



STATE RESILIENCE INDEX ANNUAL REPORT 2022



STATE
RESILIENCE
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
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


STATE RESILIENCE INDEX

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MAPPING RESILIENCE IN 2022





STATE RESILIENCE INDEX

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- 8.4 Norway (1)
- 8.3 Sweden (T2)
- 8.3 Finland (T2)
- 8.3 Switzerland (T2)
- 8.2 Denmark (5)
- 8.1 New Zealand (6)
- 7.9 Ireland (T7)
- 7.9 The Netherlands (T7)
- 7.9 Germany (T7)
- 7.8 Australia (T10)
- 7.8 Austria (T10)
- 7.8 Canada (T10)
- 7.7 The United Kingdom (13)
- 7.5 Japan (T14)
- 7.5 Belgium (T14)
- 7.5 France (T14)
- 7.4 Estonia (T17)
- 7.4 Singapore (T17)
- 7.4 The United States (T17)
- 7.3 Portugal (T20)
- 7.3 Slovenia (T20)
- 7.3 South Korea (T20)
- 7.3 Spain (T20)
- 7.1 Costa Rica (T24)
- 7.1 Uruguay (T24)
- 7.0 Italy (T26)
- 7.0 Lithuania (T26)
- 7.0 Czechia (T26)
- 6.9 Latvia (T29)
- 6.9 Chile (T29)
- 6.8 Israel (T31)
- 6.8 Slovakia (T31)
- 6.7 Poland (T33)
- 6.7 Greece (T33)
- 6.6 Cyprus (35)
- 6.5 Croatia (T36)
- 6.5 Trinidad and Tobago (T36)
- 6.5 Hungary (T36)
- 6.4 Jamaica (T39)
- 6.4 The United Arab Emirates (T39)
- 6.3 Malaysia (T41)
- 6.3 Mauritius (T41)
- 6.3 Romania (T41)
- 6.3 Panama (T41)
- 6.2 Georgia (T45)
- 6.2 Bulgaria (T45)
- 6.2 Argentina (T45)
- 6.2 Brazil (T45)
- 6.1 Mongolia (49)
- 6.0 Thailand (T50)
- 6.0 Paraguay (T50)
- 6.0 Peru (T50)
- 6.0 Ecuador (T50)
- 6.0 China (T50)
- 5.9 Colombia (T51)
- 5.9 The Philippines (T51)
- 5.9 Indonesia (T51)
- 5.9 Russia (T51)
- 5.9 Armenia (T51)
- 5.9 Kazakhstan (T51)
- 5.9 North Macedonia (T51)
- 5.9 The Dominican Republic (T51)
- 5.9 Belarus (T51)
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- 5.8 Qatar (T62)
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- 5.7 Timor-Leste (T68)
- 5.6 Cuba (T73)
- 5.6 Sri Lanka (T73)
- 5.5 El Salvador (T75)
- 5.5 Oman (T75)
- 5.5 Kyrgyzstan (T75)
- 5.5 Bolivia (T75)
- 5.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina (T75)
- 5.5 Tunisia (T75)
- 5.5 Turkey (T75)
- 5.4 Honduras (T77)
- 5.4 Kenya (T77)
- 5.3 Senegal (T79)
- 5.3 Morocco (T79)
- 5.3 Nepal (T79)
- 5.2 Jordan (T82)
- 5.2 Tanzania (T82)
- 5.2 India (T82)
- 5.2 Gabon (T82)
- 5.2 Uzbekistan (T82)
- 5.2 Malawi (T82)
- 5.1 Gambia (T88)
- 5.1 Bahrain (T88)
- 5.1 Lesotho (T88)
- 5.0 Uzbekistan (T91)
- 5.0 Algeria (T91)
- 5.0 Guatemala (T91)
- 5.0 Iran (T91)
- 5.0 Tajikistan (T91)
- 5.0 Nicaragua (T91)

RANKING RESILIENCE IN 2022

- 5.0 Saudi Arabia (T91)
- 5.0 Palestine (T91)
- 5.0 Bangladesh (T91)
- 4.9 Zambia (T100)
- 4.9 Burkina Faso (T100)
- 4.9 Azerbaijan (T100)
- 4.9 Myanmar (T100)
- 4.9 Ethiopia (T100)
- 4.9 Benin (T100)
- 4.9 Lebanon (T100)
- 4.9 Zimbabwe (T100)
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- 4.8 Turkmenistan (T109)
- 4.8 Cambodia (T109)
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- 4.7 Pakistan (T116)
- 4.6 Egypt (T120)
- 4.6 Eswatini (T120)
- 4.6 Cote d'Ivoire (T120)
- 4.6 Niger (T120)
- 4.4 Nigeria (T124)
- 4.4 Cameroon (T124)
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- 4.4 Togo (T124)
- 4.3 Guinea Bissau (T128)
- 4.3 Mali (T128)
- 4.1 Mauritania (I30)
- 4.0 Angola (T131)
- 4.0 Libya (T131)
- 4.0 Equatorial Guinea (T131)
- 4.0 Haiti (T131)
- 3.9 Burundi (T135)
- 3.9 Congo Republic (T135)
- 3.9 Guinea (T135)
- 3.7 Congo Democratic Republic (I38)
- 3.6 Central African Republic (T139)
- 3.6 Sudan (T139)
- 3.4 Afghanistan (T141)
- 3.4 Somalia (T141)
- 3.3 Chad (T143)
- 3.3 Syria (T143)
- 2.9 South Sudan (T145)
- 2.9 Yemen (T145)

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Contextual Risk Tools



Data for Peace



Conflict Early Warning and Response



Preventing Election Violence

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Responsible Business Practices



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Convening Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives



Preventing Gender-Based Violence



Combatting Violent Extremism

WE HELP DIVERSE STAKEHOLDERS



Contextual Risk Assessments



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Security Risk Assessments



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BEND NOT BREAK: RESILIENCE IN UNSTABLE TIMES

NATE HAKEN

When Ukraine was invaded in February 2022, many believed Kiev would quickly fall to the Russians. It did not. When NATO withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, it was widely assumed that the Afghan army would hold off the Taliban. It did not. When COVID-19 spread across the world in 2020 it was believed that the U.S. was the most prepared country in the world to manage a pandemic, and that West Africa, by contrast, would be overwhelmed. The United States was not prepared. West Africa was not overwhelmed. As it turns out a country's strength cannot be measured by the number of doctors, dollars, and defense forces it has. Richer countries can be destabilized, too.

The term "Resilience" is the latest jargon that tries to get at this intangible quality that enables a country to manage a destabilizing shock or rise in pressure. The term is often used in contradictory ways. Some use it as shorthand for the inverse of "Fragility," as in any country that is not fragile, is accordingly resilient. Others use it to describe the ability of people in fragile countries to tolerate terrible conditions. But neither of those contradictory definitions offers much insight into how resilience can be measured, promoted, or enhanced.

Every country in the world will experience a major shock from time to time. Recent history suggests a global shock occurs about every 10 years. In 2007-2008 there were two: 1) a global food crisis due to a sharp increase in commodity prices, which triggered food riots in dozens of countries around the world, which was then compounded by 2) the cascading effects of the Financial Crisis and the Great Recession. Then, in 2020-2021 there was the COVID-19 pandemic. Both cycles put major pressure on democracy and governance around the world, straining public confidence in

institutions, and setting in motion a series of chain reactions of political instability and unrest in both the Global North and Global South. A global shock every ten years is hard enough to manage, but if demographic and climatological pressures continue to worsen, the frequency and amplitude could increase even more.

