


Conflict Bulletin:

Borno State

May 2014



Borno State, the location of the April 2014 abduction of nearly 300 school girls, is at the heart of what has been called the “Boko Haram” insurgency.

The insurgency, perpetrated by a militant group called Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-da'wa wal-Jihād (JAS), began in 2009 as a mass uprising against police in the states of Bauchi, Yobe, and Borno in which hundreds died. Violence de-escalated rapidly after insurgent leader Muhammed Yusuf was captured and killed. However, in 2011, the death toll began once again to rise and kept rising for the next three years. In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa to contain the violence. To date, the initiative has had mixed results. Violence in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, which had been the most severely affected Local Government Area (LGA) in terms of the number of incidents and fatalities, appears to have decreased dramatically.

However, according to data aggregated on the P4P Web Map, violence was merely displaced from the urban center to more rural parts of the state.

Borno state is home to approximately 4.2 million people (2006 census). The population is mostly Muslim and ethnically Kanuri, Bura, and a few nomadic Shuwa Arabs. It is the second-largest producer of maize in Nigeria. Farmers also grow millet, rice, wheat, and cotton. Its location at the border of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon makes it strategic for trade in and out of the country. Kashim Shettima, from the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), has governed Borno since winning the April 2011 gubernatorial elections.

This bulletin provides a brief snapshot of the trends and patterns of conflict risk factors at the State and LGA levels from 2009 to 2013, drawing on data available on the P4P Digital Platform for Multi-Stakeholder Engagement (www.p4p-nigerdelta.org). The trend line below draws from Nigeria Watch data. The heat maps and summaries draw on data collected by FFP's UNLock, the Council on Foreign Relations' NST, WANEP Nigeria, and ACLED, integrated on the P4P platform.

LGA Level Summary


Maiduguri

JAS was originally founded by Mohammed

Yusuf in Maiduguri in 2002. In the latter half of 2009, deadly clashes between JAS and Nigerian security forces killed hundreds. Subsequent to this spike in fatalities, however, insurgent activity in the state decreased significantly, with no reported incidents attributed to them in the first half of 2010. In October 2010, a reported attack attributed to Boko Haram left the Borno State Chairman of ANPP dead. In December of that year, multiple attacks on churches were also blamed on members of the group.

In 2011, incidents involving Boko Haram and their consequent fatalities rose steadily, beginning with the murder of a leading ANPP candidate and his entourage in Maiduguri in January. Throughout the year, Boko Haram was blamed for an increasing amount of attacks on churches, moderate clerics, local political figures, and police while shootouts between suspected Boko Haram members and the police and JTF were common. In April 2011, local and general elections also appeared to spark a string of violent attacks on polling centers and voter registration events. Also of note in 2011, the use of suicide bombers became increasingly prevalent, particularly in the last quarter of the year when they were used in at least five incidents, although many were intercepted prior to detonation. Violence by police, in the course of counter-insurgency operations throughout 2011, also reportedly claimed the lives of dozens of civilians.

Incidents of Violence in Borno*



* Using Nigeria Watch data (www.nigeriawatch.org) formatted to the P4P Web Map platform (www.p4p-nigerdelta.org)

In 2012, violence continued unabated, with weekly reports of deadly clashes between police, JTF and suspected Boko Haram militants killing and injuring scores of people.

Throughout the year, attacks on both universities and primary schools were attributed to Boko Haram. In April, a UN report cited that up to 7,000 children had been affected by the attacks in the past year, in a state where primary enrollment, at merely 28%, significantly lags behind the rest of Nigeria. Violence remained steady throughout 2012 and the beginning of 2013, exploding in April with a clash between Boko Haram and the JTF, which reportedly killed around two hundred people, principally civilians. Almost one month later, on May 14 President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, as well as Yobe and Adamawa states.

The military response to the Boko Haram attacks that accompanied the state of emergency actually began a few days prior to the declaration, when the government sent 2,000 troops along with heavy military equipment, including fighter jets, to Maiduguri to reinforce the 3,600 personnel already there and other major towns in the Northeast as part of the Joint Task Force

(JTF). Beginning in June 2013, the Nigerian military operating in Maiduguri has been supported by civilian vigilantes, the "Civilian JTF" (CJTF). These are made up of youths from the city armed with machetes, axes, bows and arrows, clubs, swords, and daggers operating under the supervision of JTF sector commanders. In November 2013, the Nigerian government extended the state of emergency for an additional six months.

Bama

Bama saw little violence from 2009 through the end of 2011. Throughout 2012, however, police checkpoints at the border with Cameroon sustained violent attacks, particularly around the city of Banki in April and November. In response, the police and JTF raided many of the militant's training camps while suspected insurgents raided military facilities, police stations and prisons. One attack in May 2013 reportedly claimed the lives of 22 policemen, 14 prison officers, two soldiers, 13 insurgents, three children and one woman. In October, at least 18 women and children were reportedly killed when a suspect believed to be a member of Boko Haram attacked a village with IEDs and petroleum bombs, which detonated and quickly burned homes and shops to the ground. Violence continued on a near weekly basis throughout November and December 2013, including ambushes on buses and weddings that reportedly killed more than 40 civilians.

