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The Fund for Peace
1101 14th Street NW, Suite 1020
Washington, D.C. 20005

T: +1 202 223 7940
F: +1 202 223 7947

www.fundforpeace.org
OVERVIEW

PIND’s peacebuilding strategy is to catalyze and leverage local capacity for early warning, conflict management, and peacebuilding across the Niger Delta, with a view towards creating an enabling environment for sustainable broad-based economic development. From the initial scoping in 2012 until 2018, the peacebuilding program has produced a network of thousands of peace actors, platforms for engagement, a rich repository of data and analysis, capacity building and interventions on the ground, all of which has generated a series of ripple effects which would not have happened otherwise. One of the challenges in undertaking such an assessment is that it is the second and third-order (downstream) effects that this report seeks to measure, beyond the immediate outputs of the project. This report measures impact of the efforts of PIND and its partners across the full conflict cycle, to include early warning, conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. As such the report will be divided into three sections, right:

In the following pages, this assessment will first look at each component individually. Then, based on the level of violence over the last two years and the relative density of the social infrastructure by state, plot each state on the x-y axis for prognosis and strategic planning going forward. The chapter for each component will begin with a Purpose Statement, followed by an overview of the sub-components and key findings. This will then be followed by a detailed description and explanation of each sub-component.
PIND’s peacebuilding strategy is to catalyze and leverage local capacity for early warning, conflict management, and peacebuilding across the Niger Delta, with a view towards creating an enabling environment for sustainable broad-based economic development. From the initial scoping in 2012 until 2018, the peacebuilding program has produced a network of thousands of peace actors, platforms for engagement, a rich repository of data and analysis, capacity building and interventions on the ground, all of which has generated a series of ripple effects which would not have happened otherwise.

One of the challenges in undertaking such an assessment is that it is the second and third-order (downstream) effects that this report seeks to measure, beyond the immediate outputs of the project. This report measures impact of the efforts of PIND and its partners across the full conflict cycle, to include early warning, conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. As such the report will be divided into three sections:
1. PIND’s impact on enhancing Early Warning in the Niger Delta,
2. PIND’s impact on management and mitigation of conflict escalation in the Niger Delta, and
3. PIND’s Impact on enhancing social infrastructure/capital for long-term and sustainable peacebuilding efforts in the Niger Delta.

A second challenge is in the inherent complexity of the conflict system PIND is seeking to influence. In a project like this, a reduction in violence alone is not necessarily a success if that reduction would have occurred absent PIND’s presence in the region. Likewise, given exogenous shocks and shifting sociopolitical winds, an increase in violence is not necessarily a failure if the increase would have been sharper without PIND. By definition then, the report seeks to measure outcomes against an intangible counterfactual.

Challenging though it may be, by taking a mixed-methods quantitative/qualitative approach, and employing systems modeling tools like GIS and social network analysis, it is possible to measure and describe impact in a compelling and tangible way and evaluate the project’s adherence to its Theory of Change and its Results Chain, which was developed as far back as 2013.

Reinforcing PIND’s commitment to a data-driven approach to targeted and impactful conflict mitigation, the Theory of Change is as follows:

When data on patterns and trends of conflict risk factors are connected with training and capacity building for response and amplified by the use of peace journalism in the media, a positive impact can be made for peace and security at the local, state, regional and national levels.

This data driven approach may not be unprecedented in the field. But it is unusual if not rare outside of academia. Most field-based peacebuilding efforts are so busy reacting to crisis that they do not have the bandwidth to collect and analyze data on patterns and trends, much less on an ongoing basis, and to use that analysis to inform planning and response at both the structural/policy level as well as at the operational level and for rapid response. But during the inception phase of the program, PIND had the foresight to spend the time and effort necessary to establish platforms for data collection and visualization, produce monthly and quarterly trackers, and then train hundreds of peace actors across the Niger Delta in conflict analysis and conflict management skills so that they can make use of the information. Furthermore, PIND uses the data collected to determine priorities, key messages, and as a baseline before each activity or media campaign. In this way, PIND is able to become more efficient and effective, rather than trying to do everything everywhere. They are able to pinpoint the most critical need as well as the greatest opportunity to effect change, with a focus on “low hanging fruit” as well as longer-term strategic thinking.
Without this data-driven approach to Early Warning and Response (EWR), the default would be to rely on qualitative methods for prioritizing the problem and identifying solutions. But using qualitative methods without a strong quantitative foundation tends to create a dynamic where proximity bias holds sway (where the closest problem and most recent incident are assumed to be the most important) and in the course of stakeholder consultation, the loudest or richest person at the table inevitably defines the parameters of the problem and solution, regardless of the reality on the ground.

Hence PIND’s theory of change, which is predicated on the scientific and robust use of data as a foundation. They have now developed a reputation so that academics, private sector actors, and other peacebuilding and development agencies look to PIND’s analysis and often reach out to them for partnership.

Helping these and other stakeholders to be more effective is at the heart of PIND’s design and its Results Chain. Rather than considering any of these actors as competitors and attempt to crowd them out, PIND strives to create common platforms and shared resources so as to encourage a crowding-in effect where more peace agents are attracted to the region and all are enabled to be more effective through collaboration and information sharing.

In 2013, PIND articulated its Results Chain as illustrated on the next page. The last five years demonstrate a striking fidelity to this original design. The idea was that a series of activities that would amplify the voices of peace agents (peace messages and awards), develop a network so that peace agents can bring their efforts to scale (P4P Chapters, Information Hub, Peace Camp, working groups, website and social media), and concrete action for targeted conflict mitigation (through small grants and P4P interventions). These would target stakeholders such as youth, women, community leaders, and international organizations, and lead to increased interaction, skills, knowledge, understanding, coordination, and interventions, which ultimately would improve peacebuilding and reduce violence, creating a more enabling environment for sustainable economic development which would eventually improve the wellbeing of the average citizen.

This Results Chain dynamically illustrates the logic of PIND’s peacebuilding program design. While tracing a direct causal link between PIND’s activities and the employment rate is beyond the
MEASURING IMPACT AGAINST PIND’S THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS CHAIN DESIGN

RESULTS CHAIN

FINAL IMPACTS

By increased incomes and employment in the Niger Delta

By more suitable environment for economic activities and growth

By Reduction in violence and tensions (violence is a key constraint to economic growth)

By People in the Niger Delta increasingly choosing peaceful and cooperative strategies for solving problems

By Peacebuilding interventions are more effective in anticipating and responding to conflict

INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

By Awareness: Stakeholders are more aware of the negative impacts of conflict on their livelihoods and are more supportive of peacebuilding efforts

By Engagement: Stakeholders are more actively engaged in peacebuilding activities

By Understanding: Stakeholders have a more accurate and detailed understanding of conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta

By Collaboration/Coordination: Stakeholders increasingly make use of platforms for collaboration and coordination in conflict assessment, management, prevention, and peacebuilding

By peacebuilding actors have better skills to conduct interventions and deal with conflict

OUTPUTS

By Community members hear and engage with peace messages

By Awards ceremony publicizes successful peacebuilding

By Peacebuilding actors engage with P4P chapters and clubs

By Peacebuilding development and other actors use information and analysis

By Peacebuilding actors interact using the website and social media

By increased communication and information sharing between peacebuilding actors

By Participants network with each other and are trained

By Key peacebuilding actors acquire skills to use in their projects

By Successful implementation of peacebuilding projects that address specific and local conflict

ACTIVITIES

By Peace Messaging (films, SMS)

By Awards

By P4P Chapters and Clubs

By Information Hub

By Website & Social Media

By Working Groups

By Peace Camp

By Assessments

By Training and Dialogues

By Small Grants

INTERVENTION AREAS

Communications and Publicity

Relationship Building

Information Sharing

Training

Financial Support

TARGET: General public of Niger Delta

TARGET: Stakeholders in the Niger Delta

TARGET: Local organization(s) involved in supporting peacebuilding initiatives

TARGET: Peacebuilding organizations with the Niger Delta

METHOD

By People in the Niger Delta increasingly choosing peaceful and cooperative strategies for solving problems

By Peacebuilding interventions are more effective in anticipating and responding to conflict

By Reduction in violence and tensions (violence is a key constraint to economic growth)

By more suitable environment for economic activities and growth

By increased incomes and employment in the Niger Delta

TARGET: General public of Niger Delta

TARGET: Stakeholders in the Niger Delta

TARGET: Local organization(s) involved in supporting peacebuilding initiatives

TARGET: Peacebuilding organizations with the Niger Delta

TARGET: Peacebuilding organizations with the Niger Delta
scope of this report, understanding the way in which discrete activities and components of PIND’s EWR system interact will be important for accurately estimating impact in Early Warning, Conflict Management, and Social Infrastructure/Capital.

Impact on Early Warning: In this report the section on Early Warning will describe the quantity and quality of PIND’s work in monitoring of trends, analysis of conflict dynamics, patterns, and trends, and dissemination of information as well as how that information is received by users. PIND’s EWR employs tools and methods for measuring trends in violence down to the LGA level across time (e.g. by year, election cycle, season, month, quarter, etc.). Beyond monitoring and evaluation, these data are also used to help local stakeholders prioritize, plan, and execute their efforts.

Impact on Conflict Management: The section on Management and Mitigation of Escalation will look at the extent to which interventions and activities were directly responsive to identified risk factors and provide examples of effective mitigation of communal, political, criminal violence, and insurgency. These will include efforts by PIND as well as their partners, such as the P4P Network, the Peace and Security Network, and others. Given that each time period has a unique set of social, political, and economic pressures, and cannot necessarily be compared with a previous time period, for measuring impact it is necessary to also identify qualitative examples of specific conflict issues that were mitigated through PIND’s efforts. Success stories may suggest that whatever the levels of violence may be, absent PIND’s intervention, they would have been worse in certain cases and situations.

Impact on Social Infrastructure/Capital: The section on Long Term Peacebuilding Efforts will describe progress towards the social infrastructure that has been built for the reduction of vulnerabilities and the promotion of resilience across the region. This will include the P4P Network strength, as well as their structures, tools, and skills. Success in this component of the assessment means laying a sustainable foundation for locally-owned conflict management at multiple levels (linking grassroots to civil society, traditional rulers, security services, and political leadership). Catalyzing and leveraging social capital in this way provides a resource that is contributing to peace in the Niger Delta today and will grow to become a real force over time. Membership strength and robust platforms for collaboration as well as trainings and collaborations with other actors are therefore also measurements of potential impact.

Ultimately, this report will assess how far PIND has come with regards to peacebuilding in the Niger Delta, and identify opportunities for management, donors, and partners to amplify and optimize that impact based on areas of relative strength and/or weakness and in the program. A successful effort will have built up a peacebuilding infrastructure that can react to spikes in risk, while building social capital to reduce pressure over time.

PIND’S STORY OVER TIME

IN 2012, PIND began with an analysis of the conflict drivers and key stakeholders in each of the nine Niger Delta states. This included a series of Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with men, women, youth, ex-militants, administrative officials, traditional authorities, and other opinion leaders. This assessment was then followed up with more extensive consultation across the region as the Theory of Change and Results Chain came into focus, which then culminated in a Strategic Communications Campaign Plan where stakeholders from the nine states agreed on target audiences, key messages, a logo, and other branding and communications tools.
In 2013 the Communications Strategy was tested and rolled out in all nine states. This consultation also served as a way of mobilizing stakeholders for a foundational Peace Camp during which hundreds of people were invited to develop a Terms of Reference for the Partners for Peace Network and launch the process of electing executive committees so that the real work could begin. This two years of intensive consultation before the executive committees were elected were critical to the ultimate success of the initiative. Given the history of networks in the region, the limited capacity of stakeholders, as well as the need to build a common vision to transcend latent distrust and destructive competition, this consultation phase was critical. By the time the Chapters were up and running, they had been extensively engaged, and a platform had already been built for the collection and visualization of early warning data.

2014 was mainly about state-level election, ratification of the P4P Charter, chapter inaugurations, and the election of a Central Working Committee. At the same time, PIND also conducted a series of conflict analysis trainings and began deploying small grants for conflict mitigation activities.

During 2015 there was a huge focus on the election. The EWR system was set up including an SMS platform. The Prevent Committee model for rapid response was piloted and each chapter was trained in Conflict Management.

2016 was focused on consolidation of the processes that had been piloted and tested in 2015 to ensure a flow between the collection of data, the computation and collation of that data, as well as analysis, planning, and execution of conflict management interventions.

This consolidation was continued into 2017, during which the PIND staff themselves focused increasingly on their own capacity building so as to be more effective as leaders, analysts, and trainers in their own right. In this way they became more professional and effective at building the capacity of stakeholders in the public and private sectors as well as to coordinate conflict mitigation efforts in a range of challenging and sensitive conflict situations.

In 2018, now that the systems have been optimized, the network catalyzed, and the capacity of PIND staff strengthened, the focus has been on maximizing efficiency through more robust data analysis, and improving sustainability of the P4P Network.

PROGNOSIS AND PLANNING

The Theory of Change and Results Chain described above suggest a framework for evaluating success, but more importantly, from a project perspective, it also presents an interpretive lens for prognosis and planning.

PIND works in two dimensions. On the one hand the program tries to keep the present level of violence as low as possible notwithstanding all the shifting social, economic and political pressures and dynamics, through conflict management and peace messaging activities. Simultaneously, and on the other hand, the program catalyzes, facilitates, and grows the social infrastructure and social capital for long term, sustainable peace, through training and networks and platforms.

Viewed on an x-y axis (above) the program is always trying to move the needle from Quadrants A, B, and C, to Quadrant D where there is low levels of violence and strong social infrastructure.

The prognosis for each Quadrant is as follows:

Quadrant A (Escalation): High Levels of Violence and Low Levels of Social Infrastructure/Social Capital. In this case there tends to be a vicious cycle where violence and insecurity erode the social bonds between individuals and groups, leading to more conflict, which...
further erodes social infrastructure and so on, in a spiral of deterioration. In this environment it is very difficult to disentangle those conflict drivers and to bring matters back to baseline. The best approach here is to first try to dampen the violence through rapid response and proactive conflict resolution activities. Then when there is a pause in the violence, actors can shift their focus to building social infrastructure to manage the pressures over the medium to longer term, moving the situation to Quadrant B.

**Quadrant B (Oscillation):** High Levels of Violence and High Levels of Social Infrastructure/Social Capital. In this case, the socio-political pressures are very high, but there is strong capacity to manage the violence when it occurs. The typical conflict model here is one of oscillation, which may occur along election cycles, seasonal patterns, or cultural events. With each oscillation, key actors and power brokers tend to follow a script, which moves the conflict between a predictable range of intensity, assuming there are no miscalculations. The best approach here is to analyze the patterns, identify leverage points and spheres of influence, then strengthen the capacity of Peace Agents to anticipate and respond. Over time, the magnitude of the oscillations will become smaller until the overall situation moves to Quadrant D.

**Quadrant C (Inattention):** Low Levels of Violence and Low Levels of Social Infrastructure/Social Capital. This is the most insidious of the four Quadrants, because here there is no active crisis. No one is paying attention because people assume that all is well. And all may be indeed well for the foreseeable future. Eventually, though, there will inevitably be a shock and there will be no capacity to manage. In this circumstance a small matter very quickly overwhelms the system, plunging the situation into conflict. These shocks (i.e., a health crisis, natural disaster, economic shock, or political controversy) are the “Black Swan” events that experts try to analyze in the postmortem, but the fact of the matter is that the shock itself is not the determinative factor or even particularly special. Rather it is the social infrastructure that was unprepared for any destabilizing influence. From a Peacebuilding perspective, this, of all the Quadrants, presents the greatest opportunity for saving lives, but is the least rewarding because prevention is invisible.