The Fragile States Index measures pressures and shocks. But because every country will eventually experience crisis, the fact of a crisis does not determine whether a country is resilient or the degree to which resilience factors exist that can be leveraged. A new tool, the State Resilience Index, fills this gap. Resilience, as defined by the Index, is the extent to which a country can anticipate, manage, and recover from a crisis, relative to the severity of that crisis.

To promote resilience, it is not enough to build infrastructure and create jobs. Infrastructure and jobs are important of course, as these contribute to an enabling environment for the empowerment of individuals and communities to innovate and adapt. But for resilience, these must be developed in a way that does not create dependency on a single commodity export, a single trading partner, a single authority figure, a single energy source, a single monocrop, or single industry. Because if a shock strikes that single point of failure, then crisis can cascade across the entire system, perhaps even leading to collapse. By contrast, if a country is resilient, it will certainly experience a crisis at some point, but the intensity will be dampened. The effects will be contained. And the country will quickly recover after the crisis has passed.


Sometimes, to lay a foundation of resilience, this means development needs to be done more slowly and deliberately. Instead of standardized models and turnkey approaches that can be quickly replicated and efficiently

scaled, time must be taken to understand the context and cultivate partnerships, promote diversification, decentralization, and inclusive governance structures. This may not be a new idea, but within our current systems, most incentives naturally incline towards a quick return on investment, value for money, the number of beneficiaries, etc. And if you cannot measure resilience, it is difficult to develop a logic model around it, let alone a business case, as donors are accountable to taxpayers, shareholders, or boards of trustees.

For the last 18 years, the Fund for Peace has been collecting data and analyzing countries through the lens of state fragility. But this year, FFP has created a complementary State Resilience Index (SRI) to fill this critical gap and to help identify strategic points of entry that can help to create synergy and momentum for greater resilience around the world. The SRI measures 7 pillars of resilience, with gender integrated and mainstreamed throughout.

- **Inclusion:**¹ When people are socially, economically, or politically included, they have less exposure to risk and vulnerability, are represented in decision making, and have access to public resources to mitigate and respond to crisis and disasters.
- **Social Cohesion:**² In addition to inclusion, a sense of solidarity is key to a resilient society. Kinship ties, sociocentrism, as well as social and political capital can create opportunities for generosity and collaboration, which is necessary to overcome a major crisis.
- **State Capacity:**³ When the government has effective systems, and the trust and confidence of the population to act in the interest of the public good, then it has the flexibility to persuade and mobilize collective action when faced with crisis.
- **Individual Capabilities:**⁴ When the average person has a stock of education, health, income, and food security, then when a crisis hits, they will not be immediately rendered destitute and reliant on social protection services or external intervention to survive.

Economy; Capital Flows



- **Environment/Ecology:**⁵ Stable, regenerative ecosystems, water access, and clean energy are vital to health and livelihoods, as the world faces increasingly frequent and intense threats from climate change and extreme weather events.
- **Economy:**⁶ Diverse and innovative economies with access to capital are less vulnerable to price shocks and supply-chain disruptions, and they recover more quickly after a disaster. For longer term economic resilience, infrastructure and high-quality economic management are necessary to compete in a changing global economy.
- **Civic Space:** A healthy public square enables robust consultation, debate, dialogue, and consensus building so that the needs and grievances of individuals and communities can be addressed constructively. When faced with crisis, countries that have a stable social contract will generate accountability for leaders and buy-in by the general population to a national strategy.

At first glance, the SRI ranking does look much like the inverse of the FSI, with Yemen, South Sudan, Syria, Chad, and Somalia on the least resilient end of the spectrum, and Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Denmark the most resilient.

This may raise questions about the value of a new index if the ranking is so similar. However, as a decision support tool, the index surfaces key insights for planning and response, as even the most fragile of states can have areas of resilience that can be leveraged. For example, Somalia, which was the second most fragile state in the world on the FSI 2022, has the highest score for personal remittances within the indicator for capital flows in the SRI 2022. With a vibrant diaspora and wide adoption of mobile money technology across the country, quick access to finance in situations of economic distress can be built upon for both development and humanitarian response by government and donor partners alike, in addition to civil society, kinship, and interpersonal networks.

Another way the SRI can add insight into how sensitive a country might be to a potential shock is to use it alongside the Fragile States Index to see where different countries

find themselves and which direction they move over time, 1) toward the low capacity/high pressure quadrant (which tends toward a potentially escalating crisis situation, 2) the high capacity/low pressure quadrant (a more stable situation), 3) the high capacity/high pressure quadrant (a more cyclical/oscillating crisis dynamic), and 4) the low capacity/low pressure quadrant (a latent crisis situation). For example, holding the SRI scores constant, from 2007-2022, the United States moved 13 points from the center of the Relative Stability quadrant below in the direction of the Potential Oscillation quadrant, suggesting a future pendulum effect with periods of crisis followed by periods of recovery unless the resilience can be improved, or the pressures subside.

A disaggregated analysis of the SRI pillars and sub-pillars can surface insights as to where strategic emphasis should be placed to reverse this trend. In the case of the United States, for instance, Social Cohesion has the weakest level of capacity followed by Environment/Ecology. The strongest level of capacity is Individual Capabilities/Resources, followed by Civic Space.

This suggests that although the United States has a robust civic space where people can use their freedom of speech to engage on issues of public concern, there is a relative lack of solidarity, which undermines the country’s ability to collectively manage a crisis. At the same time, while there is a high degree of human and financial resources that individuals can rely upon in times of crisis, there is relative lack of environmental resilience, particularly regarding agriculture, ecosystem health, and clean energy.


These areas of relative weakness can be built upon to better position the United States to effectively prepare, manage, and recover from the next crisis that strikes.

Models are built around different assumptions and parameters. The Fund for Peace worked with SAS Data for Good to develop a “Crisis Sensitivity Simulator” based on interactions between the SRI and the FSI. This Simulator estimates the sensitivity of each country to different types of crises and disasters, to show which combinations of shocks are more likely to be destabilizing to each country.

Whether using bar charts, maps, scatterplots, or models and simulations, the Fund for Peace hopes that the SRI will be used by humanitarian actors, development practitioners, security professional, and government officials to prioritize prevention efforts and allocate resources in preparation for the next crisis.

Recently, other organizations have made progress in understanding how resilience can lead to more sustainable development. Several Multilateral Development Banks and Regional Economic Communities have developed, or are in the process of developing, internal tools to measure resilience for purposes of strategic and operational planning at the regional level. FFP’s State Resilience Index is a public, global tool can enrich the dialogue around how to promote a more stable and prosperous world. Certainly, the use of the SRI will not completely avoid miscalculations like in Afghanistan, Ukraine, or the relative effects of COVID-19. But when leaders begin to see the challenge of development through the lens of resilience, they will have a more complete and realistic idea of the range of possibilities that might achieve positive outcomes and a more peaceful world.