Kaga

Kaga LGA was also impacted by violence throughout 2013. In May, two clerics were reportedly killed while attacks on the town of Mainok by Boko Haram insurgents reportedly killed up to 23 civilians in July. Attacks on police stations and LGA officials occurred throughout the year as well and clashes between militants and vigilante groups also rose steadily. In October 2013, a military offensive reportedly killed dozens of

insurgents in air and land attacks on suspected Boko Haram holdouts. Civilian casualties were also reported but not confirmed.

Biu

Biu was the fourth most violent LGA on a per capita basis, with insurgents frequently targeting religious communities. In 2011, a Muslim cleric was murdered in his home while a church was reportedly attacked during Sunday mass in June 2012, killing two and injuring hundreds. In August 2012, there were attacks at mosques that killed at least two individuals. In July 2013, 13 were handcuffed and burnt to death in a church while in August eight people, including teachers and clerics, were killed in an attack. Raids by the JTF and youth vigilante groups were carried out in response, reportedly killing insurgents but also causing deaths and injuries to civilians.


Gwoza

After the state of emergency was declared in 2013, there appeared to be a steady escalation in violence in Gwoza LGA, on the border of Cameroon. Villages inhabited by minorities were targeted by suspected insurgents, killing worshipers and torching churches and houses. The military raided suspected strongholds in May and employed airstrikes in November.


Other LGAs

Throughout 2012 in Konduga LGA, there were attacks reported on telecommunication towers and multiple assassinations of clerics, village heads and traditional rulers. The Nigerian military, with assistance from youth vigilantes, responded with raids on multiple suspected militant camps in May, June and July 2013, killing insurgents and recovering arms. There were also the reported use of air strikes on suspected camps.

Note regarding terminology: it is not always clear when an incident of violence is perpetrated by members of JAS, or factions sympathetic to JAS's ideology and objectives. The generic name "Boko Haram" has come to be used by the public to describe Islamist insurgency in the region, broadly speaking.



Before State of Emergency (2013 Q1)



After State of Emergency (2013 Q4)

In Damboa LGA, militants killed the former chairman of the LGA in February 2012, while a secretary of the State House Assembly was murdered in February 2013 and a village head in April 2013. Insurgents also

attacked telecommunication offices and government buildings throughout the latter half of 2012. In October 2013, militants reportedly shot several people at a mosque while in November, multiple villages were attacked, killing dozens resulting in a series of retaliations by various vigilante groups. In April 2013, in Kukawa LGA, a huge clash between suspected Boko Haram insurgents and the JTF reportedly left close to 200 dead, with 2000 homes, 62 cars and 284 motorcycles destroyed.

Conclusion

The results of the state of emergency and the concurrent military offensive are mixed. On the one hand, the security situation in Maiduguri seems to have improved significantly, with the number of incidents of violence dropping over the year since the state of emergency was declared. On the other hand, the increased security presence in the capital of Maiduguri appears to have simply displaced the violence to other areas of the state. The other LGAs, especially Bama, Gwoza, Kaga, and Konduga, have collectively seen a rise in the number of incidents of violence that seems to mirror the decrease in incidents in Maiduguri. Furthermore, the level of fatalities in LGAs outside of Maiduguri has spiked much faster than the increase in the number of incidents since the imposition of the state of emergency, with the result that in 2013 the total fatalities in Borno state have seen a

rapid and dramatic increase even as the total number of incidents across the state has remained fairly constant.

These figures suggest that while the offensive may have been a military success in Maiduguri, there has since been a spiraling cycle of violence throughout the state that has yet to be contained.

The mobilization of civilian vigilante groups is to be expected in the face of such a blistering and near-constant onslaught of insurgent violence. The raids and pitched battles that have resulted, however, continuously put civilians in the crossfire. Furthermore, the military's facilitation of such groups often increases the chance of retaliatory attacks on villages.

Viewed through a human security lens, it would appear that there has been a failure to employ an approach that emphasizes civilian safety beyond stemming the death toll and retaliating for insurgent attacks. Evidence suggests that in spite of the state of emergency, the scope of violence has widened throughout the state. With the renewal of the state of emergency in November, combined with simmering political tensions throughout Nigeria in the run up to the February 2015 elections, it is all the more urgent that a more integrated and comprehensive approach to dealing with the problem of insurgency in Borno be implemented.



FFP is committed to promoting sustainable human security around the world, and is the International Coordinating Partner on P4P, an initiative supported by PIND. FFP has been working with local civil society in Nigeria to develop the UNLock network since 2010.



One of the data sources utilized in the summary was derived from the UNLock network in Nigeria, a partnership between The Fund for Peace and the Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (IHRHL).



The data used in this analysis was pulled from the integrated digital platform for multistakeholder engagement developed by Partners for Peace (P4P), an initiative supported by PIND. For a deeper understanding of the conflict risk factors, visit www.p4p-nigerdelta.org.