**Quadrant D (Sustainable Peace):** Low Levels of Violence and High Levels of Social Infrastructure/Social Capital. This is the goal. If there is a vicious cycle in Quadrant A, there is a virtuous cycle in Quadrant D where a lack of violence provides space for a thriving social infrastructure and vice versa so that if ever there is a shock, the situation will be managed well and quickly resolved. Each of the nine Niger Delta states is at a different point on the x-y axis at any given point and PIND, through the peacebuilding program described here is trying to move them each individually and collectively closer and closer to Quadrant D.

In 2015, the Initiative for Global Development (IGD) conducted an impact assessment of all of PIND’s program areas, looking at the extent to which they have reached a “tipping point” and achieved “systemic change.” They described the Peacebuilding Network Development as having achieved a maturity score of 3.1 out of 5 or a level of stickiness that is “getting ready to scale” where there is buy-in, tightly connected networks, capacity building, consistent investment, and a strategic M&E plan. Five key impacts that they identified at the time were as above (see Figure A.5).

IGD’s assessment is helpful for context. In the years since, there has been progress in some of these but as a general overview, it gives a sense of where the program is relatively strong. This present assessment, however, takes a deeper dive into the specific ways in which there has been impact on conflict mitigation and sustainable peace. But before diving into the findings, an overview of the recent history of conflict in the Niger Delta.

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**IGD Impact Assessment: Key Impacts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Impact</th>
<th>MS*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Legitimizes and supports self-identified Peace Actors (individuals and groups)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Provides healing to wider community members</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. P4P Members are responsive and help mitigate conflict</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Government, international development, and private sector actors participate in spreading peace</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. New and more accurate information, resources and strategies about peace available, enable more effective engagement</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Maturity Score
In 2012, PIND conducted an intensive conflict assessment of the region as part of the design phase of the peacebuilding program. For this assessment they interviewed men, women, youth, militants, militant leaders, traditional rulers, religious leaders, women’s leaders, government officials, and peacebuilding experts across all nine states to understand the experiences of conflict, and the impact of that conflict on people’s livelihoods.

What they discovered, as they went through the transcripts was that the socio-political environment was highly fragmented and polarized and each state had a different conflict profile.

The maps below show the number of fatalities by conflict type across the region from 2011-2018, highlighting just how different each state is from the other and the need for each State Chapter to develop its...
own tool box to respond appropriately and effectively to the local dynamics on the ground, and for PIND to provide the specific technical support needed.

The assessment conducted in 2012, and corroborated in PIND’s research since then, found that in each Niger Delta state except for Cross River the political economy of oil extraction was highly contentious as stakeholders jostled for maximal value and minimal cost — especially in Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers. Legal and illegal oil bunkering often led to environmental damage, affecting livelihoods and exacerbating grievance. Boundary disputes between communities escalated when the outcome of that dispute affected status as “host community” and associated eligibility for benefits such as jobs and scholarships from a company. Corruption and criminality around oil theft eroded the effectiveness of institutions and proliferated the emergence of armed groups. Furthermore, a sense of widespread grievance and agitation persisted over the fact that despite the industry’s outsized role in the national economy and government budget, more than 70 percent of the region’s 40 million residents still lived on an average of less than US$2 per day.

The early years of the 21st century in the Niger Delta were marked by the emergence of armed militant groups like the Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force. These groups initially aimed to extort funds from the multinational oil companies operating in the region, but quickly progressed to championing “resource control” and coalesced under an umbrella group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in January 2006. Primarily through a combination of oil bunkering, attacks on pipelines, and kidnappings of foreign oil workers, MEND contributed to an environment of instability that reduced Nigeria’s oil exports by roughly one-third.

The implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) in August 2009, in which militants were required to cease operations and surrender their weapons in exchange for training, rehabilitation, and monthly payments, proved to be a success. Violence in the region dropped sharply, with most senior commanders and their followers acceding to the terms of the amnesty program. In the longer run, however, PAP and similar programs like the Niger Delta Amnesty Program (NDAP), have also had the effect of entrenching militant hierarchies. Stipends would typically be given to top commanders to distribute to their followers, reinforcing links with their former commanders. In addition, the program has seen limited success in reducing the prevalence of small arms and light weapons; it is estimated that of 30,000 enrollees in PAP, only 2,700 arms were turned over.

Fatalities continued decreasing on an annual basis through 2012, at which point PIND began its peacebuilding work in the region. According to PIND’s 2012 conflict assessment, there were serious concerns that still needed to be addressed. PIND’s peacebuilding program was operating in an environment where there was an entrenchment of militant hierarchies, an overlap of militancy with organized crime and ethno-nationalist groups, as well as a proliferation of small arms. The underlying issues of the conflict system had not been completely resolved and violence was likely to escalate once again.

The initial uptick in violence took multiple forms, including communal violence and renewed attacks on energy infrastructure. In 2014, even as these types of violence fell violence by cult groups surged.

In 2015, conflict fatalities fell somewhat in Delta state and were overtaken by violence in Rivers due to a combination of gang violence, which had been steadily growing since 2011, and political violence surrounding the presidential and gubernatorial elections. The two sources of violence were related, with the major political actors often employing cult groups for political intimidation and violence. A Rivers Commission of Inquiry reported that nearly one hundred people had been killed in the state between mid-November 2014 and April 11,
2015 along with widespread destruction of property and significant levels of internal displacement. \(^6\)

Indeed, the stakes in the election were high. The incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, was the first president from the Niger Delta region and when he lost to a northerner, Muhammadu Buhari, many feared what that might mean for the future of the Amnesty Program. Some militant groups, including the Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front (NDPSF), only conditionally accept Buhari as president. \(^7\) Others feared that the security and development of the region would be deprioritized in the national agenda. Some groups began reviving calls for regional autonomy, demands that had been quiescent during Jonathan’s rule. \(^8\)

The gubernatorial elections were, if anything even more contentious, especially in Rivers State, rooted in the divisive rivalry between Governor Rotimi Amaechi, who had defected from the PDP to the APC in 2013, and his former protégé, Nyesom Wike, who was running under the PDP’s banner. Heated rhetoric from both the PDP and the APC candidates contributed to widespread violence both in the run-up to the elections and on election day itself; polls serving nearly half a million voters, accounting for nearly a fifth of the voting population, were cancelled and some major figures were assassinated. \(^9\)

After the PDP emerged victorious, the APC disputed the results of the election, and while the courts allowed the gubernatorial results to stand, the results of the legislative elections were annulled due to the violence and allegations of corruption. The reruns were held in March 2016 and were also marred by violence. The APC alleged that 32 of its members had been killed and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) reported in a statement that their offices had been barricaded and members of their staff abducted and fatally attacked by “well-armed thugs and miscreants allegedly acting on behalf of some politicians”. \(^10\)

In 2016, the continued election violence and use of armed groups by political parties, and escalating supremacy battles between cult groups contributed to levels of violence in the region not seen since 2009. Meanwhile, in Cross River there was an increase in inter-communal violence which continued into 2017. And in Delta and Bayelsa, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), a new militant group which burst onto the scene in February 2016, launched a series of attacks on major pipelines. \(^11\)

The NDA claims to be a separatist advocacy group fighting for the redress of economic and environmental grievances, in which they assert socioeconomic freedom for local communities by rerouting wealth away from the government and large oil companies. The NDA has made a deliberate effort to connect its activities to a wide range of broader interests and demands. These included the causes of the Indigenous People of Biafra, ex-militant Tompolo, and MEND, all of which disavowed the NDA, as well as those of ethnic militant groups such as the Red Egbesu Water Lions and the Isoko Liberation Movement, where NDA’s efforts to make alliances was more...
successful. Since 2017, however, this new round of militancy seems to have quieted down.

Indeed, in 2017 militancy, election violence, and cult violence all deescalated significantly. In Rivers, conflict fatalities were less than half what they were the year before on the back of a decline that had begun in the latter half of 2016. Yet with a concurrent rise in communal violence in Cross River, Akwa Ibom, and Delta, the overall level of lethal violence continued to increase.

While it is too early to determine whether these trends will continue, there are two major concerns. First, the armed militant groups that formed in 2016 have not disappeared, and while they have not returned to the same level of violence as accompanied their formation, the second half of 2017 and the beginning of 2018 have seen renewed violence and some outside observers have expressed concerns that the negotiated amnesty and resulting peace are on the verge of collapse. Second, presidential and gubernatorial elections are scheduled for early 2019 and there is widespread belief that the two main political parties have embraced a “win or die” mentality, especially in Rivers state, that will see them again employ cult groups to commit political violence in the run-up to and after the elections, as was seen in 2015.

PIND’s peacebuilding program seeks to keep the level of violence as low as possible, particularly in key communities of interest, while also building the social infrastructure and social capital of peace actors across the region for long term sustainable peace. This includes working on problems of militancy, election violence, gang/cult violence, and communal violence. It also relates to the cross-cutting matter of Violence Affecting Women and Girls (VAWG). This is a strategic line of effort for the program, in that PIND partners with organizations focused on gender to collect VAWG early warning data. In addition, they also disaggregate all early warning data by gender so that the impacts of violence particular to women and girls can be highlighted, whether that be women caught in the crossfire of communal or gang clashes, or specifically targeted as victims of sexual violence or abuse.

PIND tracks and analyzes of these trends and dynamics and produces memos, alerts, and briefs for their partners to inform their planning and response. The next section of this assessment looks at the question of impact with regard to Early Warning.

ENDNOTES
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
COMPONENT 1: EARLY WARNING

PURPOSE STATEMENT

An ongoing, systematic collection and analysis of early warning data highlights conflict risk factors, informs planning, and raises awareness among those with a mandate to respond.

SUBCATEGORIES

Early warning impact is measured across three sub-categories:

1. Quality and quantity of early warning data
2. Relevance, timeliness, and meaningfulness of early warning analysis
3. Dissemination and uptake of early warning products

DATA COLLECTION AND AGGREGATION

Principles of High Quality Data and Data Aggregation

Data is the lifeblood of an effective early warning system; without access to good data, even the most sophisticated and cutting-edge systems cannot play an effective role in mitigating conflict. Data quality, however, is not a unidimensional concept but instead comprises five different facets: quantity, accuracy, scope, bias, and speed. The first two of these facets — quantity and accuracy — are perhaps the most straightforward. More data is generally better than less data as it decreases the likelihood that important events or trends will be missed. This data must also be as close to the truth as possible, in the most basic way. Incorrect information on e.g. fatality numbers, location, date, or what happened will contribute to a misleading

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IMPACT ASSESSMENT: EARLY WARNING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Metrics</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality and Quantity of Early Warning Data</td>
<td>Quantity, Accuracy, Scope, Bias, Speed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PIN(D)'s approach to EWR, which provides a platform to amplify existing initiatives and fill gaps as necessary, enhances the quantity, scope, and accuracy of the collective early warning space. The Peace Map is by far the most comprehensive platform for data on conflict risk and vulnerabilities in the Niger Delta. This comprehensiveness and scientifically robust approach does present some tradeoffs on speed. However, that trade-off is mitigated using automated alerts, and a real-time SMS component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance, Timeliness, and Meaningfulness of Early Warning Analysis</td>
<td>Alerts, Trackers, Briefs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PIN(D)'s early warning products are widely sought after and of high quality. The timeliness has improved as the PIN(D) research team has become more fluent in the use of the Peace Map analytical functionalities, and the use of quantitative methods to produce meaningful charts and graphs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination and Uptake of Early Warning Products</td>
<td>PIN(D) Chapters, External Users</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The audience for the early warning products are PIN(D) (for their own strategic and operational planning), the P4P Network, as well as external users to help raise awareness, as well as to strengthen conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding throughout the region. Data indicates that external users do, in fact, highly value and make practical use of PIN(D)'s early warning efforts.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* Impact Score — See Appendix for Scoring Matrix
picture of the world, degrading the effectiveness of the broader early warning and response system. The third facet of good quality data, scope, is closely related to quantity, but instead of referring to the simple amount of data, it encompasses whether everything, in both a geographic- (e.g., all states or LGAs) and a thematic- (e.g., protests, militant violence, etc.) sense, is covered by the data collection process. The fourth facet, bias, refers to whether everything within the scope is covered equally. For example, if one state is covered by a comprehensive data collection system but another is covered by a less comprehensive system, then what looks like a larger increase in violence in the first state may be the result of this imbalance instead of an accurate description of the world. The final facet, speed, refers to the time between the occurrence of a conflict incident and the time the data becomes potentially actionable, which could mean its inclusion in the quantitative foundation for a piece of analysis or in the basis of an alert.

Any individual data source can never satisfy all five facets equally, as it must always grapple with the trade-offs that are, to some extent, unavoidable. For example, the more time spent on double-checking the accuracy of data, the slower the turnaround between occurrence and actionability. In addition, every data source relies on different methods of collecting data, each of which have their strengths and weaknesses, and also may have different thematic or geographic scopes. These trade-offs and differences are represented clearly in the data sources that form the basis for PIND’s early warning system, which range from Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED), drawn from media sources and updated weekly with a nationwide coverage, to the Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development (CIEPD), which utilizes real-time data primarily from social media and has a focus on specific conflict hotspots, among several others. After collecting data from these diverse sources, PIND integrates and aggregates the data through a process which involves cleaning, coding, and formatting it before uploading it onto the Peace Map.

This type of aggregation process has both benefits and potential drawbacks. Most obviously, the total quantity and the scope of data increases, particularly when each data source has a different thematic focus, as is true for those used in the PIND early warning system. Multiple sources also allow for triangulation between them; trends and patterns that appear in more than one dataset are more robust, increasing confidence in their validity. Similarly, if the individual data sources have opposing biases, aggregation can balance those biases,
producing a more accurate picture of reality than that given by any single source. If, on the other hand, their biases are similar, they can compound and exaggerate further, exacerbating the problem. An additional concern when combining data sources is the possibility of double-counting, e.g. when an incident is present in multiple sources and therefore included twice in the aggregated dataset.

PIND’s Peace Map has several features which help to maximize the benefits of data aggregation while minimizing the drawbacks. Users of the Map can select which data sources they want to include, an option which ensures they have the flexibility to decide how to best balance the strengths, weaknesses, and characteristics of each source for their specific needs. The analysis tools that are available as part of the map include the option to view incidents or fatalities over time merged by source, which adopts a simple algorithm intended to counteract the possibility of double-counting.

**DATA SOURCES USED BY THE PIND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM**

The data underpinning the PIND early warning system is compiled from multiple sources (see Figure 1.3), each of which has its own strengths and weaknesses.

**Armed Conflict Location Event Data**

The Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED) collates data on protests, political violence, and armed conflict in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The data is primarily drawn from secondary sources and is also useful in tracking and mapping non-violent and non-fatal incidents and has a nationwide geographic coverage. ACLED typically publishes data weekly; for use in the PIND early warning system data is downloaded monthly and coded and formatted for the Peace Map.

**Nigeria Watch**

Like ACLED, Nigeria Watch has a nationwide coverage, compiling data on violent fatalities from several print and online media sources in Nigeria. Nigeria Watch’s data is particularly useful for tracking conflict dynamics and violence both geographically and periodically and the database is updated daily. For use in the PIND early warning system, data is downloaded monthly and coded and formatted for the Peace Map.

**IPDU SMS Early Warning System**

PIND’s IPDU Early Warning System is an online and SMS-based platform that collects, analyzes, and disseminates early warning information to targeted stakeholders for preventive interventions. Incident reports are sent in daily and in real-time from trained community-based field monitors through a dedicated mobile line. Field monitors are trained regularly and receive follow-up through weekly calls to ensure regular reporting of incidents. In addition to the real-time dissemination of incident reports to relevant responders, data from the system is downloaded monthly for coding and formatting for the Peace Map.

**Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development**

The Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development (CIEPD) crowdsources conflict data from targeted communities in specific conflict hotspots in the Niger Delta through a dedicated Conflict Watch Center. Conflict incident reports are sent to the Center by community-based stakeholders in real-time, principally through social media. For use in the PIND early warning system, data is downloaded monthly and coded and formatted for the Peace Map.
The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme: Violence Against Women and Girls

The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) collects data on violence against women and girls in eight Nigerian states where women and girls are most at risk – Borno, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta. Data is collected daily through a combination of personal ground-level/crowd sources as well as print and online media sources. For use in the PIND early warning system, data is downloaded monthly and coded and formatted for the Peace Map.

Other Sources

While PIND relies most regularly on the above sources for early warning and analysis, there are sometimes other sources that present themselves as being particularly useful for a specific problem set or period. As these sources become available they are also included on the platform for cross-validation and triangulation. Examples include UNLocK, CSS/ETH Zurich, WANEP, Council on Foreign Relations, and NEWS2015/TMG. The PIND IPDU Research Coordinator is always looking for new sources that can be integrated to enrich the analysis being produced through the EWR system.

COMPARISON OF DATA SOURCES

Each early warning product that integrates and triangulates data from different sources requires a research design that takes into consideration the relative distribution of each source across space, time, and theme. When conducting a quantitative analysis of trends at the regional level for instance, PIND researchers are careful not to simply aggregate duplicates or include sources that are unevenly distributed across all nine states. The Peace Map, and its interactive analytical functions, presents a useful platform by which to do that, after initially conducting a comparison of the different sources as an important first step.

A principle advantage to aggregating sources on the Peace Map is that the quantity of data is substantially increased; the single largest source, Nigeria Watch, contributes only thirty percent of the total. However, compiling, processing, and coding this large quantity of data does come at the cost of slower, less frequent updates – the Peace Map is only updated monthly while the component data sources are updated weekly or daily.

A further benefit of integrating multiple sources is that the data provided by each of those component sources are not merely, or even principally, duplicates of each other. This assertion is grounded in several bases. First, the experience of compiling, processing, and coding the data for upload to the Peace Map as well as exploring it in detail during analysis offers anecdotal evidence that such duplicates are limited in number. Second, the sources each have different scopes, either geographic or thematic, or both. Third, the correlation between the individual datasets is lower than would be expected if they were duplicates. The correlations between four of the five datasets used by the PIND early warning system is shown in the table above (Figure 1.4).

The most closely correlated are ACLED and Nigeria Watch, an unsurprising result given that they are both drawing principally from secondary media sources. Even given this similar source material, the correlation also reflects their differences in thematic scope as well as presumptive differences in methodology in the process of converting secondary source material into incident reports. Most of the other correlations are somewhat lower, reflecting differences in either geographic scope (e.g., CIEPD only covers targeted communities), thematic scope (e.g., ACLED is useful for both lethal and non-fatal, non-violent incidents), methodology (e.g., the IPDU SMS system draws from trained community-based field monitors), or some combination thereof. The correlation between the IPDU SMS system data and the ACLED data is particularly low, though it is not clear from the parameters of the two datasets why this should be so and why this correlation should be so much lower than that between, e.g., ACLED and CIEPD, which also have thematic and methodological differences.

The precise values of the correlations are not important, in part because they can change substantially based on the particular specifications underlying the calculations, especially the timeframe used (although the correlation between ACLED and Nigeria Watch...
data remained remarkably constant across all three temporal specifications used above). Importantly, the value of the correlation does not represent the proportion of overlap between two sources. This is because even if two sources record the same number of fatalities in a given state and quarter, those fatalities may be due, at least in part, to different events, for example one source may have compiled its fatality figure principally from communal clashes while the other may have done so primarily from crime and violent protests. Instead, the correlation numbers are simply intended to give a very rough sense of the relative amount of likely overlap between various sources and to present an upper bound for the amount of overlap.

More specifically, the difference in geographic focus between the different datasets is greater than that suggested by the descriptions of each source. The most conspicuous example of this is the NSRP data; almost 95 percent of its incidents come from Rivers State. However, there are also significant, albeit less extreme, differences in the geographic coverage of the data from the other four sources, as illustrated above (Figure 1.5).

The CIEPD data, for example, is extremely concentrated in Rivers State, much more so than that from any of the other sources, but is significantly less concentrated in Cross River State. These differences are likely a reflection of the fact that CIEPD picks specific conflict sites from which to collect data, sites that would seem to be concentrated in Rivers State given that state’s historic high level of violence. The data from the IPDU SMS system, on the other hand, is much less concentrated in Delta State than the data from other sources. The data from ACLED and Nigeria Watch is the most similar, which is what would be expected given the closer correlation discussed above. As with the correlations, the precise geographic concentrations are in part a reflection of the time period chosen, and although the major differences between sources is largely consistent over time, there are numerous stretches where even sources that generally report a similar number give sizeable differences for one or more states. These differences in geographic focus are beneficial because, combined with the diversity of thematic foci, they reduce the likelihood that the aggregated dataset misses crucial developments.
Another consideration to bear in mind for meaningful triangulation in the production of a specific early warning product is that not all the datasets cover the same date ranges (See Figure 1.6). For example, ACLED and Nigeria Watch have the longest history, as shown above, and therefore any analysis of conflict trends extending further back than 2016 is likely to rely principally on these two sources, both of which consistently report a lower proportion of total fatalities as occurring in states such as Bayelsa and a higher proportion in Delta than does the IPDU SMS system.

Two mitigating factors, however, include the following: first, in the time period before the IPDU SMS system begins reporting data, there are other data sources available, including UNLocK and the Council on Foreign Relations. Second, this variance is likely to lessen over time as the IPDU SMS and CIEPD data systems constitute a greater share of any historical analysis. Additionally, for analyses of recent developments and trends — which includes PIND’s Conflict Trackers — this issue is not a constraint.

A factor that is a constraint however — that PIND takes the necessary steps to control for in their analysis — is the fact that NSRP data makes up less than 7 percent of the total and is principally concentrated in Rivers state. As the NSRP data is focused on violence against women and girls, the limited quantity and scope of this data could present an incomplete picture of its prevalence and location. However, PIND is aware of this gap and controls for it in their analysis. First, in quarter 3 2017, they hired an additional staff member to begin systematically collecting data on violence against women and girls to compensate for the decline in the organizations that had previously reported that data. Second, they have mainstreamed gender into the Peace Map and into the data cleaning and coding process to ensure that violence against women and girls that is captured by other sources remains available for easy identification and analysis. Third, when calculating patterns and trends they are careful to only quantify those conflict factors that lend themselves to meaningful quantification. VAWG is one of those issues more amenable to qualitative analysis, using the Peace Map, than quantitative, due to uneven reporting overall.

As the foundational element in any early warning and response system, the collection and aggregation of data poses a number of difficult trade-offs and potential issues which PIND has done an excellent job in identifying and addressing. Inasmuch as the sources that PIND aggregates include an array of geographic and thematic foci, PIND’s early warning and response system is broadly inclusive and unlikely to miss important developments and trends. PIND has successfully identified gaps in their data collection process as they manifest and taken crucial steps to close them. Accordingly, PIND embraces flexibility to capture as many of the benefits offered by data aggregation as possible. This includes a suite of interactive analytical functionalities on the Peace Map that allow the user to control for uneven coverage and to explore patterns and trends at multiple levels of analysis, across eight social, economic, political, and security indicators and 65 sub-indicators. Users can include or exclude specific sources, allowing them to balance the benefits and drawbacks of each accordance with their needs. Users can test hypotheses through heat maps, bar charts and trendlines at the national, regional, state, LGA, or community levels. They can also conduct customized key word searches within the broader parameters of a query to better understand the context and texture surrounding a specific problem. Further the tool generates automatic alerts to registered users in affected states for enhanced rapid response capabilities. Finally, users can always check the quantitative findings against the raw data to confirm or qualify the findings generated.

**ANALYSIS PRODUCTS**

The coded and aggregated data forms the basis for quantitative analysis of conflict patterns and trends over time, identifying hotspots, and establishing baselines. This data is then used to produce three main early warning products: **Automated Alerts, Conflict Trackers, and Policy Briefs**.

The Automated Alerts are a function of the Peace Map by which analysts who identify a spike in violence in one or more Local
Government Area can quickly send an email to all Peace Agents present in the same state in which the spike occurred. These alerts allow Peace Agents to monitor the current situation and evaluate whether the strategies and programs that are already in place are working to deescalate the conflict or whether a different approach might be needed. The principal benefit of the Automated Alerts is that it allows for a rapid response time and directly communicates with on-the-ground stakeholders who are best placed to use the information in the immediate term.

Like Automated Alerts, Conflict Trackers and Policy Briefs begin with a quantitative analysis of conflict dynamics. However, this analysis is also supplemented by qualitative data drawn from key informant interviews and focus groups discussions. This data is used to validate and contextualize the information derived from quantitative research as well as to provide a richer and more nuanced understanding of the broader environment and its influence on the onset and incidence of conflict. This addition of qualitative research results in a slower turnaround time for Conflict Trackers and Policy Briefs but also allows them to provide more detail, nuance, and context and to reach an audience beyond local Peace Agents to inform the planning and activities of other stakeholders and organizations.

**CONFLICT TRACKERS**

Conflict Trackers are produced for each of the nine Niger Delta states on a monthly and a quarterly basis. The Trackers highlight the principal patterns and trends affecting peace and security observed during the preceding four months, detail specific incidents that have occurred during the most recent month, and solicit feedback and input from Peace Agents on the conflict dynamics in their state. Given the relatively short-term scope of the Conflict Trackers, an important metric for evaluation is the elapsed time between the end of the period of time they cover and the date of publication. This metric has indeed been steadily improving since mid-2017, as illustrated right (Figure 1.7).

The graph in Figure 1.7 shows the relationship between the month covered by a set of monthly trackers (i.e. the Trackers for all nine Niger Delta states) and the number of days between the last day of that month and the date of publication to the PIND website. It also includes a linear best fit line which demonstrates that, although there has been some variation, on average that time has been decreasing over the past two years. The quarterly trackers are similar to the monthly trackers, but also include an analysis of the patterns and trends at a regional level in addition to at the level of each of the region's nine constituent states. Given the limited number of quarterly trackers that have been completed over the same time frame, there are insufficient to establish a trend of time to publication, but this is a metric that may be useful to watch in the future.

**POLICY BRIEFS**

Unlike Conflict Trackers, which provide a relatively high-level broad overview of conflict dynamics, Policy Briefs cover a specific issue or theme arising from PIND’s research and data analysis at greater depth and detail. These Briefs utilize a greater variety of datasets and information sources, including an increased use of key informant interviews and focus group discussions, which allows for a deeper level of analysis than is possible with Conflict Trackers. The Briefs are aimed at informing local, national, and international stakeholders who have an interest in generating more informed or targeted policies for response as well as those who have a mandate to respond and therefore often contain recommendations or suggested ways forward. The Policy Briefs cover a wide range of topics, with the three most recent covering domestic violence in Rivers State, organized crime in the region, and increasing Biafra agitation and ethno-political
polarization. In addition to their examination of recent trends and developments, the Briefs often include an explicit consideration of the implications of those trends for upcoming events such as the 2019 elections. For these briefs, the quantitative analysis of the Peace Map data is qualified with interviews with a broad range of stakeholders. PIND’s central location in the network of organizations working on peace and security issues in the Niger Delta – as described in the section on stakeholder network analysis – enables the organization to draw on this wide array of actors, giving it a more inclusive and more accurate picture than it would otherwise be able to compile.

**IMPROVED QUALITY**

In order to provide the greatest use to the widest possible audience, the Conflict Trackers and Policy Briefs must be accurate, comprehensive, and clear. The quality of final, published version of PIND’s early warning analysis products across these three dimensions has typically been high, but the organization has, especially over the past eighteen months, improved their internal processes such that this high level of quality is achieved more consistently and efficiently, especially across the latter two dimensions, with less need for major revision throughout the production process.
The accuracy of the analysis products is principally dependent on the strength of the quantitative and qualitative data upon which they are based, which has been covered earlier. An additional determinant of accuracy, however, is the quality of the graphs produced from the quantitative data. Even if the underlying data is of high quality, there are two major problems that can arise. First, a graph could show a spurious trend or one that is highly dependent on its parameters, such as the chosen date range. Such a graph is the most straightforward definition of inaccurate and can be most detrimental to overall quality and time-consuming to fix. Second, there may be a misalignment between the graph and the qualitative conclusions highlighted in the textual narrative. While such a mistake is not as harmful, it has been significantly more common in the past, and addressing it has been a major contributor to the improvement of quality on a consistent and efficient basis.

Comprehensiveness is perhaps the trickiest of the three components of high quality analysis products because its parameters are difficult to define. From the broadest perspective, most causes and consequences of conflict and instability are related, albeit often indirectly and perhaps weakly. Therefore, it can be difficult to determine exactly what is sufficiently relevant to be included in a Conflict Tracker or Policy Brief. Nonetheless, PIND has made a number of important improvements on this dimension. First, they have done a better job including all of the salient incidents, within a given time period for a Conflict Tracker or on a given topic for a Policy Brief. Saliency, in this case, may encompass those incidents with a high number of fatalities or those that exemplify a trend or pattern in the data. Second, in the Conflict Trackers, PIND has integrated a finer-grained level of detail through the incorporation of a graph of conflict fatalities over time at the LGA level, which is particularly valuable either for finer-grained analysis or for those end-users who have interests only in specific LGAs. Finally, gender is now mainstreamed in the Conflict Trackers as well as being given increased importance in the Policy Briefs through the inclusions of a section on violence against women and girls where appropriate, which ensures that vital but often overlooked trends are not missed.

Clarity in the analysis products is a matter of two things: language and graphs. The former has seen a great deal of improvement recently
while improvements to the latter have focused on concerns of accuracy, as described above. There have been two changes that have helped ensure that the language in the analysis products is consistently clear and concise. First, the use of insensitive, gory, or inflammatory language to describe some violent incidents has been eliminated. This is not only important because of how this type of language can offend, disturb, and incite, but also because the use of such language distracts from the critical analysis that the Conflict Tracker or Policy Brief is trying to communicate, thereby degrading its effectiveness. Second, standardized language has been established and adopted. This standardization goes beyond problematic word choice, but also ensures that a correct level of epistemic certainty is communicated (i.e. incidents are described to have “allegedly” or “reportedly” happened) as well as helps improve concision, which is vital for communicating the maximum amount of useful information in a limited space.

**DISTRIBUTION AND OUTSIDE USE**

PIND uses its early warning data system and analysis products to inform its planning and response to conflict in both its operational and rapid response activities as well as in its structural efforts to build and improve the social infrastructure in the Niger Delta. They are used to help determine priorities by identifying critical needs and opportunities, craft key effective messages, and to construct a baseline in order to evaluate PIND’s activities in a methodologically sound manner. All of this is vital to PIND’s success over the past years and in the future, and it will be covered in detail in the following sections of this report. However, these internal uses of PIND’s early warning data and analysis products do not constitute the entirety of the benefits they provide, as PIND provides both the data – through the Peace Map – as well as the Conflict Trackers and Policy Briefs to outside stakeholders, both inside and outside of the Niger Delta so that those stakeholders can also leverage the benefits of these resources to improve their own work. In this way, PIND’s efforts are able to have a multiplying effect throughout the region.

In addition to the analysis products that PIND produces, several of PIND’s partners use the early warning data from the Peace Map to produce assessments and reports of their own. The graph below (Figure 1.10) tracks the total number of these products, including the trackers that PIND produces, that PIND has been aware of since the beginning of 2016.

While these figures almost certainly do not include every report and assessment that is produced using PIND’s early warning data, they do suggest that this type of use has remained relatively consistent over time. Furthermore, these numbers certainly do not capture all the benefits that PIND’s early warning data provides to outside users, to include informal exploration of the patterns and trends in the data and many others which will be touched on below.