Capacities against Pressures - 2022






Figure I: The State Resilience Index dashboard

Footnotes

1. Inclusion Sub-Dimensions: Economic Inclusion of Youth, Political Inclusion, Access to Finance, Group-Based Inclusion, Equitable Access to Economic Resources, Access to Employment, and Protection against Precarity
2. Social Cohesion Sub-Dimensions: Social Capital, Social Relations, and Confidence in National Institutions
3. State Capacity Sub-Dimensions: Government Debt and Credit, Government Effectiveness, Disaster Risk Reduction, Public Health, Education System Rule of Law, and Freedom from Corruption.
4. Individual Capabilities Sub-Dimensions: Food/Nutrition, Education, Health, Wealth.
5. Environment/Ecology Sub-Dimensions: Pollution, Oceans and Fisheries Health, Agricultural Productivity, Ecosystem Health, Biodiversity, Climate Stability, Clean Energy, and Water Availability
6. Economy Sub-Dimensions: Diversification, Business Environment, Dynamism/Innovation, Physical Infrastructure, Capital Flows, and Economic Management
7. Civic Space Sub-Dimensions: Engagement, Accountability, Democratic Structures, Human Rights and Civil Liberties, and Information Access



BUILDING RESILIENCE AMIDST A NATIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS



JOHN MADDEN

When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was elected in 2018, he moved to ease political tensions in Ethiopia by releasing political prisoners, privatizing state enterprises, and loosening restrictions on media.¹ He also removed prominent opposition groups from the official list of terrorist organizations to create a more enabling environment for inclusion and social cohesion.² In 2019 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing an end to the 20-year conflict with Eritrea. In his acceptance speech, Abiy spoke of how a sustained commitment to peace can lead to “prosperity, security, and opportunity,” as well as, “synergy, convergence, and teamwork for a common destiny.”³ In a word, he spoke of Resilience. But if the Amharic philosophy of Medemer, described in his speech as a profound commitment to peace, was truly his doctrine for leadership, those ideals were quickly overtaken by events triggered by the shock of COVID-19.

According to field research conducted by the Fund for Peace to contextualize the findings of FFP’s new State Resilience Index, (SRI), underlying tensions between the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the government of Ethiopia had been building for years.⁴ Then in 2020, the pandemic struck, and the government ordered general

elections to be postponed for reasons of public safety, extending current office holders’ terms beyond their constitutional mandates. When Tigray defied that order, and held a regional election, the government cut funding to the region, which led to a cycle of violence that sent the country into a tailspin for the last two years.

Since the beginning of FFP’s Fragile States Index (FSI) in 2006, Ethiopia has shown worsening trends in fragility in indicators like Group Grievance, Refugees and IDPs, and State Legitimacy. These are not topical challenges that can be solved with the right formula of foreign direct investment, clever development programing, and economic diversification. For Ethiopia’s long-term outlook to improve, the peace process following this conflict must go beyond well-meaning gestures of good faith, such as the release of political prisoners, to a focus on fundamental institutional reforms that foster social cohesion and manage grievances among a diversity of ethnic groups sharing a tight political space.

Institutions both shape and mirror societal divisions and connections. Ethiopia’s constitution, ratified during the TPLF’s rule in 1994 declared ethnic federalism as Ethiopia’s system of governance, which endowed ethnically defined states with the rights to self-determination and secession.⁵ Ethnic

federalism roots political representation and land rights in ethnicity, entrenching differences between groups and across territories.⁶ Linking land rights and political representation to ethnicity may help manage conflict in the short term, but eventually as demography changes with population growth and migration, these formulas need to be revisited if they are to avoid creating more harm than good. In 2018, the protests that brought about Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn's fall from power erupted because of compounding grievances over marginalization, threats of displacement, and political underrepresentation for specific ethnic groups.⁷ During this time, Ethiopia had 2.9 million internally displaced peoples (IDPs) due to conflict.⁸ Under Abiy, the same grievances of ethnicity-based marginalization and displacement have worsened. In 2021, Ethiopia had 5.1 million IDPs due to the war between the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and TPLF.⁹ Abiy's promises of change and appeals to create a more inclusive Ethiopia have proven to be nothing more than bromides, as Ethiopia is facing ever worsening group grievance, violence, and displacement.

In 2019, Abiy created the Prosperity Party (PP), uniting leaders from different ethnic parties under the banner of pan-Ethiopian nationalism but excluded members of the TPLF,¹⁰ presenting his reform agenda as a direct alternative to the TPLF's ethnic-nationalism.¹¹ Differences over governance between the Abiy administration and the TPLF also have an ethnic coloration, making this conflict not only a fight over State Legitimacy, a metric on the FSI for which Ethiopia has consistently worsened since 2014, but a fight for control over the national identity.¹²

Given this context, if Abiy's goal is to unify the country, as he articulated in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, then his administration is going about it in the wrong way. Since the beginning of the war, the ENDF besieged Tigray, used airstrikes on civilian infrastructure, and instituted a humanitarian aid blockade.¹³ According to the UN international commission of investigators on human rights, the Ethiopian

federal government denied 6 million Tigrayans access to electricity, telecommunications, and internet, and took steps like killing livestock and destroying food sources, leaving 90% of the Tigray population in dire need of assistance.¹⁴ In November the warring parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities. But it is one thing to stop fighting and entirely another to build resilience. In the aftermath of this conflict, if transitional justice measures and reforms do not take place, then Ethiopia will be predisposed to bouts of destruction and displacement in the future.

FFP's State Resilience Index (SRI) shows Ethiopia underperforming the global average for almost every indicator except Social Cohesion.¹⁵ Although counterintuitive, Ethiopia scores just above the global average in Social Cohesion because of strong performance in its Social Capital sub-pillar. Within the Ethiopian context, strong Social Capital should be read as strong interpersonal trust within ethnic groups when measured against individualism. Despite high levels of inter-group polarization, this intra-group social capital presents an opportunity to build upon for greater resilience in the future. In Ethiopia, where individualism is low, high social capital endowments could be leveraged for conflict resolution and promoting the public good. Instead, such endowments have been cultivated by political actors into various forms of Ethiopian nationalism, which facilitate division and marginalization. Moving forward, Ethiopia's challenge is to build institutions that convert social cohesion within groups to social cohesion across groups. Focusing the already strong social capital within groups on their shared interest in the common good with other groups could improve cohesion overall.

These points were reiterated in field interviews conducted by FFP. FFP interviewed 20 experts in government, civil society, community, and religious leadership (58% female), who shared their perspectives on the ways in which society can prevent, manage, and recover from crisis.¹⁶ Experts expressed the complexity and depth of these conflict dynamics.


They largely agreed that divisions have been worsening over the last decade and that the conflict itself is multifaceted, rooted in disagreements and divisions over political ideology, ethnicity, and territoriality. One interviewee argued that a lack of public confidence in democratic governance, combined with high ethnic consciousness, and disparities between ethnic groups have created a perfect storm, which has worsened Ethiopia's situation of fragility over the last decade. But while that may contribute to a situation of fragility, interviewees also stressed that Ethiopia is a socio-centric society, one where the youth are raised by the village, not just their parents. They identified strong communities, religious devotion, and a respect for elders as factors of resilience. However seemingly intractable, conflict in Ethiopia is not a lost cause. If local stakeholders can identify factors of resilience like strong communities, and the SRI identifies social capital as a factor of resilience amid a massively destructive civil war, surely there is cause for hope in Ethiopia's capacity to recover from this crisis and to thrive.

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A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY DESPITE THREATS TO IRAQ'S FUTURE



GRACE HILLERBY

Iraq's political and economic structures suggest vulnerability, but long-term positive trends and moderate levels of individual capabilities, as measured on the State Resilience Index (SRI), position Iraq to set a new course of resilience.

In 2020, Iraq suffered the dual shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic and the global collapse in oil prices. At that time, the country had only recently emerged from 40 years of conflict. Public trust in the government was at a low. Popular protests were widespread. And the effects of climate change were escalating. As a result, Iraq's capacities for recovery have been depleted.

Iraq's resilience problems are shaped by its economic dependence on oil and by its political system; both undermine the state's capacity to deliver services and encourage corruption. In turn, these structural challenges intensify social divisions and hurt the country's ability to respond to worsening crises like climate change.

