND uses small grants to help address identified risks and areas of concerns. These small grants are provided to specific NGOs/CSOs in order to work on specific emerging risk factors in hotspots. This approach allows PIND to leverage conflict mitigation professionals to address the deeper drivers of communal, political, and criminal conflict to help resolve issues, going beyond simply managing them. The organizations to which PIND provides small grants bring a deeper understanding of the specific conflict dynamics, drivers, and actors in the communities in which they operate. Additionally, they have strong relationships with community groups and leaders that can play an important role in mitigating existing and future conflict dynamics.

groups to help them pursue their work, PIND can offer technical support, which has twofold benefits. First, PIND’s broader regional perspective can help community organizations understand how their local conflict dynamics are affected by and fit into larger regional conflict dynamics. Second, PIND can draw on the extensive conflict management experience that it has through the PREVENT Committees to help equip community members with skills in conflict management, peacebuilding, and early warning and response in order to resolve potential issues before they reach a crisis point. Finally, these partnerships help PIND by extending the scope and utility of its early warning network, both by expanding the number of people trained in reporting to the Peace Map and by exposing more people to the benefits in using the Peace Map.

In addition to the material support that PIND’s grants provide to these

FROM EARLY WARNING TO RESPONSE

Figure 5.3



**Strategic Level Response:**

**P4P State Chapters**

Beyond the rapid-response PREVENT Committee interventions, there are two other ways in which PIND facilitates response for conflict management. Sometimes, a P4P state chapter determines that a

strategic, integrated campaign is required to deal with a complex problem. Then they meet and designate who would be responsible to respond to what situation, as well as how and when they would respond. Most times, this kind of sustained intervention is undertaken around risk factors like election violence and communal conflict and may be done with partners such as Government or security services.

**AFTER ACTION REPORT PROTOCOLS**

**AAR Protocol A:**

Immediately after an activity, project, or intervention, staff involved in the activity will convene to briefly answer the following questions. The completed form will then be circulated to the entire Peacebuilding team by email and saved in the Google Drive used by the team.

1. What were we trying to accomplish?
2. What did we do to accomplish it?
3. In what ways did we accomplish it? Why? How?
4. In what ways did we fail to accomplish it? Why? How?
5. Where there any unexpected challenges?
6. Where there any unexpected successes?
7. List any new sources of information as a result of the activity:
  - a. Key contacts
  - b. New data sets
  - c. Institutions
  - d. Reports
  - e. Similar projects
  - f. Other resources

**AAR Protocol B:**

During the weekly Team Meeting, the entire team will discuss any AARs that have been filled out and circulated during the week and will answer the following two questions, which will attempt to operationalize the insights in practical ways for future interventions.

1. How will we apply these findings in future activities (be specific)?
2. Did any opportunities present themselves for follow-up activities based on traction achieved during the activity being reviewed?

Intervention planning is drawn from conflict analysis and proposals by individuals, organizations, and each state chapter of the P4P Network. During the P4P Network Annual Strategic Planning Meeting budgets, workplans and Monitoring & Evaluation frameworks are developed for each intervention. Many of the P4P members are also involved in gathering and transmitting early warning information to P4P's SMS-based early warning platform, further enriching their process of analysis when designing interventions.

## AFTER ACTION REVIEWS

Once interventions have been carried out at the operational and strategic level, it is important to reflect on the successes and challenges of the intervention. Undertaking After Action Reviews (AAR), are crucial for data-driven and evidence-based Early Warning and Preventative Response, undertaking them in a systematic way to ensure that information accrued, and lessons learned are fed back into the system. PIND has developed two AAR protocols, as illustrated above. The AAR Protocol A will be deployed by the team at the end of each activity (workshop, training, intervention, etc.). Protocol B will be deployed, if applicable during each weekly Team Meeting.

## RECOMMENDED RESOURCES

- Alexander Austin (2004) Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science? Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin). Available at: [http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2575/pdf/austin\\_handbook.pdf](http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2575/pdf/austin_handbook.pdf)
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**SAMPLE TEMPLATE: P4P PREVENT COMMITTEE INTERVENTION PLANNING**

<i>Potential Violence Reporting</i>			
<i>State</i>		<i>LGA</i>	
<i>Name of Community</i>		<i>Population</i>	
<i>Potential Violence Type</i>			
<i>By who?</i>		<i>Against Who?</i>	
<i>Threat against infrastructure?</i>		<i>Type of Infrastructure</i>	
<i>Brief Description of Threat</i>			

<i>Proposed Intervention I</i>		<i>Proposed Intervention Date</i>	
<i>Proposed Intervention II</i>		<i>Proposed Intervention Date</i>	
<i>Proposed Intervention III</i>		<i>Proposed Intervention Date</i>	
<i>Who Will Intervene?</i>	<i>Name of Intervening Person</i>	<i>Phone Number</i>	

<i>Brief Description of Intervention</i>
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### SAMPLE TEMPLATE: STRATEGIC PLANNING MEETING AGENDA