While there is limited information on the external use of PIND’s early warning data, there is substantially more on the distribution and use of the organization’s analysis products, much of which comes from a study PIND did on the reach and impact of its Conflict Trackers in 2017. According to the quarterly reports, the number of people receiving PIND’s analysis products – the most common of which are the Conflict Trackers – increased from 250 at the end of the first quarter to nearly 400 by the end of the year (not including the potentially many more who access or share the trackers online that cannot be quantified). The study that PIND conducted received 116 responses, representing between a third and a half of the total number of known recipients.

The study found that PIND’s Conflict Trackers are used by a diverse variety of organizations. While the overwhelming majority – nearly 80
percent – identified as civil society organizations, the respondents included:

- Academic Institutions
- The Diplomatic Community
- Government Agencies
- Intelligence Organizations
- The Media
- Entertainment organizations

Perhaps unsurprisingly, more than three-quarters of these stakeholders are located within the Niger Delta, with the heaviest concentrations located in Rivers, Delta, and Cross River States, which are also the three states that report the highest share of fatalities in the IPDU SMS early warning system in the last two years. Approximately sixteen percent are located elsewhere in Nigeria and another seven percent are located abroad, including in the United States, Belgium, and Mali.

Given their organizational and geographic diversity, it is not surprising that the recipients of PIND’s Conflict Trackers use them for a wide range of uses, which PIND grouped into ten principal categories:

- Interventions
- Advocacy
- Planning community engagement
- Research, learning, and documentation
- Assessing conflict trends

![GEOGRAPHY OF RESPONDENTS](image1)

![FREQUENCY, SATISFACTION, INFLUENCE](image2)
MEASURING IMPACT AGAINST PIND’S THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS CHAIN DESIGN

- Proposal writing
- Aid policy recommendation and formulation
- Mitigating and managing conflict
- Aid business consultancy
- Aid project programming

Across these diverse uses, most respondents reported that they use the Conflict Trackers frequently and that the trackers form a crucial part of their work. Additionally, the vast majority of respondents reported being satisfied or very satisfied with the content and quality of the trackers.

These results suggest that PIND’s Conflict Trackers, and by extension likely the rest of PIND’s analysis products, do contribute significantly to the fostering of wider knowledge and deeper insight into conflict dynamics and patterns in the Niger Delta across a wide range of stakeholders working in a variety of fields. Therefore, PIND’s early warning system is having a clear impact not only through informing the organization’s direct work in conflict management and social infrastructure, but also through the work of other stakeholders in the region.

ENDNOTES

2. As the data from NSRP has a very specific thematic scope (violence against women and girls) as opposed to the much broader (though not identical) thematic scopes of the other sources, the correlations for that data source were not calculated.
3. This row calculated based on quarterly state fatality numbers in the Niger Delta, Q4 2016 – Q1 2018.
4. This row calculated based on quarterly state fatality numbers in the Niger Delta, Q1 2016 – Q1 2018.
5. This row calculated based on quarterly state fatality numbers in the Niger Delta, Q1 2010 – Q1 2018.
6. The time period chosen for the graph was selected as the longest time period with consistent data from all four sources.
COMPONENT II: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

PURPOSE STATEMENT

In the context of social, economic, political, and security shocks and escalation dynamics, PIND employs conflict management activities to keep the level of violence as low as possible. This way, longer term peace infrastructure can be cultivated and developed for sustainable prevention.

SUBCATEGORIES

Conflict Management impact is measured across two subcategories:

1. alignment of conflict management activities with trends in lethal violence by conflict type,
2. quality and effectiveness of conflict management activities.

ALIGNMENT

Central to PIND’s evidence-based approach to peacebuilding is the premise that rapid-response, conflict management interventions should target real and emerging problems on the ground in order to create a space for longer-term peacebuilding efforts. If conflict management interventions are targeting the wrong problem, then they will not succeed in achieving their strategic objectives. For this reason, PIND established a PREVENT Committee in each of the nine state chapters for rapid response. The model was tested during the 2015 elections in partnership with AA Peaceworks, which has a strong track record in conflict management programming. After the election, the PREVENT Committees were set up, trained, inaugurated, and deployed. Each PREVENT Committee has 15 members networked

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<tr>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Metrics</th>
<th>Score*</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alignment of Conflict Management Activities with Trends in Conflict Risk Factors</td>
<td>• PREVENT Committee Rapid Response Actions&lt;br&gt;• Integrated P4P Chapter Interventions&lt;br&gt;• Small Grants Targeting Key Conflict Risk Factors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PIND’s response actions are most aligned with the risk of communal violence and election violence. However, in some states they’ve also responded to gang/cult violence. Militancy seems to be a conflict risk factor that they are least responsive to in their interventions, probably due to the complexity of the issue and the technical capacity required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality and Effectiveness of Conflict Management Activities</td>
<td>• Process-Driven Response Actions Informed by Early Warning, Conflict Analysis, and Stakeholder Mapping&lt;br&gt;• Demonstrated De-Escalation of Conflict Risk in regard to Specific Activity&lt;br&gt;• Critical mass of activities necessary for responding to conflict issues with the frequency signaled in the Early</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PIND’s EWR system is designed to encourage best-practices in conflict management through capacity building and a robust early warning input with a pipeline to different response actors depending on the specific problem set. The proof points listed in this chapter describe in detail the best practices and outcomes of interventions across all nine states. The frequency of response actions varies considerably based in part on funding availability as well as uneven leadership development across the nine states.</td>
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*p Impact Score — See Appendix for Scoring Matrix
with key stakeholder for maximum influence and reach. Linked to PIND’s early warning system, this model has had many successes.

Beyond the rapid-response PREVENT Committee interventions, there are two other ways in which PIND facilitates response for conflict management. Sometimes a state chapter determines that a strategic, whole-chapter, integrated campaign is required to deal with a complex problem. Most often, they’ve undertaken these sorts of sustained interventions around risk factors like election violence. Finally, PIND gives small grants to NGOs with expertise in dealing with difficult conflict issues. This is an important tool in the toolbox because the P4P Network, which is made primarily of volunteers may not always have the technical skills required. Beyond these three action types, PIND also seeks to enhance the capacity of external actors to be more effective in their conflict management activities, through sharing of early warning data and products as well as capacity building.

Taken together, the data shows that PIND has been most responsive in dealing with election violence and communal violence, followed by cult/gang violence. PIND has been less responsive in dealing with problems of militancy and piracy.

**RESPONSE ACTIONS**

Since 2014 there have been at least 143 response actions to early warning signals. Some of these were “rapid response” actions by a small Prevent Committee designated for the role. Others were strategic campaigns coordinated by the entire chapter, for example in the months running up to an election, or in response to a chapter-wide conflict analysis process. A few were small grants that were given to NGOs to tackle specific conflict risk factors in a particular state.

The graphs below show the trends in fatalities by conflict type per state as well as the response actions that were executed during that same time frame. Each state had a different conflict profile and each chapter had a different range of capacities and skills. Taken together each state shows a different array of response actions to the conflict early warning signals generated. In general, there is a strong alignment between the need as identified in the conflict data, and the response as undertaken by the Chapters. Below is a narrative description of an illustrative conflict management intervention from each of the nine states.

In Abia there was a sharp increase in communal/ethnic violence starting in 2016, including protests by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in response to the arrest of Nnamdi Kanu and crackdowns. In this context, there was also increased ethnic tensions between those considered to be northerners and indigenes within the state. In 2014 the Abia State P4P Chapter focused on communal tensions as well as sensitization in the run-up to the 2015 election. Then, after the election, the Prevent Committee responded several times to spikes in communal/ethnic violence, the most critical conflict issue during the entire seven-year period. For example, they conducted several interventions helping to resolve farmer/herder conflict in Ohafia. According to contemporaneous news reports in the New Telegraph, as a result of the intervention community members and the herdsmen “embraced peace.”

In the graphs below, the colors of the icons match the specific conflict type being addressed by the action. A black icon signifies a conflict type not explicitly reflected in the early warning data.

- Rapid Response Action
- Strategic Whole-Chapter Campaign
- Small Grant for Key Risk
As with the other states, the Akwa Ibom Chapter focused on preventing and managing election violence in 2014 and 2015. Then, when lethal communal violence began to spike in 2016, the Chapter shifted their focus. For example, they helped resolve land disputes in Urue and Uyo to the extent that in one case a peace treaty was signed and in the other the litigation of the matter was formally dropped.

Beyond a strategic focus on preventing election violence, several rapid response actions were undertaken to respond as communal violence sharply rose in 2016 and 2017. When a Hausa youth was murdered, The PREVENT Committee requested the body of the victim from police custody to bury according to Islamic rites. After the burial, they spoke with key stakeholders in the local Hausa community, urging them not to retaliate.

Overall, in Bayelsa election violence was the primary focus of the project, both in the run-up to the 2015 Presidential election as well as the off-cycle gubernatorial election in 2016, during which violence was elevated. The State Chapter also focused on communal tensions, although those were not as problematic according to the data. Notably, the chapter did not address risking lethality in regard to militancy during the period.

The three main conflict issues in Delta State during this period was ongoing clashes between cult groups, a surge in militancy in 2016, and a sharp spike in communal violence from 2014 to 2016. The project was very responsive to communal violence in the state, though a small grant, as well as rapid response action by the Prevent Committee. They also strongly emphasized the prevention and management of election violence in 2014 and 2016.
While clashes between cult groups were the main causes of conflict fatalities in Edo, the project tended to focus more on the secondary factors (election violence and communal tensions). For example, during the Gubernatorial election in 2016 they were very proactive in training field monitors, identifying hotspots, sensitizing stakeholders, and developing a strategic communications campaign plan for response.

Rivers is another state where there was a strong linkage between the need and the response actions, particularly with regard to election violence and cult clashes in 2015. However, in 2016, violence increased sharply. Responding effectively to cult violence, especially when it is that lethal, requires a high degree of expertise and risk-tolerance. This graph suggests the need for more capacity building in this area.

In Ondo, a relatively peaceful state in the Niger Delta, the main lines of effort were in preventing election violence and responding to cases of communal violence. There has been an increase in militancy and clashes between cult groups over the last several years, which has not been responded to by the project.
QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF RESPONSE

The following pages describe in detail illustrative examples of conflict management response actions conducted in each of the nine states. Examples from Abia, Cross River, Delta, Ondo, and Rivers where one of the issues highlighted in the early warning data above focused on communal violence, the P4P Network reduced tensions, in one case forestalling a clash, which otherwise could have triggered a ripple effect of sectarian, ethnic, and political violence. Examples from Baylesa and Edo show proactive and innovative approaches to managing election violence. The example from Cross River illustrates a multi-stakeholder approach to dealing with urban criminality and violence. In Imo, the example provided illustrates how PIND dealt with the very sensitive and difficult issue of gang violence and militancy.

Data suggests that while the alignment is quite good and the quality of the interventions is good, the frequency of the response actions varies considerably, due in part to unevenness in funding availability, as well as leadership development across the nine states. In 2015 and 2016, for instance, response actions were more frequent than in 2017. Fewer response actions is not necessarily a weakness if the depth of those actions is higher, but it does suggest that given the impressive strength of the system and the high quality of the interventions, the potential impact is higher than what is currently being achieved.

Abia State Intervention:
Preventing Communal Violence During the New Yam Festival in 2014

One of the earliest intervention success stories comes from 2014, when a concerted effort by the Abia State P4P Chapter proved critical in ensuring that an annual festival meant to celebrate prosperity and community didn’t turn violent. During 2014, conflict data integrated onto the Peace Map was collated to produce conflict bulletins that showed the trends and patterns of conflict risk and violence for each of the nine states of the Niger Delta. For Abia state, the conflict bulletin identified Umuahia North LGA as a hotspot of violence, with an elevated risk of political tensions, cult violence, kidnapping for ransom and shooting incidents. While conflict patterns and trends are key to understanding what the overarching issues fueling violence may be, and which areas are vulnerable, to better understand and contextualize the quantitative analysis, a qualitative assessment is key.

In Abia, the P4P Chapter wanted to better understand the conflict drivers captured in the quantitative analysis and determined to utilize a local expert to perform an in-depth assessment in the state using a mixed approach including Focus Group Discussions, Key Informant Interviews, and town hall meetings with local stakeholders. After gathering this information, which helped to fill in gaps in the quantitative assessment and provide context, a forum of stakeholders comprising traditional rulers, women’s leaders, youth leaders, political leaders, and CSOs/NGOs, was organized to review the information. During the review, participants agreed that Umuahia North was a key hotspot where implementers could intervene to reduce potential violence. Through a participatory process, they determined that the annual New Yam Festival in Ibeku community was a trigger event that needed to be mitigated through advanced planning and sensitization campaigns as, in prior years, it had led to violence, including the destruction of lives and property.

Based on the information gathered from both the quantitative data as well as a qualitative analysis of contextual risk factors, the group organized a successful intervention to sensitize the wider community against violence during the festival. This included meetings with key stakeholders such as traditional leaders, local government actors, youth groups, and CSOs and NGOs who were familiar with the context and potential for violence, and ways to mitigate it. The
subsequent festival that was held was peaceful compared to previous years and deemed a success story for both P4P and Abia State, with local media and traditional leaders highlighting the inclusivity and thoroughness of the intervention.

This early intervention demonstrated was the value of a full-scale conflict early warning analysis, and the inclusion of key stakeholders from at all stages, from analysis to planning to intervention. From a conflict analysis perspective, while the examination of trends and patterns is critical, in order to fully understand what the underlying causes and current conflict triggers may be, qualitative methods (such as interviews and focus groups) help add context and fill in missing information.

Akwa Ibom Interventions:
Managing Land Conflict in 2016-2017

In the Niger Delta, conflict is often inter-generational, with disputes between families or communities lasting for decades. This is particularly the case around land conflicts, often thorny issues that can fester for years only to be ignited by an obvious or seemingly unrelated conflict trigger. Such conflicts are often deeply personal, with historical grievances becoming deeply entrenched, and forming part of the identity of one or more of the aggrieved parties. In Akwa Ibom State, the P4P Chapter and PREVENT Committee are no strangers to such conflicts, having successfully mediated several over the years. The key to such interventions is the ability of the mediators to acknowledge feelings of grievance on both sides, and to come to a solution that is mutually acceptable to both parties. Additionally, a deep understanding of the conflict legacy, and its tendency to manifest in other ways if only superficially addressed, is crucial. In two instances, in Q4 of 2016 and Q3 of 2017, the skills of the P4P Akwa Ibom P4P Chapter and PREVENT Committee were put to the test.

In the first instance, a nine-year land conflict between two families in Uru LGA had been escalating, and the police were called in to resolve the dispute. While a police intervention in the form of punitive response, or a court intervention in the form of adjudication, may resolve the outward manifestations of a conflict, they rarely touch the root causes. Without a concerted effort to find a solution that addresses the immediate conflict while also acknowledging the root causes and historical grievances, interventions can merely be stop-gap measures between one crisis and the next. In the case of the Urue land conflict, the PREVENT Committee conducted a full situational analysis of the crisis, including the identification of key stakeholders and persons who were in a position to exert a positive influence on the dispute. Following the analysis, mediation efforts were undertaken, involving both the aggrieved families and the key stakeholders identified in the analysis. Eventually, the families agreed to resolve their dispute through peaceful means and withdrew their case from the police, preferring the good offices and mediation efforts of the PREVENT Committee to resolve the issue without recourse to violence.

In the second case, a land conflict in Uyo between two families was escalating when the P4P Chapter was called in to assist. As in the first case, the P4P Chapter utilized situational and stakeholder analyses to determine the best course of action to resolve the dispute. After determining that the Uyo caretaker Chairman was a trusted figure to both parties, it was then decided that opening a market on the disputed piece of land would be the best solution. P4P suggested that revenues generated weekly from the market be shared between the two families, and that a portion should be sent to the LGA board. Both families agreed and signed a peace treaty, with the LGA chairman serving as witness.