As one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, Iraq's economy is vulnerable to price fluctuations. On the Fund for Peace's State Resilience Index (SRI), Iraq shows poor performance for Economy overall, which is underpinned by deficiencies in the dynamism sub-pillar.¹ Over the last

decade, the hydrocarbon sector has accounted for 42% of the country's GDP, 99% of its exports, and 85% of the government's budget.² Any hope of developing a productive non-oil economy has faded because of the government's reliance on a single source of revenue. Managing oil production often pulls focus from other critical policy reforms.³

The perils of excessive oil dependence were underscored when the pandemic reduced demand and Russia and Saudi Arabia became embroiled in a price war. Oil prices crashed to their lowest level in 18 years, plunging Iraq into a fiscal crisis which was exacerbated by the COVID-19-induced economic shock.⁴ Despite the fact that Russia's war in Ukraine has caused global oil prices to spike, Iraq's economic situation is still unstable.

Iraq's political system and democratic structures further weaken its resilience. Consociational democracy institutionalizes power-sharing along ethno-sectarian lines. The intention of this system of governance is to prevent a tyranny of the majority and the possibility of a return to conflict in a diverse country with complex social divisions. However, it frequently results in political deadlock among groups of factionalized elites.⁵

Additionally, it takes several months for established parties to reach an understanding on the proportional

distribution of jobs and state resources after an election. The major impasse that has crippled Iraq's political process since the 2021 election is but one example of this post-electoral pattern. Stalled attempts to form a new government have trapped the state in a legitimacy crisis, lacking a stable and official command structure.⁶

Frequent political stalemates and dependence on oil limit the state's ability to restore infrastructure and deliver public services, reflected in Iraq's score of 3.5 out of 10 for State Capacity on the SRI.⁷ Water, sanitation, and hygiene systems remain defective and damaged by decades of war. Insufficient access to electricity causes habitual and widespread power cuts.⁸ Investment in the reconstruction of healthcare and education is lacking. Only 17.3% of the poor are covered by some form of social protection.⁹ In the absence of a robust social safety net, the pandemic seriously challenged the country's health system, and its economic consequences were felt most acutely by vulnerable groups.

With Iraq's economic and political structures, there is also little incentive for accountability. The state's reliance on oil for revenue reduces accountability to its citizens because the demand for general taxation is minimal.¹⁰ In addition, consociationalism encourages the allocation of government positions based on patronage networks, as well as the transfer of resource wealth to maintain group loyalty. In this sense, proportionality allows for politically sanctioned corruption.¹¹ Despite efforts to implement anti-corruption mechanisms, the issue remains acute, with the country ranked 157 out of 180 on the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2021.¹²

Corruption and a lack of service provision hurt the country's Social Cohesion, which is reflected in a score of 4.3 on the SRI.¹³ While the nation attempts to reconcile its wartime grievances, poor public services and inequalities in basic access generate perceptions of 'haves and have nots', raising the likelihood of tension between the country's diverse socioeconomic and ethno-sectarian groups.¹⁴ Corruption also harms vertical cohesion by undermining the government's

ability to instil public confidence. One of the SRI's sub-pillars for Social Cohesion is Confidence in Public Institutions, for which Iraq scored 3.1. During the pandemic, entrenched mistrust in the political elite fuelled conspiracy theories and deterred infected individuals from seeking medical assistance.¹⁵

Finally, prolonged political crises and high levels of corruption undermine the state's ability to respond to climate change. Scoring 4.2 on the SRI for Environment and Ecology,¹⁶ unstable governance and insufficient public spending limit long-term climate action. Meanwhile, with increasing water scarcity, record-breaking heatwaves, and declining precipitation levels, the country has become one of the most vulnerable to climate change's consequences.¹⁷

These effects are likely to compound Iraq's resilience problems as they aggravate grievances, exacerbate political crises, and threaten Iraq's stability. Climate change-induced displacement and conflict over scarce resources can threaten peace in a country that has only recently begun to recover from decades of violence.¹⁸

Iraq reveals how the various indicators of resilience are inextricably linked. The effects of oil dependency and consociational power-sharing cascade across public services, levels of corruption, public trust, social divisions, and climate action. As a result, a drop in global energy prices can impact the quality of healthcare reform or domestic power supply. A faltering health sector can deepen inequality and exacerbate social tensions. Corruption and political deadlock can constrain the government's ability to respond to a climate shock. Simultaneously, climate stress can destabilise an already vulnerable political system. In essence, the consequences of crises are not isolated, and the prospect of a swift recovery is limited.

However, there are some signals of hope. Since the shocks in 2020, the country's ranking on the Fragile States Index (FSI) has improved by six places.¹⁹ This trend is part of a much larger improvement, moving from 9th to 23rd rank in the last decade. Conflict has ended. Group grievance is

gradually declining. Economic inequality is improving.²⁰ And as an upper-middle income country, Iraq's best performing SRI pillar is Individual Capabilities, with moderate scores for Food/Nutrition, Education Outcomes, Health, and Wealth, suggesting that people are less dependent on external support in the face of a crisis than they might otherwise be. With these existing capacities and long-term reductions in fragility, Iraq is increasingly well positioned to work on the long-term project of resilience.

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RESILIENCE FROM FRAGILITY: SOLIDARITY IN POST-COUP MYANMAR



STEPHANIE MAYLE

In February of 2021, on the morning a new parliament was slated to be sworn in, the democratically elected government of Myanmar was ousted in a coup d'état. After years of touted political and economic progress, the coup has ushered in a violent new chapter of widespread conflict, mass protests, and oppression. The shock of the coup made Myanmar the state with the greatest 1-year increase in fragility on the 2022 Fragile States Index (FSI).¹ Although the coup represents an important turning point in Myanmar's recent history, the current calamity is a foretold outcome in a country that has struggled for decades with various components of state fragility. Myanmar provides an opportunity to examine how countries with longstanding weaknesses in the areas of discrimination and social cohesion can be predisposed to low resilience and quickly descend into crisis when faced with a shock.

Beginning in 2008, Myanmar began to transition away from a junta regime with a controversial referendum that established a "discipline-flourishing democracy" through a new constitution. Although any transition away from a junta regime is important, the new constitution reserved one quarter of all parliamentary seats for military officers and placed certain powerful ministries entirely under military control.² In 2015,

Aung San Suu Kyi, the founder of the National League for Democracy (NLD) political party, was elected State Counsellor, a position comparative to prime minister. The election represented the first peaceful transition of power from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

Despite these hopeful signs of democratic reform, Myanmar still faced monumental obstacles to widespread social cohesion and inclusion. Myanmar is an extremely diverse country, officially recognizing over one hundred different ethnic groups with even more going unrecognized. The ethnic majority, known as the Bamar, who traditionally practice a form of Buddhism, represent roughly two-thirds of the population and have historically held a privileged economic and political position in society. The ethnic minorities, on the other hand, have faced systemic discrimination, limited representation in government, and abuse from the military.³ Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law codifies this hierarchy by creating three classes of citizen—full citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen—which are based on ethnic classification and family lineage.⁴ Assigning citizenship status using arbitrary characteristics like ethnicity and codifying such differences into law creates unfair, uneven, and unjust societies.