Time	Activities
10:00 — 10:30	Arrival and registration of participants
10:30 — 10:45	Introduction of participants
10:45 — 11:15	Tea Break
11:15 — 11:40	Opening remarks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On PIND Foundation</li> <li>• EWER System</li> <li>• Objectives of the meeting</li> </ul>
11:40 — 12:00	Reflections on issues and dynamics of security challenges in the region and efforts at addressing challenges in the area
12:00 — 12:40	Break
12:40 — 13:20	Effectiveness, Risks and Gaps of current initiatives
13:20 — 13:50	Concrete next steps – The role of security stakeholders and Allies
13:50 — 14:00	Closing Courtesies
14:00	Lunch

### SAMPLE TEMPLATE: ANNUAL WORKPLAN & BUDGET

Workplan for [YEAR]

#### Month I: Introduction

Summary of the:

- Issue/s the workplan activities seeks to address
- Brief description of the activities and the theory of change
- Intended outputs and outcomes of the activities i.e. how will you measure success?

Activities	Description	Cost (N)	
I.1	Awareness Raising and Preventive Action	Raising public awareness and generating constituencies informed of conflict prevention and peace-building efforts, including the important role of civil society, Developing effective tools and operational capacities to mobilize action and enable CSOs to contribute to preventing conflict in collaboration with other key stakeholders	30,000
I.2	Media	Publicity of our interventions and advocacy visits	10,000
I.3	Communication (i.e. calls and SMS) etc.	Make calls and SMS to interact with early warning group, community stakeholders, government agencies etc. post conflict prevention follow up etc	10,000
I.4	Stationeries / Hand Bill	Introducing and breaking down activities to language the least common man can understand	8,500
I.5	Interaction and Advocacy Visits	Visit and meeting with relevant government agencies and major actors in conflict to discuss policy and mechanism to maintain peaceful atmosphere, strengthening the cooperation between CSOs and policymakers from governments	20,000
I.6	Intervention Logistics	Meeting with stakeholders in conflict situation to resolve the conflict	12,000

Continue for each month and provide a summary budget at the end with annual costs.

90,500



**SAMPLE TEMPLATE: STRATEGIC PLANNING**

Interventions	Objectives	Specific Activities	Outputs	Persons Responsible	Success Metrics
<p><b>Addressing the street children phenomenon in xx area</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop collaboration between government and CSOs to address the street children issue</li> <li>Reduce the number of children living on the streets of the capital city</li> <li>Reduce number of crimes committed by street children within the capital city</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify existing organizations working to address this issue</li> <li>Convene a multi-stakeholder forum at the state level comprising of these organizations</li> <li>Implement outcomes and recommendations from the forum</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a multi-pronged approach to addressing this issue in collaboration with CSOs</li> <li>Learn from the experience of other CSOs working in this area</li> <li>Leverage on and harness existing efforts of other actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Office of the SSA</li> <li>PIND</li> <li>Partners for Peace</li> <li>Other CSOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reported reduction of street children criminal activity (based on KIs with CSOs, community members and law enforcement)</li> <li>Reported reduction of street children in the area (based on KIs with CSOs, community members, and government departments)</li> </ul>



# CONCLUSION

This handbook describes in detail the entire integrated early warning and response system built and maintained by PIND in the Niger Delta. Given the complexity of conflict and the inevitability of gaps and contradictions in available data as it applies to conflict risk, early warning is a major challenge. In a field fraught with moving parts and ambiguity at every level, conflict early warning requires humility, empathy, rigor, and creativity. Researchers must be very clear in what can be measured empirically and what cannot. They must be clear-eyed about what can be quantified, and what can only be described qualitatively. But they also must never let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Ultimately early warning is about solving problems. An analysis that is accurate but impractical does not achieve the objective of conflict mitigation. However, if the analysis is transparent about the scope and the limitations of the data, and explicit about the parameters and assumptions that are being made in the analysis, then decision-makers and practitioners will be able to make good use of the early warning products, whether they be trackers, briefs, alerts, or even an urgent phone call to a traditional ruler or a security agent.

PIND's role in the Niger Delta is to provide platforms, templates,

methodologies, and information to whoever is willing and able to use it for the prevention and mitigation of conflict risk. In keeping with this mission, PIND hopes that this handbook will be useful to development actors, government, private sector, civil society, and community stakeholders as we all work together to promote peace in the Niger Delta. The handbook lays out the theory and practice of how PIND collects data and integrates secondary sources for a diagnosis of risk that needs to be addressed. It goes on to describe how those early warning products are used to extrapolate a prognosis and a qualitative analysis for recommendations that can be applied by decision makers and/or practitioners. It also includes templates and modules for Training of Trainers and Applied Learning.

Through this handbook, it is hoped that more actors will be able to key into the PIND early warning system as well as to conduct their own programs, projects, and activities for early warning and response. Ultimately, PIND aims to promote partnerships because it is only by working together that we will be able to collectively bring our efforts to scale, and make a fundamental, systemic change in the Niger Delta for sustainable peace and prosperity.