In both cases, the P4P Chapter and PREVENT Committee put to use several critical skills in conflict analysis, mediation and resolution. First, in performing a detailed situational analysis, which included visits and interviews with the aggrieved families, the manifest and root causes of the disputes were brought to light. Secondly, in performing a stakeholder analysis, the identification of trusted figures and key influencers in the community was achieved, ensuring wider social buy-in for the eventual resolution. Finally, particularly in the case of the Uyo intervention, a solution that provided both revenue and the necessity of working together to achieve financial gains was reached, demonstrating creative and mutually-beneficial problem-solving skills. To date, the peace has held between the families in each case, as well as in the wider community.

Bayelsa Intervention:
Managing Election Violence in 2015

The transition of gubernatorial power has historically been fraught with violence in Bayelsa State, a key oil producer in the Niger Delta. During the last gubernatorial election in 2012, for instance, political tensions were high, with reported explosions at party secretariats, politically motivated cult killings, kidnappings, attempted...
assassinations, and general political thuggery. In 2015, signs of conflict issues began to emerge after the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced 5th December 2015 for the gubernatorial elections in the state. In October 2015, based on data received by Peace Agents through the PIND SMS Platform, as well as through an examination of other datasets, it was apparent that the potential for conflict in the state was growing. Utilizing these multiple streams of information, PIND then aggregated, cleaned, collated and uploaded the integrated conflict data to the Peace Map in order to analyze the conflict patterns and trends apparent in the data. PIND then produced a Conflict Briefing highlighting the potential for election violence in the state. These findings were shared with key P4P Network stakeholders from Bayelsa to help better understand the context as well as develop some initial recommendations for how to mediate the conflict risks.

In November 2015, based on the findings and recommendations of the conflict briefing, and using a combination of Stakeholders Network Analysis (SNA) and P4P network partnerships, the Bayelsa State P4P Chapter conveyed and facilitated a multi-stakeholders’ forum on mitigating violence during the elections in the state, with participants including representatives of political parties, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the Nigeria Police, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), civil society organisations (CSOs), ex-militants, youth groups, and media houses. At the end of the forum, participants issued a communique and signed a “Peace Pact,” where party representatives vowed to work closely with security agencies and key community stakeholders to ensure peace and security before, during and after the elections. PIND followed up with these commitments by training community-based Peace Monitors in identified hotspots on volunteerism and conflict incident reporting, to ensure operational level response to conflict risk and violence during the election. PIND also embarked on a non-violent election advocacy program through the media and bulk SMS peace messaging to respond to structural vulnerabilities and underlying drivers of election violence in the state. PIND also built the institutional capacity of the P4P state chapter on leadership, project management and resource mobilization, facilitated a conflict analysis and planning session for the state chapter to better respond to conflict issues.

Following the elections, the Bayelsa P4P State Chapter as well as PIND staff followed-up with data collection, key informant interviews, and regular monitoring of the prior identified conflict risk and vulnerability factors to determine the impact of the intervention and any unanticipated or corollary effects. This information was then fed back into the system to ensure that lessons learned were captured, as well as both intended and unintended impacts and outcomes.

Cross River State Intervention: Managing Criminality and Youth Restiveness in 2016

The phenomenon of street children is sadly common to most cities in Nigeria. From 2013 onwards, however, the Cross River state capital of Calabar was faced with rising levels of insecurity and community tension as a result of violence and criminality attributed to street children locally called ‘Skolombo Boys’ and ‘Lacasera Girls.’ The problem in Calabar was complex, impacting both the security of the capital as well as the psycho-social welfare of some of its youngest and most vulnerable residents. From a security perspective, the children had begun roaming the streets for survival in bands, which in several cases had morphed into criminal gangs associated with incidents of robbery, kidnapping, rape, pick-pocketing, and drug abuse. Additionally, parental absence, and the psychological trauma of societal rejection and abuse, had rendered these children even more vulnerable to predation by gangs and human traffickers. Although the state government, in 2015, inaugurated a special security task force to address the issue, the focus was largely punitive and unable to effectively address the more complex underlying dynamics related to dysfunctional homes, superstitious practices, child trafficking, urbanization, and forced migration. Finding longer-term solutions to the rehabilitation and community reintegration of the children, and the need for innovative thinking about how to prevent the problem in the first place, were also critical. Overall, while there were multiple government and civil society initiatives aimed at addressing various
aspects of the problem, there was little collaboration and coordination, or opportunities for sharing across sectors to find a holistic and integrated approach. This is where PIND and the P4P Network came in.

In late 2016, the Cross River State government, through the office of the Senior Security Advisor (SSA) to the governor, contacted PIND and the Cross River State P4P Chapter for assistance. Recognizing that PIND and the P4P Network had the experience, connections, training and skills to address such a multifaceted issue holistically, a partnership was born. After a full review of the conflict dimensions, PIND and P4P suggested that the Cross River State government approach the issue from a social perspective as well as a security one, and leverage the existing efforts and best practices of CSOs in addressing it. A core tenet of the PIND and P4P approach is leveraging existing efforts rather than recreating the wheel, and the cooperative partnership was built on this foundation. In early 2017, a Stakeholders’ Forum was organized by the office of the SSA in collaboration with PIND and P4P. The forum brought together representatives from multiple government agencies, ministries and departments—including the security services— with relevant civil society organizations, including the church. It featured panels that served as platforms for cross-sectoral information and best practices sharing, and helped to cement the relationship between the government, security agencies and local CSOs. It also included perspectives from former street children who had been successfully rehabilitated to ensure that their voices were heard.

At the end of the forum, participants shared sector-specific recommendations from their own successes and shortcomings and identified key actors already in place to deal with various dimensions of the problem. A key objective of the stakeholder’s forum was to ensure that it would not be a “talk shop” with no tangible way forward, but one that included targeted and actionable recommendations in a comprehensive framework for enactment across sectors. This goal was achieved and cooperative efforts across sectors continues today, built in part on linkages made during the Stakeholders’ Forum.

Delta State Intervention:
Managing Communal Violence in 2017

In the Niger Delta, land disputes that give rise to communal conflict remain some of the most complex and long-running drivers of violence in the region. Delta State, from 2014 onwards, experienced a spike in communal conflict, intersecting with a surge in militancy in 2016. As noted in other intervention stories in this section, land conflicts can take on multiple dimensions in the Niger Delta, and are often generational. The sluggish process of court or commission adjudication often puts these conflicts on a slow simmer for years, with various attempts by state or local government to enforce peace through the deployment of police or military assets. In the meantime, as the root causes of the conflict remain unresolved, they often take on other aspects, such as identity or ethnic/religious overtones, and are exacerbated by other conflict drivers, such as increased militancy or gang/cult violence.

For the past forty years, such a scenario had been playing out in the Isoko South local area of Delta State. A long-running land boundary dispute between two communities—the Okpolo-Enweh and the Igbide—began to flare up again in mid-2016, with reported militant youth groups perpetuating attacks and reprisal attacks that led to multiple deaths as well as property destruction. In an attempt to restore calm and separate the warring parties, the military was deployed to the area in May 2016. Despite this, and various initiatives by leaders of both communities to come to a peace agreement, the violent attacks continued, worsening in their lethality and destructiveness throughout 2017. In late 2017, the Delta State P4P Chapter determined to take another tact in helping the afflicted communities; namely, to train them in leadership, peacebuilding and conflict resolution skills to equip peacemakers with alternative means to calm the violence and address some of the root causes of the dispute.

The Delta State P4P Chapter intervention began in November 2017, with advocacy visits to the palaces of the Okpolo, Enweh and Igbide communities to gain an understanding of the current situation and introduce P4P and its intention to conduct two days of leadership and peacebuilding trainings. The P4P team was made up of the P4P state liaison representatives/trainers and participants of the various communities in Delta State, including those afflicted by the conflict. Following these visits, and upon securing support from the local government, Isoko Development Union (IDU), traditional rulers and community leaders, the training commenced. Over two days, participants were introduced to various peacebuilding and conflict resolution modules; including types of conflict styles and manifestations (including identity conflicts), a training on leadership in peacebuilding, and introduction modules to the use of mediation,
negotiation, and early warning reporting for response. To formalize the training and the intention of P4P and the Delta State Chapter to stay involved, a P4P sub-chapter was also inaugurated during the visit, comprised of individuals from both communities. At the end of the training, a communiqué was also released that pledged to make use of the skills learned and to work together as a newly inaugurated sub-chapter of the P4P Network.

The Delta State P4P Chapter intervention in Isoko South was innovative for several reasons. The first was that rather than attempt to solely extract more verbal agreements or promises of peace from high-level leaders or community committees that had broken down in the past and could only be enforced from the outside (i.e. through the military or police), the focus was on instilling skills and understanding that could become a force multiplier for peace at multiple levels—from leadership to grass roots. Secondly, as the participants included both literate/skilled as well as illiterate/unskilled individuals, the training established a level playing field for all involved, moving away from models that may have not been fully inclusive and thus not fully accepted by all. Finally, in inaugurating a P4P subchapter with individuals from the various conflicting parties, the P4P Network implicitly empowered the parties not only through training and education, but also through their inclusion as part of the largest grassroots peacebuilding and advocacy umbrella organization in Nigeria. As in all P4P trainings, there was further an emphasis on inclusion of women, youth and other vulnerable groups who may not have previously been given a voice and thus felt that resorting to violence was their only recourse. To date, there have not been any further attacks by either party and the reports from the Delta P4P Chapter indicate that youths from both communities have continued to come together to socialize and are on the path of re-integration.

**Edo State Intervention:**
**Preventing and Managing Election Violence in 2016**

Elections in the Niger Delta tend to carry a high risk for violence, as they are often perceived as “zero sum” or “winner takes all” affairs. More so than national elections, state elections tend to drive the most incidents of violent conflict, and Edo state has been no stranger to that dynamic over the years. According to a July 2014 PIND/FFP Nigeria Conflict Bulletin, on a per capita basis, Edo was one of the Niger Delta’s most violent states basis from 2012 to mid-2014, with about 113 incidents and 250 fatalities, with the peak occurring during the governorship election in 2012. Overall, gubernatorial elections are seen as opportunities to influence the distribution of public wealth and to access large clienteles of political patronage, creating incentives for intra- and inter-party violence.

Cognizant of that history and determined to reduce election-related violence in the 2016 Edo State gubernatorial elections, the Edo State P4P Chapter designed and executed an intervention with two key components: advocacy/sensitization campaigns and election conflict early warning and response training. The advocacy and sensitization campaigns targeted relevant stakeholders through peace messaging and advocacy visits before, during and after the elections, while the early warning and response component focused on the training of 60 peace monitors in four identified hotspot LGAs on early warning reporting. This included the establishment of a situation monitoring room in Benin, the state capital, to collect, analyze reports, and contact key stakeholders (INEC and Police) through dedicated phone lines for timely response.

In the aftermath of the election, independent nongovernmental, observers and analysts acknowledged that the Edo 2016 governorship election was “largely peaceful.” From the reports of field monitors on the IPDU SMS platform, of the 140 reports received on the day of the election, more than 80% of peace monitors reported that the election was peaceful in their respective localities. While some in the government attributed the success to the deployment of over 25,000 police personnel, in an After Action Review (AAR) meeting convened by the P4P Edo Chapter, international and local NGOs, as well as
some government stakeholders, noted the role that advocacy and intervention programs played in dissuading violence, including those efforts undertaken by P4P Edo. Institutions and groups such as National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Nigerian Union of Journalist (NUJ), International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), and INEC specifically cited P4P for contributing to the peaceful election through its sensitization, advocacy and early warning and early response mechanism. It also lauded the Chapter’s efforts to build local capacity by training and deploying Peace Monitors.

The post-election peace messages created by the P4P Chapter and aired on radio in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of election results were also singled out for success during the ARR. Participants related that the peace messages were particularly effective in reducing tensions and triggering political parties, other CSOs, and the state government to issue press statements calling for calm. While it is impossible to measure the levels of election violence might have been absent the P4P intervention, the follow-up engagements and AARs with stakeholders provided insights into the overall success of the strategy, particularly the peace messaging campaign. It also provided insights into its shortcomings, including not engaging INEC and other governmental bodies earlier. These lessons learned and best practices may not have been captured without the review, a critical component often missing in conflict prevention and intervention efforts, but essential for ensuring that there is a feedback loop that can inform future interventions by preserving institutional best practices. The incorporation of this into the P4P Edo State Election Violence Prevention Intervention not only helped build the institutional memory and capacity of the Chapter, but also contributed to the wider body of information available to other chapters and actors on election violence prevention initiatives for future efforts in Edo and beyond.

**Imo State Intervention: Managing Gang/Militant Violence in 2016**

In Niger Delta states such as Imo, it can sometimes be difficult to isolate where one conflict driver begins and another one ends. This is particularly true when there are a multiplicity of underlying conflict patterns and potential triggers present; including long standing land grievances, communal tensions, cult and gang-related violence, and election-related tensions. Imo is also one of the Niger Delta’s top oil-producing states, turning many conflict issues into high-stakes, “do-or-die” affairs when compounded with the presence of international oil companies and questions of community resource allocation. This was the case in the Awarra Court area of Imo State where a decades-long conflict over land had morphed into a larger communal conflict that eventually drew in prominent Niger Delta cult groups, multinational oil companies, police and military personnel, traditional rulers, and local communities. The involvement of two prominent cult gangs (Dewell and Debem; later renamed as the “Niger Delta Red Squad” and the “Niger Delta Rescue Force,” respectively) marked a particularly violent phase of the conflict, with local youth involvement intensifying. By early 2016, multiple attempts over the years at quelling the conflict had failed. These included the deployment of police and military personnel, who were later withdrawn, and various initiatives led by traditional and religious leaders as well as local government actors and civil society. By the time the Imo State P4P Chapter was preparing for its intervention in mid-2016, the loss of life and the destruction of property had resulted in significant community displacement, with traditional rulers and other leadership figures fleeing the area, and increased attacks on oil infrastructure, with no police or military presence to help stem the violence.

Initially, the Imo P4P Chapter set out to explore a proposed plan for Demobilization, Demilitarization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) of the armed combatant groups as part of an initial step to quell violence to usher in conflict mitigation and management efforts. However, once they began to engage with local stakeholders and dive more deeply into the present manifestations of the conflict, it was understood that DDRR was merely a temporary means aimed at stopping the cycle of attack and counter-attack. While such an effort was surely needed in the short-term, it did little to address the root causes and subsequent manifestations of the violent conflict that had held the area in its peril since 2004. After an initial conflict and situational analysis, the Imo P4P determined that a two-fold strategy was needed that addressed a key conflict driver: disengaged and aggrieved youth who were easily coopted into the cult groups and, under the current system, had few chances for gainful employment or a way out of poverty and violence. The strategy developed placed youth and the development of structures and mechanisms for their institutional and organizational inclusion in decision-making at the center of efforts. It also recommended a review of the GMoU and implementation policies of multinational oil companies operating in the area, concluding that failing to implement Community and Social Responsibility agreements regarding the provision of basic goods and services to the community (roads, electricity, potable water, health centers, scholarships for youth, etc.) had resulted in a vicious cycle of
violence absent development and development impeded by violence.

Over the course of several months, beginning in April 2016, meetings were held, and correspondence exchanged with traditional rulers, local politicians and the state’s assembly representatives; the cult and militant groups operating in the area; police and other security personnel; youth groups; the church and other pertinent CSO actors. In addition, a Peace Summit was organized which brought together key actors, including youth, and also succeeded in getting the two cult groups to sign a temporary ceasefire to allow for further conflict mediation and resolution efforts. Finally, the efforts of P4P also resulted in the establishment of the Awarra Court Area Youth Council (ACAYOC) that created a formal linkage between the youth groups and the Awarra Court Area Traditional Rulers Council, two of the main conflict actors in the area. Finally, by the time the main activities of the chapter had concluded, locally displaced persons were also beginning to return to the area.