When societies use discrimination as a foundational pillar, they are likely to prove more fragile. The most well-known example of this state-sponsored oppression is the 2017 genocide against the Rohingya people. The Rohingya, who are predominantly Muslim and reside in the Rakhine State of Myanmar, have endured grave human rights violations such as killings, torture, and rape, at the hands of the military for decades.⁵ In 2017, the military doubled down on its efforts against the Rohingya people with renewed violence, triggering a mass exodus of people into neighboring countries. This is reflected in Myanmar's score on the Fragile States Index for Refugees and IDPs, which shows a steep increase between 2016 and 2018. Additionally, in the 2022 Fragile States Index, Myanmar scored a 9.2 out of 10 for Human Rights, placing it within the top ten states globally for the highest indication of human rights violations. Tens of thousands of Rohingya people were killed by military forces in 2017 alone and hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes. The United Nations stated that the move showed "genocidal intent" with the UN Secretary-General at the time describing the violence as ethnic cleansing.⁶ Aung San Suu Kyi and the military repeatedly denied these allegations despite mounting international pressure and ongoing documentation by human rights groups.⁷ As the Rohingya crisis shows, systematically discriminating against certain groups not only weakens stability but also threatens resilience, a country's ability to bounce back from crisis.

Resilience in Myanmar is further threatened by social and political stratification between ethnic groups. Myanmar scores just below the global average for the Social Cohesion pillar of the Fund for Peace's State Resilience Index (SRI). However, a closer look at the sub-pillars under Social Cohesion reveals an extremely low score (1.7) in 'Social Relations' which measures the degree to which people trust and tolerate those from different backgrounds and orientations. Within the Social Cohesion pillar, the relatively higher scores for 'Social Capital' and 'Confidence in National Institutions' likely come from the from the Bamar majority

group's intra-ethnic support systems and approval of the Bamar representatives once in parliament. During the 2017 military violence against the Rohingya, most members of the Bamar majority kept quiet, with some voices even defending the military's aggression.⁸ In a country as ethnoculturally diverse as Myanmar, such low levels of social cohesion and solidarity between groups pose a serious challenge to national resiliency.

While there have been some state-sponsored initiatives for creating solidarity in Myanmar, such as the promotion of a nationwide common language and education system, they have ignited protests amongst ethnic minority groups who fear the loss of their own languages, cultures, and religions.⁹ In other words, attempts at improving social cohesion has looked more like forced assimilation for ethnic minorities. This historically integrationist approach has done little to strengthen interpersonal connections between minority groups and the majority Bamar population.¹⁰

It is within this historical backdrop that the February 2021 coup arose. In presidential and parliamentary elections in November 2020, the NLD re-elected Aung San Suu Kyi and won 83 percent of parliamentary seats, effectively squashing the electoral power of the USDP.¹¹ While most voters elected new leaders in 2020, that vote excluded dozens of ethnic groups who have been denied voting rights through the withholding of their citizenship status.

Surprisingly, under the oppression of a violent military coup, many different ethnic groups have successfully formed coalitions and begun to address inter-group grievances. In the last year, there have even been public apologies by individuals from majority groups for their complicity in decades of oppression against ethnic minority groups.¹² Many Burmese, fueled by the younger generation, have experienced a wake-up call in response to the horrors brought on by the coup. To harness this current momentum for a true resilience transformation, Myanmar (which currently scores a 4.9 for 'inclusion of youth' on the SRI) needs to invest in this generational reckoning rather than squash it. Whether this


movement will prove to trickle up from the community level to genuine state resiliency will be something to watch in Myanmar in the coming years. Myanmar's popular resistance political group, known as the National Unity Government (NUG), has issued a call for a democratic government that is "inclusive of all ethnic people" and has appointed members of ethnic minority groups to top positions.¹³ Although many unrecognized minority groups, including the Rohingya and most other Muslims, Tamils, Gurkhas, Chinese, Bengalis, Punjabis, and Telugus, continue to be excluded from some resistance efforts, there is hope that these developments provide an opportunity for a more inclusive future in Myanmar.¹⁴ If Myanmar wants to turn the tide from fragility to resilience, then a process of social reconciliation and healing is a crucial first step. While resiliency is not built overnight or even within a decade, perhaps the next generation of Burmese youth will be able to lay its foundation.

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PARALLEL PEACE: CHIEFTAINCIES AND THE STATE IN GHANA



THEO ANASTOPOULO

Citing the 2021 Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranked Ghana as the second most peaceful country in Sub-Saharan Africa, a 2022 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report referred to Ghana as a regional “oasis of peace.”¹ After decades of coups and one-party rule that ended in 1993, the description has been aptly earned. In this first edition of the State Resilience Index, Ghana ranks as the most resilient country in West Africa, due in part to its high scores under Inclusion and Social Cohesion pillars. Behind Ghana’s history of relative stability is an institutionalized peace architecture that prioritizes its vibrant civil society space, multi-ethnic political inclusion, and most notably, a collaborative statutory-traditional institutional dynamic whereby parallel networks of political legitimacy are instrumentalized to foster social cohesion and inclusion.

Ghana’s statutory-traditional institutional dynamic is currently underpinned by the 1992 Constitution, which outlines the chieftaincy’s independence from state interference while also establishing the bodies through which chieftaincies can officially advise and collaborate with the state. Although traditional authority now assumes some formal power, state policy consistently curbed the chieftaincy’s influence in the decades following independence in 1957 by controlling the right to the status of chiefs. During colonial rule, the British

reserved for themselves this right,² and similar measures were taken by post-colonial governments to consolidate the new state’s authority. President Kwame Nkrumah himself usurped economic powers traditionally under a chief’s domain, thereby relegating chiefs as subservient to the central government.³ The Chiefs Recognition Act of 1959 codified these efforts, which vested in the central government alone the right to recognize or withdraw a chief’s status.⁴ Later, Ghana’s Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) revolutionaries under Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings held a trying relationship with chiefs while establishing control over their status.⁵

Nonetheless, resistance to these challenges ensured the chieftaincy’s continued relevance, and in 1992 during the transition to multiparty democracy, their eventual legitimization within specific spheres of society was established by customary law. Through official state bodies within Ghana’s decentralized system of governance, chiefs wield considerable influence. It is this influence that bestows chiefs, as representatives of diverse ethnic and religious communities, the ability to promote social cohesion, development, and respect for rule of law at the local level. In addition to being a community’s primary point of assistance, a chief’s authority extends to settling local disputes, organizing communal labor and festivals supporting peace in their respective jurisdictions, and working alongside state officials at various levels of

government.⁶

This has the effect of boosting citizens' confidence in those institutions. Land disputes, for examples, are adjudicated through chiefs' courts, quasi-legal state agencies, and other informal arbitrations in addition to the formal state courts. In the Kumasi High Court, for example, nearly 30% of cases used traditional chief courts as the first methods when settling a dispute.⁷ At the national level chiefs are also represented in the National House of Chiefs, which advises those in authority overseeing matters affecting local chieftaincies.

Inclusion has also been promoted by the state through development policies aimed at addressing legacies of inequality in Ghanaian society, particularly regarding the country's North–South developmental trajectories. Governments have implemented infrastructure policies addressing political and economic discrepancies in the two regions, for example, and efforts have also been made to redress historical imbalances through fair representation in government, public service bodies, and ruling military councils reflecting the country's diversity.⁸ In giving due attention to the North, Accra thereby maintains relationships with chieftaincies in traditionally underdeveloped areas, allaying potential fodder for conflict against the government.

The continuation of chieftaincy systems similarly preserves indigenous religions and traditional values, which emphasize religious coexistence and respect for private beliefs.⁹ Otherwise, chieftaincies do not extend influence over matters of private religion. Ethnic and religious diversity themselves are not particularly unique to Ghana. What is unique is the country's successful incorporation of more than 90 multireligious ethnic groups in the political process. While minor conflict periodically erupts along religious lines, relations among Christians (71% of the population concentrated in the south), Muslims (18% of the population concentrated in the north), and adherents of animist and indigenous beliefs (5%) likewise remain overwhelmingly civil.¹⁰

Muslim and Christian leaders often espouse principles

of tolerance and religious freedom, which are enshrined in Ghana's Constitution prohibiting religious discrimination. Some scholars point to the “accommodative nature” of Ghana's indigenous religions as laying the groundwork for peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians, from which religious wisdom and conceptual interpretations of God have historically been considered interdependent.¹¹ This has helped foster high levels of syncretic pluralism, which in turn encourages religious tolerance.¹² In operation, this takes, for example, the form of The Ministry of Education's public curriculum balancing Christian and Islamic perspectives.¹³

These measures are significant given recent surges in jihadist militarism emanating from the Sahel. To Ghana's north, Burkina Faso in January and September experienced two coups driven partially by widespread discontent over the government's inability to check deteriorating security concerns posed by violent jihadist groups and other community militias.¹⁴ ¹⁵ There, according to ECOWAS, Burkinabé authorities control only 60% of the country.¹⁶ In all of Ghana's regional neighbors, including Mali, Togo, Benin, and Côte d'voire, the Sahel, groups such as the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, and Ansarul Islam were responsible for more than 2,000 violent events in 2020, representing a 70% spike from 2020.¹⁷

Group-based inclusion strengthens Ghana's aggregated social cohesion score and helps stem the likelihood of similar violent extremism driven by ethnic or religious marginalization. Maintaining cohesion among Ghana's multifarious religious and ethnic groups very much forms the bedrock of the country's 1992 Constitution. In practice, Ghana's robust and independent judiciary plays an important role in upholding respect for civil and political liberties.¹⁸ Among their more consequential decisions include rulings on electoral reforms since the restoration of constitutionalism in 1993 and expanded space for political participation. This has provided a civil and accessible forum for grievance expression.

Also key within the government's peace architecture

underpinning strong social cohesion is the National Peace Council (NPC), established in 2006 as a government-led effort to “strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, management, resolution and sustainable peace.”¹⁹ The body very much embodies the success of Ghana’s parallel authorities by preemptively spreading awareness of non-violent mediation strategies through the marriage of customary and statutory law. In situations where conflict does arise, it draws heavily from traditional indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. Selected from a “broad-based consultation process,” its body comprises religious leaders, respected private persons, political parties, chieftaincies, and youth and women’s groups.²⁰ The NPC faced a formidable test during elections in 2008, when chieftaincy-related conflicts spiked amidst close polling numbers. The NPC nonetheless mediated a peaceful political transition. Emmanuel Bombande, founder of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, stated at the time, “When it mattered most...the National Peace Council was there to save Ghana.”²¹

It is this ability to manage horizontal and vertical violence through spheres of formal and traditional authority that support Ghana’s resilience score. Both the country’s statutory realm and formal institutions are reflective of inclusive structures fostering social cohesion and inclusion. The system is not without challenges, but such arrangements of power could, if given consideration by other West African states, provide key insight into organizing stronger peacebuilding measures in the region.

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UKRAINE'S DECENTRALIZATION AND CIVIC SPACE STRENGTHEN THE COUNTRY'S WARTIME RESILIENCE



GRACE HILLERBY

When Ukraine was invaded on February 24, most observers expected that Russia would quickly prevail. After all, Russia, a militarily and economically stronger country, had annexed Crimea with ease in 2014. And, in comparison with 2014, the West was evidently divided and exhausted after 20 years of war in Afghanistan, concerns over energy security, and a looming global economic slowdown. Despite all this, Kyiv did not fall, and in early September the country even regained some 3,000 square miles of Russian-occupied territory.

Ukraine is now a different, more resilient country than it was in 2014, when its score worsened by 9.1 points on the 2015 Fragile States Index (FSI).¹ At that time, the population was deeply divided, wracked by protests of corruption and abuse of power, and calls for the resignation of President Yanukovich in the Euromaidan Uprising. Trust in political elites was at a low ebb, and Russian-backed separatist wars in the Donbas further eroded state capacity.² Political, ethnic, and regional divisions were easily manipulated by Moscow to spread disinformation and to further weaken Ukraine's solidarity and resolve. The economy collapsed. Poverty surged.

Since then, however, Ukraine has embarked on a comprehensive decentralization initiative, aimed at improving democracy and increasing accountability. Small, underfunded

municipalities were fused into self-sustaining Amalgamated Territorial Communities (ACTs). Their grassroots design and creation fostered collective action, robust debate, and joint decision-making.³ ACTs also gained significant rights in public policy and self-government, improving the quality of democratic structures and the state's capacity to deliver services.

The productivity of public spending increased as a result of fiscal decentralization in the context of financial stabilization. Since 2014, initiatives by the central government to increase integration into global financial markets, diversify trading partners, boost export volumes, improve competitiveness, and stimulate innovation have gradually helped stabilize the economy.⁴ This environment has evolved in tandem with the devolution of tax-raising authority and allocations from the central state budget to the ACTs. The latter now collects 60% of personal income tax, for example, allowing them to deliver public services and improve infrastructure.⁵ As a result, decentralized governance served as the foundation for massive reforms in healthcare availability and cost, as well as compulsory education modernization.⁶ This provision of services contributes to Ukraine's above-average score on the State Resilience Index (SRI) for the Public Health and Education System sub-pillars.

The OECD recognized the importance of these reforms in 2018, adding that if momentum was maintained, Ukraine's decentralization could further strengthen its resilience.⁷ Indeed, faced with the shock of an invasion in February, the tiered system of governance did not collapse. Administrative-territorial structures have continued to function. Mayors and sub-state authorities have been able to provide financial help, obtain critical resources, manage communal services, and care for the vulnerable, even as the state has shifted to a wartime posture.⁸

Decentralization extended beyond the political and economic spheres, to include a massive reorganization and modernization of Ukraine's armed forces. A civilian-led military fostered legitimacy and accountability. A decentralized command and control empowered tactical decision making.⁹ Reforms to minimize corruption and improve transparency in the defense sector boosted troop morale.¹⁰ Then after the invasion, thousands joined volunteer formations, and territorial military organizations were backed by sub-state councils to fight for the nation of Ukraine.

A vibrant civic space also emerged after 2014, reflected in Ukraine's above-average score of 6.8 on the SRI. Renewed perceptions of Russia's threat contributed to the strengthening of a national identity based on freedom, courage, and kinship.¹¹ Armed conflict in the East encouraged the growth of myriad donation and volunteer networks. The influence of civil society organizations working to build bottom-up resilience also expanded. For example, independent sociopolitical media groups emerged to provide local populations a voice, encourage participatory politics, and combat disinformation.¹² These organizations fostered group connectedness and solidarity by defending universal citizen rights. In this sense, new modes of resistance and participation enhanced civic space and established the foundations for stronger horizontal cohesion.

Volunteerism and civil society serve as the foundation for the nation's resilience and self-defense during wartime. Civilians, churches, and organizations fight disinformation,

deliver humanitarian assistance, provide psychosocial support, and assist in the maintenance of key services.¹³ Collective mobilization for war has strengthened national cohesion and emphasized civic identity over ethnic identities.

Despite its remarkable wartime resilience, Ukraine has hidden vulnerabilities, scoring 4.6 on the SRI for Social Cohesion. Its ranking of 122 out of 180 on the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index¹⁴ suggests that this is owed, in part, to persistently high levels of corruption, which harm trust in national institutions. Furthermore, group grievance continues to undermine social relations, albeit to a lesser extent.¹⁵ While cohesion still improved after 2014 because of decentralization reform and civil society, for continued improvement in resilience, over the longer term, will require sustained anti-corruption efforts.