As in other interventions mentioned in this section, the P4P Imo Chapter utilized a model that not only included a robust quantitative and qualitative assessment of the key actors, conflict drivers, triggers, and historical patterns and trends, but also one that relied on multistakeholder engagement to obtain additional contextual, qualitative information. Based on this, they were able to pinpoint key constituencies that needed to be engaged (youth, traditional rulers) in the short term to ensure that any DDRR efforts were not divorced from wider peacebuilding initiatives. They also recognized the value of sustained engagement over time, with multiple efforts needing to take place simultaneously or in close succession. Overall, although the area remains troubled, the efforts of the P4P Imo State Chapter in bridging some critical gaps and identifying an overarching strategy remains in place today as a model of community engagement.

Ondo State Intervention:
Sustained Engagement in Resolving Communal Conflict in 2016

Ondo is known as one of the more peaceful states in the Niger Delta, regularly reporting fewer conflict incidents and fatalities over the years than some of its neighbors. Nevertheless, from mid-2015 onwards, there was an increase in reported incidents of communal violence and election-related tensions. In the case of the former, herder-farmer conflicts had been on the rise in the state in 2015 and 2016, with insecurity and violence manifesting mainly in Oke-Odu, Ipinsa, Ilere, Ljare, Ogbese, and Gaga communities. As seen in other parts of the region, as well as the nation, herder-farmer conflicts, if left unaddressed, could quickly spiral from a conflict over land and grazing rights to a multidimensional crisis with ethnic and religious dimensions. Once entrenched, untangling the various conflict dynamics and finding a peaceable solution for all parties becomes more elusive. Aware of such dynamics and the ramifications for the communities, as well as the potential for tensions to spread across the state, the Ondo State PREVENT Committee took action.

Beginning in June of 2016, the Ondo PREVENT Committee began engaging with stakeholders in the affected communities, advocating for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. In Oke-Odu, they met with traditional rulers and other relevant stakeholders in a series of dialogues that allowed all parties to air their grievances while securing support for a peaceful solution from trusted traditional leaders. Throughout the summer, they conducted peace advocacy visits to each of the affected communities, often centered on community dialogues that brought all stakeholders to the table. In Gaga, the community dialogue led to the formation of a peace committee, comprising representatives of the farmer and herder communities, in addition to PREVENT Committee members. Amidst continued and often violent clashes, the visits persisted. On the part of the PREVENT team, members knew that the community dialogues were often the only opportunity for local residents from each aggrieved party to speak openly with the support of mediators and community leaders focused on resolution. In securing the support of traditional leaders for peace, they acknowledged the importance of community-driven, and sanctioned, solutions. In July of 2016, their efforts paid off
when the communities developed and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) taking into account the interests of the herders as well as the community residents.

In the case of the Ondo State interventions, the PREVENT Committee demonstrated that sustained engagement, and a willingness to work directly with all conflict stakeholders to find a solution that best suited all interests, was required. Often, in the face of rising tensions and conflict, the desire for a rapid end to the violence may compel parties to come to “quick fix” solutions. However, as demonstrated by the PREVENT Committee in Ondo, a willingness to engage over the longer term, and a commitment to dialogue and the flexibility to work locally, often results in a more sustainable peace. Although Ondo continues to be afflicted by intercommunal conflict, often exacerbated by rising rates of cult and gang-related violence, the 2016 interventions helped not only to build the skills and resources of the PREVENT Committee, but also helped cement their reputation as fair and trusted conflict mediators in the state.

**Rivers State Intervention: Averting Communal Crisis through Rapid and Inclusive Response in 2016**

Beginning in 2016, Rivers State began to experience a sharp rise in insecurity, with incidents of criminality and cult violence spiraling to levels not seen since the end of the militancy in 2009. In such an environment, several key skills are required of responders, including a high degree of expertise and risk tolerance, and the ability to mobilize and respond quickly. While the Rivers State P4P Chapter and PREVENT Committee had already been active in mediating and resolving disputes relating to political and cult-related crises in the state for several years, an incident in the second quarter of 2016 truly put their skills to the test. While Rivers State has not experienced the level of social and security-related cleavages from herder-farmer conflicts that have affected other states in the Niger Delta, the rise in insecurity and the tendency of rumors to spread like wildfire gave rise to an incident that had the potential to ignite such divisions. In Rivers, the Okrika settlement has long been home to various religious and ethnic communities, including herder groups. While co-existing peacefully for the most part, following a story that a Boko Haram terrorist had been traced to the herder community and arrested, fear and suspicion quickly took hold. A group of youths began planning an attack on the community in retaliation for suspected role in harboring a purported terrorist, a situation that had the potential to become both catastrophic and very deadly in short order.

The Rivers State PREVENT Committee, upon hearing news of the impending attack, knew that time was of the essence and mobilized for response quickly. After meeting together to determine the best course of action, and one that would involve all aggrieved and suspicious parties, they called a meeting of the CDC chairmen of the four communities that owned the settlement. After hours of sometimes tense and heated dialogue, facilitated by the Rivers PREVENT Committee, the CDC chairmen agreed to talk with the youth of their respective communities and dissuade them from attacking the targeted group or anyone living in the settlement. The CDC chairmen emphasized the need to for tolerance and understanding and warned of the dangers of rumor in an already charged environment. They also explained how the planned attack, while perhaps momentarily assuaging feelings of fear and a perceived need for retribution, would trigger a series of crises that could quickly engulf the entire settlement. In the end, the youth were persuaded, and the planned attack was averted.

The PREVENT Committee, as well as the wider P4P Chapter, had put to use several key skills during this intervention, including a rapid and participatory analysis to determine the scope and magnitude of the problem, and its possible second and third order effects. They also utilized inclusive dialogue and mediation skills, understanding that by not including all parties in the discussions, a wider community-owned solution would remain elusive, leaving the door open for another potential crisis in the future. To date, the Okrika settlement has avoided the type of ethnic and religious polarization that has afflicted other Niger Delta communities.

**ENDNOTES**

1. Excerpts taken from “PIND Conflict Early Warning and Response Handbook: Case Studies”
COMPONENT III: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

PURPOSE STATEMENT
The augmentation of the social infrastructure and social capital in the Niger Delta through connecting and engaging existing stakeholders, inspiring and recruiting new stakeholders, providing support and expertise, and reaching out to the broader public through events and media efforts.

SUBCATEGORIES
Social infrastructure is measured across four sub-categories:
1. New stakeholder recruitment,
2. Connecting and engaging existing stakeholders,
3. Stakeholder support,
4. Public outreach, and
5. Reach Centrality

As described in the previous two chapters, the Early Warning component tracks and analyzes conflict risk factors so that PIND can plan and adjust for more effective and targeted conflict management – to reduce the level of violence from where it would otherwise be absent PIND’s intervention. At the same time, PIND cultivates social infrastructure and social capital across the Niger Delta to build a foundation for sustainable peacebuilding over the longer term. However, social infrastructure is not only focused on the long term. A dense network of peace actors with skills, knowledge, and lines of communication, also creates an enabling environment for rapid dissemination of early warning signals and for scaling and replication of conflict management efforts, even in the short term. This social infrastructure, therefore, is the cornerstone of PIND’s peacebuilding strategy, and therefore key to measuring impact on the ground. It includes establishing and expanding networks, supporting those

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Metrics</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Stakeholder Mobilization</td>
<td>P4P Membership</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The P4P Network has seen consistent growth in membership after initial rapid growth but membership in some key states (e.g. Rivers, Cross River), remains low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender balance in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Existing Stakeholder Engagement</td>
<td>Registered Peace Agents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>There has been strong, albeit irregular growth in the number of registered Peace Agents. The Niger Delta PSN has expanded into key states, but does not yet appear to cover the entire region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders Support</td>
<td>Trainings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PIND has provided trainings across all nine states with topics that reflect the needs of stakeholders in the region. There has been positive feedback about the value of the trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Outreach</td>
<td>Outreach events Media appearances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Outreach events are held somewhat irregularly and participation is similarly irregular. Outreach efforts, both events and media appearances, encompass a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reach Centrality</td>
<td>Stakeholder Network Analysis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PIND is centrally embedded in the peacebuilding ecosystem in the Niger Delta. This allows PIND to be a leader in supporting stakeholders, communicating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Impact Score — See Appendix for Scoring Matrix
networks through the provision of both material and technical assistance, connecting Peace Agents already operating in the Niger Delta, reaching out to the broader public across the region to help create a critical mass of people committed to peace, and forming partnerships with a diverse range of actors operating in the region to help them ensure their operations are sensitive to the peace and security concerns present in the region. PIND’s efforts in this domain have been very successful in a number of regards, including continued consistent growth of membership in the P4P network, founding and expanding the Peace and Security Working Group, holding dozens of trainings with over two thousand participants, and engaging with thousands of people across the region’s nine states through a diverse array of outreach events.

**SUB-COMPONENT 1: NEW STAKEHOLDER MOBILIZATION**

**P4P Network**

One of the most central elements of PIND’s efforts to improve the social infrastructure of the Niger Delta is the P4P network, a region-wide platform of local stakeholders who engage with one another on an ongoing basis around conflict early warning, assessment, and response. The stakeholders that make up the network include civil society, community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, private companies, donor organizations, and the general public. Membership of the P4P network has grown to nearly six thousand members as of the first quarter of 2018.

As illustrated above right (Figure 3.2), growth was extremely rapid in the early history of the network: membership increased by over 600 percent between the third quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015, reaching nearly 3,700. Although that early explosive growth did subsequently cool, PIND has successfully managed to continue growing the network membership on a steady and consistent basis. This continued growth is perhaps equally as impressive as the network’s early rapid growth as many organizations often find it extremely difficult to continue adding new members after reaching their most obvious audience and after the fading of the initial burst of enthusiasm that typically accompanies the launch of something new. The continued growth of the P4P at a remarkably consistent pace since the middle of 2015 is a testament both to PIND’s outreach efforts and to the value that the P4P network provides to its members. Furthermore, this continued growth appears to have come largely thanks to greater engagement with the general public – the number of organizational members has grown at a slower rate than the overall growth of the network – which is crucial for achieving PIND’s goal of catalyzing new peace actors and engaging a critical mass of people across the Niger Delta. The participation of women in the network has maintained a consistent level; women comprise a little less than forty percent of the members of the network, a number which has seen some minor fluctuations but no consistent increase or decrease over time.

An important part of how the P4P network has fostered continued membership growth is through the establishment of numerous sub-chapters. These sub-chapters began to be established soon after the network itself was inaugurated, and new ones have continued to be established: there were 65 sub-chapters as of the first quarter of 2016 and 83 as of the first quarter of 2018, representing 28 percent growth in two years. These sub-chapters extend the presence of the P4P network within each state, which has two principal benefits. First, this extended presence connects the network to more people on a regular basis, helping membership growth, which is reflected in the fact that the numbers of members per capita by state is closely, though not perfectly, correlated to the numbers of sub-chapters per capita. Second, it allows the network to have a more fine-grained sense of the needs and developments in the region, improving its planning and response activities. The establishment of new sub-chapters is driven by the needs and capacities of the network in each state, which means that they are not evenly distributed across the
nine states of the Niger Delta, nor are they evenly distributed by population. The relative density of sub-chapters shows that there are some states, especially Imo, in which the P4P network has a much stronger presence. Since 2016, the growth of new sub-chapters has been particularly strong in Ondo, Delta, and Abia states.

There are a couple of ways this information could be used to inform PIND’s future operations and improve the effectiveness of the P4P network. The first would be to investigate the reasons behind the unequal presence and growth of network sub-chapters, in other words, why it has succeeded in establishing a particularly strong presence in Imo State or why it has seen such strong growth in the past two years in Ondo State. These successes may be due to the activities of the local branch of the P4P network, other activities by PIND, or perhaps outside factors. The second way in which this data could be useful going forward is based on the conclusion that the relative strength of the P4P network is not located in the same states where violence is worst, as defined by PIND’s early warning data on the Peace Map. Neither Imo nor Ondo States have experienced especially high levels of violence compared to other states in the Niger Delta while states like Cross River, and to a lesser extent Bayelsa and Rivers, have experienced relatively high levels of violence, particularly in recent years, yet the P4P network is relatively less dense and growing slowly or not at all. An important question for PIND and the P4P network is therefore whether it would be sufficiently worthwhile to consciously direct more time, effort, and resources towards expanding the network in those states by supporting the establishment of new sub-chapters.

SUB-COMPONENT 2: EXISTING STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

Peace Agents

In addition to mobilizing new stakeholders through the P4P network, a crucial part of PIND’s efforts to improve the Niger Delta’s social infrastructure is its work to identify and assist existing Peace Agents. Peace Agents are local, national, and multinational initiatives that work on issues of peace and security and are available to respond these issues. One of the ways in which PIND assists the work of these Peace Agents is by registering them and including them on its Peace Map. In addition to their inclusion on the Peace Map – from where they can be contacted – Peace Agents can receive conflict alerts and regular updates, thereby linking PIND’s early warning work with organizations best positioned to act.

As with membership in the P4P network, the number of registered Peace Agents has continued to grow over time. Unlike with P4P network membership, however, this growth has not taken place as a steady, consistent increase, but has instead manifested as something closer to a punctuated equilibrium, in which short periods of relatively rapid growth alternate with periods of relatively slow growth.

As shown above (Figure 3.3), there were large increase in the number of registered Peace Agents in the third quarter of 2016 and the second quarter of 2017. Identifying what factors contributed to these periods of strong growth could be valuable for helping PIND continue to identify new Peace Agents, thereby expanding the social infrastructure in the region and contributing to the continued success of PIND’s effort going forward.
As with the P4P Network, the registered Peace Agents are not evenly distributed across the region, though the relative density across the nine states, illustrated above right (Figure 3.5), is not the same as for membership in the P4P network.

The distribution of registered Peace Agents illustrates valuable points. At the most basic, the highest density of Peace Agents is in Rivers State, followed by Edo and Abia States while the three lowest densities are in Ondo, Delta, and Imo States. This distribution is in many ways complementary with the distribution of P4P sub-chapters; Imo State has the highest density of P4P sub-chapters and Ondo has the highest growth, but they have the lowest and third-lowest density of registered Peace Agents, respectively. On the other hand, Rivers state has a relatively low number of P4P sub-chapters per capita but the highest density of registered Peace Agents.

This complementarity ensures that PIND has strong links to local organizations working on issues of peace and security in most states either through the P4P network or through its network of Peace Agents. There are, however, a few states – such as Cross River – which have a relatively low density of both Peace Agents and P4P Sub-Chapters, which may suggest that the level of investment in social infrastructure there is weaker than might be warranted by the level of violence.

Peace and Security Working Group

PIND is a founding member of the Peace and Security Network (PSN), and continues to be a member of the PSN Steering Committee. The PSN, which was founded as the Peace and Security Working Group in 2013, brings together international agencies, donors, local and international civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, and non-state actors working on issues of peace and security in Nigeria. The network serves as a vital networking, information-sharing, and coordination platform for its members as well as helping them connect to funding, training, and partnership opportunities. One of the PSN’s major focus areas is election violence, and the group has served as a crucial hub for its members to share information and analyses of likely scenarios and coordinate plans and activities to help reduce and mitigate this type of violence.

The National PSN body meets quarterly in Abuja. Branches of the PSN, within each of Nigeria’s geo-political zones also meet, the most active of which is the South-South branch, facilitated by PIND. In February 2016, PIND participated in the inaugural meeting of the Niger Delta Peace and Security Working Group in Rivers State, which was founded to specifically address the rising level of insecurity and violence there. The issue of cultism was identified as a major contributor to this worrisome trend, and the members of the group explored possible measures that could be taken for tackling the threat and ways to coordinate with other actors in the region, including
religious leaders, traditional leaders, and unions on advocacy and sensitization messages. The following year, the group expanded by establishing working groups in Bayelsa, Cross River, and Delta States to address key conflict issues in each. These three states were those that, after Rivers State, PIND’s early warning data system had identified as experiencing the largest share of violence in 2016. In addition to using their early warning data system to strategically choose where to establish new working groups, those new working groups used PIND’s early warning analysis products in their analysis, exemplified by the Cross River chapter’s meeting in the second quarter of 2017 to discuss the challenges relating to the Skolombo Boys and Lacacera Girls that were highlighted in PIND’s policy brief from February of that year.

**SUB-COMPONENT 3: STAKEHOLDER SUPPORT**

PIND also provides direct support for the social infrastructure it helps establish, especially through the P4P network and the PREVENT committees. That support can take many forms. The provision of platforms for collaboration and data-based early warning systems have already been discussed and PIND also provides funding and other forms of material support. It also provides crucial technical and capacity-building support in the form of trainings, which it delivers to a variety of actors, including P4P Chapters and sub-Chapters, the P4P Network’s Central Working Committee, PREVENT Committees, and others. In the past several years, PIND has held a wide variety of trainings, ranging from basic skills and tools, managing budgets effectively for NGOs, conflict assessment and analysis including how to use the Peace Map to high level strategic workshops.

These trainings form a vital part of PIND’s efforts to improve the effectiveness of the social infrastructure that its other activities help build. The number of these trainings that PIND provides per quarter, as well as the number of participants that attend the trainings, has fluctuated over time, but has not seen any overall trend of increasing or decreasing, as seen above right (see Figure 3.6).

That participation in the trainings has not fallen over time is in many ways a good thing. It suggests that PIND is able to continuously innovate in creating new trainings that provide sufficient value to participants that they return, a suggestion supported by the fact that PIND changes the type of training they offer on the basis of the needs they identify within the social infrastructure they support. On the other hand, participation in the trainings has not increased over the same time period that the number of sub-chapters has increased by 28 percent and membership in PIND has increased over 40 percent. A concern, therefore, could be that PIND requires additional resources to support the expanding P4P network at the same level as it has in the past or that PIND needs to ensure that it is using its resources most efficiently and effectively as possible so that it can continue to provide the same level of effective support. Ensuring that this is the case involves allocating resources both to the locations where they are most needed and also to the types of trainings that will most effectively increase the capacity of the organizations and people who constitute the region’s social infrastructure.

Project documents suggest that a much larger number of trainings was held in Rivers (where PIND’s peacebuilding office is located), Bayelsa, and Ondo States than in the other seven states. Since the beginning of 2017, the distribution of trainings has changed slightly, with a larger proportion of trainings being held in Delta State, but is otherwise similar to the illustration on the following page (Figure 3.7).

Many of these trainings have been focused in states where the early warning system indicates a need, based on violence trends. Rivers State, for instance, has seen a comparatively high level of violence, especially late 2015 and the first half of 2016 and according to the data received through the IPDU SMS system, Bayelsa has also been one of the more violent states in the region, accounting for seventeen to eighteen percent of the fatalities reported through that system. Delta...
State, where PIND has held more trainings recently, has also reported relatively high levels of violence, and while the state’s share of the total violence in the region is below the highs of 2013 and 2014, the number of fatalities has been increasing in recent years as they have across much of the region. However, there are states – most notably Cross River – that have also seen relatively high levels of violence but have been the site of relatively few PIND trainings.

The final state where PIND has held a relatively large number of trainings is Ondo State. While Ondo is not one of the more violent states in the region, it had the third highest number of trainings and the highest average attendance per training of any state in the Niger Delta. This suggests that, despite the relatively low level of violence, there is high demand for PIND’s trainings in Ondo. Investigating why there is such high demand, e.g. whether PIND’s reputation is especially high or the trainings held in Ondo have been particularly good or there is violence that is being missed by the early warning data system, or something about the individuals within the Ondo P4P Chapter that makes them more active and engaged, could potentially be of great help in improving PIND’s future operations.

However, it should be noted that merely using the raw number of trainings conducted by PIND and the participants as a measure of enhanced social infrastructure and social capital, does undercount PIND’s impact in cases where the training has a step-down effect. One example of participants taking the skills learned and training other members of their community is when Chief Ikelele in Yenagoa, of Bayelsa State, took what he learned in a P4P training on conflict resolution and conducted a subsequent training for the other chiefs in his community. This type of diffusion of the effects of the training into the broader community increases the effective reach of a training in a way that is not captured in the reported figures of the number of participants. Since this phenomenon often takes place outside of PIND’s direct purview, it can be difficult to determine its frequency, but it can be captured through interviews with key participants and stakeholders.

**SUB-COMPONENT 4: PUBLIC OUTREACH**

In addition to formal trainings, PIND and P4P connect with residents and stakeholders throughout the region through a wide variety of events and activities, as well as through broadcast media appearances on radio and television, and engagement with schools. These lines of effort help to raise awareness and promote change in knowledge, attitude, and behavior at the level of the general public and can also serve as a way of recruiting new members to the P4P Network and increase the profile of PIND, which can be helpful for buy-in and support by key stakeholders when needed.

**Outreach Events**

These types of events help spread and promote the message of peace outside the formal networks of organizations and individuals that work explicitly on peace and security, thereby helping to engage and build a critical mass of people who support peace and who are willing to make an effort to see it realized. In addition, these events help introduce people not previously involved in peacebuilding to the work of PIND and P4P, helping to grow their network and encouraging more people to get involved in a deeper way, either through joining P4P or through empowering them to launch initiatives of their own. Several examples from 2017 are listed below:

- In August 2017, PIND organized a dialogue session in Rivers State to commemorate International Youth Day. During the dialogue, representatives of several youth organizations discussed many of the factors contributing to youth participation in violence, including lack of empowerment, employment, and education, religious intolerance, nepotism, favoritism, and tribalism. Members of P4P also talked about ways in which youth could engage in non-violent ways with these issues and push for change in a constructive and meaningful way.
In September 2017, in coordination with the International Day of Peace, two P4P sub-chapters in Delta State and one in Edo State held peace walks in partnership with civil society organizations and other stakeholders. In Delta, one sub-chapter visited Okere Prison and sensitized the inmates there on the value of peace and how to live a peaceful life when released while the other translated peace messages into local languages and dialects. In Edo, they visited Ohuoba primary school to educate pupils on the importance of shunning cult groups and violence more broadly.

Also in September 2017, the P4P chapter in Abia held a rally together with stakeholders including youth groups, traditional rulers, civil society organizations, students, and community members. During the rally, participants listened to speeches, watched plays, and sang songs; the P4P chapter also discussed their organization and its recent successes.

The P4P Chapter in Akwa Ibom State engaged in a ‘School to School’ program that continued through the fourth quarter of 2017. The program is focused on highlighting the importance of not joining cult groups and delivers this message to students throughout the state in their schools, which is where many of the cult groups were born and where many of them do much of their recruiting.

Despite the benefits that these outreach events provide, the number of people that PIND has been able to reach through this avenue has fluctuated substantially over time. In some periods, PIND has been able to engage thousands of people throughout the region in a wide variety of events. Mostly, however, they are only able to reach five hundred or fewer per Quarter.

There are several reasons for these fluctuations. One is that because PIND often partners with other organizations – including civil society organizations, student groups, traditional leaders, youth groups, and others – its capacity to hold outreach events will be at least partially dependent on the activities and capacities of these other groups. Another is fluctuation in resources that PIND has available for these types of events, which suggests that if PIND were to succeed in accessing additional resources, it could engage many more people in the cause of peace throughout the region.

Media Outreach

As a complement to their event-based outreach efforts, PIND and P4P engage in media outreach efforts, especially through radio and television, in order to promote messages of peace, champion the work of the P4P network, Peace Agents, and other stakeholders, or highlight specific issues. These efforts take a variety of forms; often they are single-day appearances but sometimes they comprise multi-day, multi-episode series.

Since many media appearances affect multiple states simultaneously due to the range of both radio and television and because the number of people affected by any given appearance is very difficult to determine, especially given the problem of double-counting, it is hard to effectively measure the level and impact of media outreach. One simple measure is the number of appearances that take place, although this does not account for the length of appearance or the type and reach of the media program on which the appearance took place.

Despite these limitations, the chart above (Figure 3.8) does illustrate that media outreach efforts fluctuate, with some quarters seeing a relatively large number of efforts while others seeing few or none. Media outreach efforts are also driven by local concerns. As highlighted in the section on conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta, each state has different priorities and needs and those priorities and needs also change over time as some threats rise in importance and others
fall. PIND works with the state P4P chapters to develop programs that are time and place specific, which can include addressing electoral violence, cultism, or communal violence. When a particular issue is highly important across the region and beyond, PIND will also develop a campaign for national radio and television to supplement state-specific efforts, as they did for violence against women and girls in the third quarter of 2017.

**School Outreach**

One of the most important institutions for outreach to the general public is the school system. Several P4P State Chapters have been proactive in leveraging that platform for outreach to children. Through Peace Clubs hundreds of children have been engaged on an ongoing basis to build their social skills in resolving conflict and to resist recruitment into criminality and violence. Ondo State in particular has been the most proactive in this regard including Peace Clubs in Ipe Akoko with kids from in Dynamic, Awodua, Ipe High, and Olawalwe schools. These clubs have met regularly from the first Quarter of 2016 through the first Quarter of 2017. Modules covering a range of topics were developed by PIND’s Integrated Peace and Development Unit (IPDU) and were used by the peace club facilitators in the schools for their meetings. One teacher reported that an unexpected benefit of this activity was an improvement in the reputation of the school as a result of the Peace Clubs.

In 2016, Quarter 4, Abia State replicated Ondo’s Peace Club model with a club at the Holy Ghost Comprehensive School in Umuahia. In 2017, the Akwa Ibom P4P Chapter partnered with Young Activists Initiative Nigeria to engage secondary school students to resist getting involved in cultism in a program called “School to School.” In Imo, the P4P Chapter partnered with the Ministry of Education and the Secondary Education Management Board (SEMB) to establish and inaugurate Peace Clubs in secondary schools in all three senatorial districts in the state.

**SUB-COMPONENT 5: REACH CENTRALITY**

Ultimately a denser and wider, more engaged and skilled network, provides an enabling environment for sustainable, self-organized peacebuilding responsive to local needs and amplifying local voices. It also enables faster communication and coordination across a larger number of stakeholders and influencers. A Social Network Analysis (SNA) of 446 peace and security actors in Nigeria illustrates how central PIND is to the peacebuilding ecosystem in the country.

A survey conducted over the course of the last two years found that there are 25 organizations strongly connected to PIND. Within two steps, PIND was connected to 96 organizations. And within three steps, PIND reaches 187. At six steps removed from PIND, they reach over 80% of the entire peace and security ecosystem. In fact, PIND had the third highest level of Reach (2 Step) Centrality out of the entire network nationally after P4P and the Independent National Electoral Commission.
These quantitative findings show that PIND is very centrally positioned and has significant influence to drive the conversation and the agenda regarding conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. There is clearly still much to be done. But PIND has changed the game.

**ENDNOTES**

1. Interview with Chief Ikelele Bayelsa PREVENT Team IPDU
CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS

In the last five years, PIND has made remarkable progress in the region. It has successfully implemented the strategy articulated in 2013 and has developed platforms, processes, networks, and infrastructure that can be built upon for optimizing impact going forward. Now PIND is in a position to be targeted and efficient without compromising that impact, whether at the regional, state, or community levels. PIND is well networked in the peace and security ecosystem and has a reputation for strong, data-driven, evidence-based work. PIND’s model is a public-good model, providing platforms and information as a service, which attracts a crowding-in effect of other peacebuilding partners and stakeholders who, in turn, share their own data and information. Between this crowding-in effect and the related multiplier effect of stakeholders taking the trainings and the tools and applying them in their own communities, this is what has and will account for systemic change in the Niger Delta. PIND should continue to promote this collaborative environment and cultivate its own analytical capabilities and the institutionalization of those tools and methods as a differentiator.

Having built this foundation, PIND is in a position to refine its model even as it continues to expand, becoming more efficient and more targeted by identifying, adopting, and spreading best practices. This refinement may involve examining how PIND’s model can and should be adapted to specific contexts and needs. It may also include how to most effectively convey not just skills and information but also its hard-won lessons to its partners, both those who are well established and those who have been newly inspired by PIND’s work. Given the increasing pressures that the Niger Delta has faced in recent years, the work that PIND does is more vital than ever, and the organization can and should be proud of its impact even as it seeks to continue improving in the future.

As described in the introduction, PIND’s strategy is to keep violence as low as possible to create space for social infrastructure to grow and mature for more effective and sustainable peacebuilding over the long term. A close look at each of the three components (Early Warning, Conflict Management, and Social Infrastructure) shows significant impact in each over the last five years. PIND has developed a robust early warning system with rich data, meaningful analysis, and dissemination of high quality products, which are used by PIND and partners for conflict management and strategic planning. At the same time, PIND has done an impressive job of catalyzing and supporting a vast network of new and existing Peace Actors, as well as reaching out to the general public through media, the school system, and a range of events and activities. This has created a foundation for the promotion of peaceable livelihoods across the region, as the Peace Building program finds synergy with PIND’s other program areas for economic development in the Niger Delta.

One of the key strengths of PIND’s decentralized approach for peacebuilding across nine states is that PIND can adapt its engagement according to the unique needs and circumstances in each location. In the early years of PIND’s existence, when it was still starting from scratch, it had to do everything everywhere. PIND had to help with membership recruitment in all nine states as well as training, institution-building, conflict management efforts, etc. But now that there is a requisite foundation in place, and a repository of data to support it, PIND can shift to a more targeted approach, without reducing its impact across the region or in any of the states. This finding complements the findings of IGD’s impact assessment, which pegged the Peacebuilding program at a level of “stickiness” such that ownership and sustainability were at a point of consolidation where diffusion could now rapidly accelerate. The difference, here in this assessment, is less an emphasis on scaling and more on the potential for efficiency.

As illustrated in the Conflict Dynamics section of this report, each state has different levels of risk that PIND must respond to, as well as different types and profiles of risk (whether that be risk of communal
MEASURING IMPACT AGAINST PIND’S THEORY OF CHANGE AND RESULTS

CHAIN DESIGN

violence, gang violence, militancy, or election violence). Each state also has a different social infrastructure profile. Cross River, for instance, is geographically distant from states considered part of the core Niger Delta and therefore more difficult to facilitate on an ongoing basis. Some states have very strong individuals but fewer P4P Network members overall. Some have a strong media presence but have not leveraged the school system as a platform for engaging the general public.

By positioning each state on a scatterplot along an X axis (social infrastructure) and a Y axis (level of violence since the beginning of 2016) PIND can tailor its engagement strategy to optimize impact.

The above chart plots each state based on its level of violence since 2016 and the relative density of social infrastructure, a framework which was presented in the introduction. The Y axis is calculated based on the number of conflict fatalities per capita. The X axis is calculated based on five metrics: 1) per P4P membership per capita, 2) Peace Agents registered on the map per capita, 3) number of PIND trainings per capita, 4) media engagement, and 5) the number of quarters since 2016 where school engagement was listed as a key activity in the state — weighted on a 2:1:1:1:1 ratio. These figures, were then each normalized and scaled, as described below. The normalized and scaled fatality score was used as the violence score, while the other five data points were aggregated to produce the social infrastructure score, a process which is also covered below.