If Ukraine was more resilient than most observers expected, this is contrast to Afghanistan which proved less resilient than many hoped and was quickly overrun by the Taliban after NATO's withdrawal. Corruption was pervasive in Afghanistan's defense and interior ministries eroding morale throughout the National Defense and Security Forces, with little being done to improve accountability.¹⁶ Distrust of political leadership undermined an atmosphere of solidarity and national responsibility in the army.¹⁷ Above all, because reconstruction in Afghanistan was top-down and externally driven, local resilience was weak.


Certainly, Ukraine would have struggled to resist as effectively without external military, economic, and diplomatic support. But without local ownership of the process, even 20 years and 2.3 trillion dollars will fail to foster resilience.¹⁸ Resilience, then, is more than dollars and defense forces. It requires decentralization, accountability, public service provision, an engaged civic space, and national solidarity. If these things are in place, a country can withstand almost anything.

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LEBANON'S CRUMBLING RESILIENCE



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The crumbling of Lebanon's State Capacity has been the defining feature of the country over the past few years amidst an unprecedented financial and economic crisis. The political class has been passive in reacting to the cascading crises and unwilling to conduct meaningful structural reforms. The international community and international monetary organizations such as the IMF and World Bank have been vocal critiquing Lebanon's handling of the crisis.¹ Therefore, unsurprisingly, Lebanon has ranked low across the pillars in this year's report.

Financial Meltdown

Lebanon's financial and economic crises has led to a drastic devaluation of the Lebanese Pound, losing approximately 95% of its value in comparison to other foreign currencies, such as the U.S. Dollar. As a consequence, most Lebanese are unable to access their dollars denominated savings accounts. Lebanon's Central Bank and other bank reports indicate a gap of over \$70 billion dollars between hard currency they have

access to, and their obligations on their balance sheet.² Since October 2019, there has been de-facto capital control implemented by banks, though without the explicit approval of the Lebanese Government or Parliament. As such, banks have refused to give depositors access to their funds, or are requiring people to take their savings denominated in dollars in Lebanese pounds instead, at values that are below the black market.³ Moreover, the Lebanese government defaulted on its debt obligations to Eurobond holders in March 2020. As a result, Lebanon ranks poorly on the Government Debt and Credit sub-indicator with a score of 2.7 and Access to Finance score of 3.7, reflecting years of mismanagement of monetary and economic policy.

The IMF and the Lebanese government signed a staff agreement deal for the fund to provide \$3 billion in funding over the course of four years,⁴ but Lebanon has been slow to adhere to many of the reforms that the fund has requested, such as lifting bank secrecy, and implementing a state budget and a monetary policy that would tackle the multiple different exchange rates.⁵ Unsurprisingly as a result, Lebanon scores only 2.9 on the economic management sub-indicator.

Disintegration of the Lebanese Society

Because of these continued banking policies, there's

been a rise in bank depositors holding banker's hostage to demand access to their deposits and savings accounts. Banks have responded by shutting down for multiple days and severely cutting back on their services, limiting who can access banks, and requiring appointments.⁶ These policies are fuelling tensions along socio-economic lines and a breakdown of social cohesion among the population as a large swath of the population views the ruling political and economic class as having taken advantage of the rest of the population. At the same time, government effectiveness has eroded due to recurring strikes by public institution staff who demanded salary increases. Public sector employees have seen their salaries erode in purchasing power since 2019, with salaries failing to cover the cost of fuel to travel to and from the office.^{7,8} As such, confidence in national institutions scored low at 3.1, and overall social cohesion at 3.7.

The declining economic conditions in Lebanon has led to an increase in youth unemployment and a rise in disillusionment by the youth towards the government. Lebanon has been faced with a combination of both high level of unemployment for youth, combined with a substantial brain drain with a huge uptick in emigration.⁹ This is reflected by low a Youth Inclusion score of 2.9.

Environmental Degradation

Lebanon's environment is not immune to the crisis that the country is facing with an Ocean & Fisheries health Ecosystem Health both scoring a 2.8. Environmental disasters are growing in Lebanon with an uptick in forest fires due to illegal lumbering and the absence of proper resources to manage forest fires.¹⁰ Lebanon also continues to deal with water sanitation and water pollution issues due to an aging infrastructure and systematic dumps of unprocessed water straight into the main waterways.¹¹

Lebanon's utilities and infrastructure have suffered from decades of poor management and lack of modernization. Lebanon's state power institutions are unable to provide more than 2 to 4 hours a day (at best), with most people in Lebanon

having to rely on private generators which are much more costly and polluting, leading to a pollution score of 5.6.¹² Similarly, pipping clean water to households is an ongoing problem, with families having to rely on buying water from expensive private providers.¹³ As a result of the financial crisis, individual households have looked for alternative solutions and installed solar power panels. However, these initiatives, while increasing in number each year, lack regulation and a coherent national policy, giving Lebanon a score of 1.2 when it comes to Clean Energy.

Lebanon's best performing pillar is the civic space with a score of 5.6, reflecting continued demands by citizens and new outlets buoyed by social media pushing for increased accountability and transparency. Lebanon has historically been a space in the region for the promotion of human rights and the importance of freedom of expression, a space where civil society could develop. It's important to note that while the past few years have seen an increase in the numbers of people who have been routinely arrested by law enforcements and violence against protestors, civil society groups continue to be a driving force for change and to hold accountable government officials for the current state that Lebanon finds itself in. These were key demands of the protest movement in October of 2019 that led to the elections of a dozen of new independent Members of Parliament in the May 2022 elections.

Conclusion


It is hard to evaluate Lebanon today and not come out with a serious concern about the state of the country. Lebanon and the Lebanese population are in a fragile state right now, and absent drastic reforms, a road to recovery and stability is a long distance away. Lebanon faces a challenging road to restore confidence in national institutions and to rebuild social cohesion among the population.

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2022: STRESS TESTING BRAZILIAN RESILIENCE



JULES OTTINO-LOFFLER

Brazil is a young democracy with a constitution enacted only a quarter century ago. For the last four years the country has been tested by a relentless pandemic, a turbulent presidency, and a polarized election that fueled public mistrust and societal fragmentation.¹ Despite these challenges, in the last year Brazil has demonstrated significant resilience through a patchwork of checks and balances negotiated between and among civil society, Brazil's federal structure, government institutions, and a robust legal framework. In January 2023, Brazil will inaugurate a new President in a peaceful transfer of power.