**PROCESS: CALCULATING THE SCORES**

The scores are on a scale of 1-10. For the violence score, 1 represents the lowest level of vulnerability and 10 the highest level of vulnerability. For the social infrastructure score, 1 represents the lowest level of capacity and 10 the highest level of capacity. These scores are calculated as relative scores; a good score (or a bad one) has meaning only in relation to the context of the Niger Delta. Thus, a score of 10 in social infrastructure signifies that that state has the highest average density of social infrastructure among the states in the Niger Delta, not that its social infrastructure could not be improved further. Similarly, a score of 0 does not mean there is no social infrastructure in a state, merely that it is on average the sparsest in the region. The violence scores were scaled using the nine Niger Delta states plus a high violence state (Benue) and a low violence state (Kebbi), to help locate the Niger Delta states in the broader Nigerian context.

**1. Normalization**

An index, by definition, integrates and compares data sets with very different curves and distribution. As a first step, therefore, it is necessary to normalize the data so that it can be properly compared. Without framing the data within the context of the wider group of numbers, its meaning can become skewed. Therefore, the process of finding the mean and calculating the Standard Deviation (SD) of the data set, then using those elements to approximate a normal distribution, can be used to provide this meaning. The Gaussian normalization formula is outlined below.

\[
\text{SD} = \frac{\sum (x - \mu)^2}{\sqrt{N}}
\]

\[
f(x, \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}} e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}
\]

Where \( \mu \) is the mean, \( \sigma^2 \) is the variance, \( x \) is the independent variable.

SD is the quantity calculated to indicate the extent of deviation for a group of numbers as a whole. Normal distribution is then used to find how the variables are approximately normally distributed. In the context of this tool, it will help to understand where countries sit in relation to each other within the group distribution of a particular data set.

**2. Scaling**

To create an index where states are scored within a defined range,
the data sets must be scaled so the scores can be integrated and compared as well as are easily comprehensible for analysis. This process of scaling transforms the normalized data into a number between 1 and 10, as outlined above. The below formula was applied to standardize the distribution values from \([\text{min}, \text{max}]\) to \([\text{MIN}, \text{MAX}]\), matching the new scale of values both for the highest and lowest edges of the distribution.

\[ X = \text{MIN} + \frac{\text{MAX} - \text{MIN}}{\text{MAX} - \text{MIN}} \times (x - \text{min}) \]

3. Aggregation (for social infrastructure scores)

The social infrastructure score is composed of five different data points, as enumerated above. To aggregate these five data points, each individual data point was normalized and scaled and then an average was taken which weighted the P4P membership twice as heavily as any other individual data point (i.e. P4P membership was given a weighting of 2, Peace Agents, PIND trainings, media appearances, and peace clubs in schools were each given a weighting of 1) because the P4P Network represents the central piece of PIND’s efforts to improve social infrastructure in each state. This aggregated score was then normalized and scaled again to produce the final social infrastructure score.

States that are towards the upper left are typically in a situation of Escalation, their high level of violence putting downward pressure on social capital, which in turn leads to more conflict. States towards the upper right typically face Oscillation, in which there are high levels of risk but also strong capacity to manage the violence when it occurs. Those towards the lower left, are victims of Inattention, perhaps the most insidious situation, where a low level of violence masks the low level of capacity to respond to a potential shock. Finally, states towards the lower right benefit from a more sustainable peace, whereby low levels of violence provide space for thriving social infrastructure, which in turn helps manage shocks.

The nine states the comprise the Niger Delta are distributed across these four quadrants.

**Quadrant A (Escalation):** Two states – Cross River and Delta – are located in Quadrant A, in the upper left, with Cross River having both the highest level of violence per capita and the lowest average density of social infrastructure. Since 2016, communal violence killed about 200 people in Cross River, particularly along the border of neighboring Akwa Ibom and Benue states. Most of these clashes are longstanding land disputes with neighboring communities.

During the same period in Delta State about 120 were killed in communal clashes. These included farmer/herder clashes, a boundary dispute between two communities in Isoko South, and between Ijaw and Urhobo communities in Warri South West, among others.

Based on the grid above, in these states, the best approach is likely to try and move them closer to Quadrants B or C by first investing in rapid response and proactive conflict resolution activities, informed by a robust early warning system. Then, when there is a pause in violence, PIND can work with other stakeholders to build social infrastructure and the capacity to manage pressures over the medium and long term.

Rivers State, which has a higher level of social infrastructure than Delta and Cross River, is midway between Quadrant A and Quadrant...
B. The level of violence is quite high, due primarily to political tensions and gang/cult violence. Going into the campaign season in the runup to the 2019 elections, PIND should build on their strong track record in mitigating election violence. This is important in Rivers as an escalation in election violence has the potential to undermine progress achieved since the end of the last election cycle. They should also focus more on cult/gang violence as that correlates with election violence but tends to be even more lethal.

**Quadrant B: (Oscillation):** Only one state – Bayelsa – is located in Quadrant B, in the upper right. Data suggests that violence in Bayelsa tends to rise and fall with the election cycle. With a very small population, Bayelsa had the fourth highest level of per capita fatalities since the beginning of 2016, especially due to rising militancy and piracy and an off-cycle gubernatorial election in 2016. While the conflict management operations conducted by the State P4P Chapter have not specifically addressed piracy and militancy, they have focused on elections as a strategic priority. The state benefits from dense, well-supported social infrastructure. It has the second-highest number of P4P members per capita and the fourth-highest number of registered Peace Agents per capita. As such, Bayelsa is well positioned to manage conflict when it arises, if it stays within the range of oscillation evidenced since 2009. PIND has supported the social infrastructure in the state with numerous trainings covering a wide range of skills and information, which is in line with the recommended strategy of analyzing conflict patterns and dynamics, identifying leverage points, and strengthen the capacity of the state to anticipate, respond to, and manage conflict. All things being equal, if PIND continues with this strategy, the oscillations should get smaller with time.

**Quadrant C (Inattention):** There is one state – Edo – located squarely in the (lower left) Quadrant C. Per capita violence in Edo is relatively low, which tends to draw attention to other more conflict-affected states. But eventually there will inevitably be an external shock (e.g. health crisis, natural disaster, economic shock, or political controversy). There is no way of predicting when this shock will occur, but when it does, unless there is stronger social infrastructure in place, the shock could trigger a crisis. The strategy in Quadrant C should be one of prevention, through a proactive effort to develop the social infrastructure before such a crisis appears.

There are three states – Akwa Ibom, Imo, and Ondo – which are located midway between Quadrants C and D. These states have relatively low levels of violence and moderate levels of social infrastructure. While the situation is not as potentially vulnerable as in Edo State, there is still the possibility that a strong shock or a series of smaller, but cumulatively significant, developments could overwhelm the capacity of these states. Therefore, PIND should continue working on developing and improving the social infrastructure in these states in order to move them further to the right into Quadrant D and improve their resilience. PIND has been successfully pursuing this strategy especially in Ondo State, where there has been high growth in the number of P4P sub-chapters and numerous high-quality trainings that have seen high levels of attendance.

**Quadrant D (Sustainable):** Finally, there is one state – Abia – which is squarely in Quadrant D, the goal located in the lower right. The state benefits from both a low level of violence and a high level of social infrastructure with the second highest number of P4P members.
despite being the second-least populous state in the region. Despite the virtuous cycle that is present in the state, local stakeholders must not be complacent as conditions may change in the future, as illustrated by the rise in restiveness over Biafran separatism in 2016. The best role for PIND here is likely supporting local stakeholders to ensure that they are able to anticipate, identify, and respond to any incipient crises and have the capacity and expertise to manage them. The Abia P4P Chapter can also help support other, neighboring states. In compiling the research for this assessment and in speaking to those PIND has trained or targeted for capacity building, the impact of those investments has been significant.

From the various types of interventions showcased in the section on Conflict Management, as well as participant testimonies and transcripts, it is evident that PIND has catalyzed a multiplier effect. In some of the testimonies gathered post-intervention and in the grant close-out documents from PIND Peace Building grantees, it is evident that in making critical skills like conflict mediation, negotiation, analysis, and dialogue available, recipients have felt emboldened to put their skills to the test in their communities. PIND has also, through its training and support of the P4P Network and the PREVENT Committees, created a subset of trained and trusted conflict managers and conflict analysts who are now called upon regularly in their communities. In empowering everyday people with skills that can be utilized not just for mitigating violence, but also getting to the root causes of many conflicts that have seemed intractable, PIND and its Peace Building team continue to do a great service to Niger Delta communities.
## Appendix: Scoring Matrix

### Category: Early Warning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Quality and Quantity of Early Warning Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Limited to no accurate data, concentrated in only one or two states and/or types of incidents, which is processed slowly.</td>
<td>The aggregated Early Warning dataset is rich and accurate, covering all geographic and thematic areas of concern without undue focus on any individual area, and is processed and available for use quickly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A moderate amount of accurate data which covers about half of the states in the region and includes incidents across several different indicator categories. Data is generally processed relatively slowly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dataset includes accurate data covering all of the states in the region and including all of the indicator categories, though data may be unduly concentrated in some geographic or thematic areas. Data is processed at a moderate pace.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rich data covering all states and close to comprehensive over all areas (rural + urban) within those states. All indicator categories and most sub-indicator categories are included. There is a limited amount of undue focus in one or more geographic or thematic areas. Data is usually processed relatively quickly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Extensive rich data that comprehensively covers the relevant geography as well as all indicator and sub-indicator categories. There is no undue concentration of data in any geographic or thematic area. Data is consistently processed quickly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Relevance, Timeliness, and Meaningfulness of Early Warning Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Dissemination and Uptake of EW Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Early Warning products are produced rarely. Graphs are absent or extremely difficult to understand. Text is often off-topic or irrelevant.</td>
<td>Early Warning products, including trackers, briefs, and alerts, are produced in a timely manner, at high quality, and on relevant topics for stakeholders working in and on the Niger Delta.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Products are produced intermittently and occasionally on relevant topics. Graphs are included but often confusing. Text is sometimes off-topic and fails to include everything of relevance. Language is sometimes distracting or offensive.</td>
<td>Products are produced consistently and usually in a timely manner. Graphs are clear and closely tied to the text. Text is consistently relevant and comprehensive. Language is clear and not distracting or offensive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Products are produced relatively consistently, with occasional gaps. Graphs are included and generally clear. Text is consistently relevant and generally comprehensive. Language is clear and not distracting or offensive.</td>
<td>Products are produced frequently in PIND’s planning. Many outside stakeholders use PIND’s analysis products and make use of them in a limited manner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Products are produced consistently and usually in a timely manner. Graphs are clear and closely tied to the text. Text is consistently relevant and comprehensive. Language is clear and not distracting or offensive.</td>
<td>Early Warning resources are used in PIND’s operational and strategic planning. A few outside stakeholders receive PIND’s analysis products and make use of them in a limited manner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Products are produced in a consistently timely manner. Graphs are very clear, appealing, and memorable and closely tied to the text. Text is relevant, comprehensive, and incisive. Language is clear and engaging.</td>
<td>Early Warning resources are used consistently in planning and play an important role in the decisions that are made. Many outside stakeholders use PIND’s resources and those resources play a crucial role in their decisions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CATEGORY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score = 1</th>
<th>Score = 2</th>
<th>Score = 3</th>
<th>Score = 4</th>
<th>Score = 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALIGNMENT OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES WITH TRENDS IN CONFLICT RISK FACTORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition:</strong> Conflict management activities are designed to address the most important conflict risk factors in the state.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> = No alignment between conflict risks (as identified in the early warning data) and response actions.</td>
<td><strong>2</strong> = Occasional alignment between response actions and problems identified in Early Warning data. Early warning data used as a standard input in planning.</td>
<td><strong>3</strong> = Beyond just using early warning data as an input for planning, response actions are also triggered by early warning signals, when conflict risk deviates from baseline. However response is not always rapid or frequent.</td>
<td><strong>4</strong> = Conflict management activities explicitly target the problems identified in the early warning data by conflict type and severity.</td>
<td><strong>5</strong> = Conflict management activities explicitly target the problems identified in the early warning data by conflict type and severity. Stakeholders with influence on those specific conflict types are consulted and included in the activity. Response is frequent, flexible, and rapid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES</strong> |
| <strong>Definition:</strong> Conflict management activities are well designed and executed. As a result they are successful at mitigating conflict risk in targeted communities and problem-sets. |
| <strong>1</strong> = Activities are designed in an ad hoc, haphazard fashion, without clearly defined targets and objectives. | <strong>2</strong> = Response actions are strategically designed and effectively executed, but often without a clearly defined definition of success. | <strong>3</strong> = Response activities are well designed and implemented but there is no standard AAR process for documenting models for replication, or standard practice of identifying follow-up actions. | <strong>4</strong> = Activities are well designed, with clear targets and objectives linked to Early Warning signals, and are executed with and by key stakeholders with influence on the identified problem. | <strong>5</strong> = Activities are well designed, with clear targets and objectives linked to Early Warning signals, and are executed with and by key stakeholders with influence on the identified problem. Activities make a measurable impact on the level of violence being targeted. Lessons are documented by After Action Review. Post activity follow-up is standard operating procedure as unanticipated opportunities open up. Models are documented for replication and/or scaling. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>Figure X.3.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEW Stakeholder Recruitment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Definition:</strong> The number of people committed to and working towards peace increase across the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belief in the possibility and/or desirability of peace is declining, reflected in declining membership in the P4P network.</strong></td>
<td>2 = Belief in the possibility and/or desirability of peace is stagnant across the region, reflected in a lack of growth in P4P network membership. Some states see membership growth, others see membership decline.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Existing Stakeholder Engagement</strong></th>
<th><strong>Definition:</strong> External stakeholders are identified, connected, and engaged in order to effectively collaborate and coordinate their activities in the region.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External stakeholders are not identified or registered.</strong></td>
<td>2 = A small number of external stakeholders are identified, registered and a limited or inconsistent (geographically) effort is made to promote collaboration and coordination among them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Stakeholder Support</strong></th>
<th><strong>Definition:</strong> Stakeholders, including the P4P network, are supported through the provision of material support, technical resources including EW data and analysis, and trainings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholders receive little to not support of any kind.</strong></td>
<td>2 = Stakeholders receive some limited support, either material or technical.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Public Outreach</strong></th>
<th><strong>Definition:</strong> The broader public across the region is engaged in the cause of peace through both events and media efforts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The broader public is largely unengaged. Events and media efforts are held rarely and public interest in limited or nonexistent.</strong></td>
<td>2 = The broader public is occasionally engaged. Events and media efforts are occasionally held, but often in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner. Public interest fluctuates but is often low.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Category: Conflict Management (continued)

Score Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning</td>
<td>Quality and Quantity of EW Data</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning</td>
<td>Relevance, Timeliness, and Meaningfulness of EW Analysis</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Warning</td>
<td>Dissemination and Uptake of EW Products</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
<td>Alignment of Conflict Management Activities with Trends in Conflict Risk Factors</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
<td>Quality and Effective-ness of Conflict Management Activities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Infrastructure</td>
<td>New Stakeholder recruitment</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Infrastructure</td>
<td>Existing stakeholder engagement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Infrastructure</td>
<td>Stakeholder support</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Infrastructure</td>
<td>Public outreach</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Infrastructure</td>
<td>Reach Centrality</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reach Centrality

Definition: PIND is well-positioned within the peace and security network to influence a wide range of key stakeholders through the multiplier effects stemming from direct and indirect engagement, communication, and collaboration.

1 = A lack of connectedness and linkages with key stakeholders limits the organization’s ability to spread information, best-practices and collaboration.

2 = The organization is locally connected in a hub-and-spoke configuration and can influence bilateral partners in the achievement of specific outputs and deliverables.

3 = The organization is centrally positioned in a multilateral web of local partnerships, which generates second and third order impacts through spontaneous and project driven collaboration.

4 = The organization is well networked both locally and regionally, and can leverage those relationships for the dissemination of Early Warning information or convening stakeholders for workshops and dialogues.

5 = The organization is among the most optimally positioned within the wider network as measured by Reach Centrality. It is within a few steps of the entire network and can rapidly disseminate Early Warning information throughout, as well as influence the broader agenda and share/replicate best practices.