First and foremost, the Brazilian Supreme Court prevailed throughout the pandemic and elections, withstanding many of President Bolsonaro's attempts to flex the office's powers and erode judicial independence.² In 2020, during the early stages of the pandemic, Brazil's Supreme Court successfully blocked President Bolsonaro's attempts to strip states of the authority to implement measures to manage the spread of Covid. This intervention would prove instrumental in limiting the damage wrought by the virus in light of Bolsonaro's lax approach to containing its spread. Furthermore, the Supreme Court halted attempts to suspend the access to

information law and withhold data from the public,³ annulled presidential vetoes that threatened to undermine appropriate healthcare in prisons and indigenous communities, ordered the stop of police raids during the Covid-19 pandemic and tamed electoral misinformation.^{4,5}

The military has historically been among the most powerful institutions in Brazil, having ruled the country for 21 years until 1989. This legacy re-emerged in the lead-up to the 2022 presidential election, with high-ranking military officials echoing Bolsonaro's rhetoric alleging election rigging mere days before election day. Nevertheless, the military ultimately announced that it would not interfere with the election results and would support a peaceful transfer of power, signaling an endorsement of the legitimacy of the institutions and democratic processes,^{6,7} and dispelling fears of a potential military coup. While this announcement eased Brazil through this transition of power, the military's nonpartisan respect for the electoral process should be reinforced for future elections as well.⁸

Another of Brazil's institutions, its public health system, also endured extraordinary challenges during the pandemic. The Sistema Único da Saúde (SUS), Brazil's central health system, is regarded as one of the world's most

progressive health programs, providing legal protection for universal and comprehensive access to free services.⁹ However, Bolsonaro's refusal to mobilize the state's power to address the pandemic, particularly for marginalized groups, strained the system to its limits. As a result, Brazil suffered the third-highest mortality rate worldwide, behind the United States and India.^{10 11} Despite the President's rhetoric and lack of federal support, the Brazilian health system, in collaboration with a web of civil society groups and state and municipal governors – supported by a robust legal framework – managed to address the pandemic and distribute vaccinations, achieving a 70% vaccination rate by January 2022.¹²

The Bolsonaro administration's undervaluing of public health matched their posture toward regulatory and environmental agencies. During his tenure, protections for the Amazon's rainforest were suspended, and deforestation increased to a 15-year high with the expansions of lumber production, agriculture, and mining.^{13 14} By the end of 2020, the Brazilian Amazon Deforestation Monitoring Program estimated a 47% increase in the expansion of deforestation compared to 2018, and 182% higher than the target established by the government in 2004.¹⁵ As one of the world's essential carbon absorbers, the Amazon's deforestation has a notable impact on climate change.¹⁶ The administration's attempts to neuter environmental protection agencies and ignore environmental laws were partly kept in check, and while the agencies were weakened, they did not collapse. With the election of Lula in November 2022, policies toward deforestation are expected to be strengthened. Furthermore, the president-elect immediately signaled Brazil's return to international environmental governance by announcing plans for an OPEC-style alliance with Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to coordinate on rainforest conservation issues, potentially strengthening Brazil's capacity to address future environmental problems, but also its ability to monetize its role as steward of the “world's lungs” through carbon markets and financing mechanisms.¹⁷

Resilience is often born of the need to counter threats to the fabric of society. With the erosion of Brazil's social cohesion over the past half-decade, driven by increased inequality and political mistrust, a robust network of civil society groups and NGOs emerged, playing a critical role in connecting, framing, and maintaining the country's capacity and institutional strengths.¹⁸ These expansive collaborative networks were galvanized during the pandemic and the polarized elections to support vulnerable people with basic information and essential services, support election integrity, and curb deforestation.^{19 20 21 22} Civil Society groups, in collaboration with the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (APIB) and six political parties, stalled deforestation by bringing cases concerning the protection of indigenous people to the Supreme Court, resulting in a directive to the government to comply with international responsibilities derived from the Constitution, provide health protections, and remove encroachers from indigenous lands. In the Favelas, organizations such as *Mães da Favela* a broad group that supports well-being and social integration for marginalized people²³ partnered with other organizations, like the *Mare Mobilization* front, an organization based in the *Maré* neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro, to help distribute health information and organize food and hygiene donations. These groups also partnered with NGOs such as the *Oswaldo Cruz Foundation*, and other healthcare-based organizations, like the *Pan-American Health Organization and Social Territories Program*, that organized assistive programs for healthcare,²⁴ and other NGOs like *Ballet Manguinhos*²⁵ and *Central Única of Favelas (CUFA)*, which has worked to implement cultural, artistic, sports, and education projects that provide otherwise unavailable opportunities. These efforts demonstrate that the resilience provided by Brazil's civil society has extended beyond the crucial coverage of basic human rights to include Brazilians' cultural fulfillment.²⁶

Brazil's resilience during the past four years safeguarded the country's institutions, which were able to

deploy a system of checks and balances to counteract exceptional pressures. This resilience often emerged from local rather than national structures. Cooperation among the diverse groups of NGOs, state governments, and civil society built a network that provided a robust framework to respond to abuses, crises, and mismanagement at the national level. And while Brazil continues to contend with economic, demographic, and social cohesion pressures, the country has demonstrated that it can address them if the systems and mechanisms of resilience continue to be cultivated and maintained.

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BUILDING RESILIENCE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE

EMILY SAMPLE

As the world confronts the effects of climate change, the vulnerability of states at all levels of development has become starkly apparent. Structural pressures are mounting, leading to increased frequency and intensity of cascading crises including stress from mass migration, droughts, extreme weather events, disease outbreaks, commodity price shocks, and associated political and social unrest. This dynamic sets up a race against time, to see whether improvements in our systems of resilience can outpace the worsening trends or whether we are heading towards a tipping point. There is one designated pillar in the SRI that specifically focuses on environmental and ecological resilience factors. This pillar helps determine a country's ability to absorb, adapt, and transform in the face of an environmental crisis.

In conceptualizing this pillar, the FFP team looked at a variety of ecological concepts. The natural environment provides the substrate on which human civilization is built. The connection between preserving environmental flourishing and human health has been well established, both on an individual level and at a system level. At an extreme, attempts have been made to determine the environmental limits within which humanity can safely operate, known as the planetary boundary concept,¹ which is an omnipresent concern as the human population reaches eight billion.² In addition to global environmental health, local ecological health – and its resilience to shocks – plays a critical role in mitigating extreme weather events, shaping food systems, improving population health, and reducing vulnerability to pandemics. The Environment-Ecology pillar aims to measure the health of air, aquatic, and terrestrial

environments; the ecological vitality of local ecosystems and biodiversity; and the stability of the local climate.

Each country in the SRI has an established score, based on 8 sub-pillars, which are themselves made up of a total of 28 metrics. In part, these scores reflect the ways a given state manages their natural resources, including the health of their air, soil, and water, their agricultural productivity, and rate of deforestation and biodiversity loss.

In the process of collecting data for the SRI, FFP hosted a workshop with leading members of the environmental and climate security communities to discuss how environmental resilience is currently measured and monitored, as well as what they saw as the current gaps in knowledge. This analysis allowed participants to highlight how certain countries have or have not demonstrated particular resilience in the face of climate change, as well as noting the ways in which the effects of climate change have cascading effects across the seven identified pillars. One thing that has become clear in not only the analysis of the environment, but also in assessing resilience in the face of climate change, is that no pillar exists in a vacuum. Even the environmental pillar cannot produce a full picture of societal resilience to the effects of climate change. Both in the short term (shocks) and long term (pressures), the effects of climate change cascade across pillars, and require more holistic analysis.

For example, imagine a scenario where there was a sudden flood in one part of a country. First, an analysis of environmental/ecological resilience would be judicious, including forest health and coverage, recent rainfall and

temperature averages, and areas of potential water infiltration. This illustrates how resilient the land area should have been to flooding. The State Capacity pillar must then be taken into account in assessing the government's response to this event, e.g., was the government able to provide rescue services, food, water, shelter, emergency healthcare, and rebuilding funds to the affected population? Next, under the Inclusion pillar, did the government provide adequate services to this group irrespective of the ethnic or religious makeup of the area? Or unequal care? This is just one example of why and how these pillars and sub-indicators should be used as parts of a whole, not a series of siloed data.

Environmental and climate resilience are major topics in the human security field, which has led some to use the term interchangeably with climate adaptation. While they have some overlapping features, it is important to recognize that resilience refers to a society's ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from climate-related shocks with a clear focus on minimizing the negative effects of these events on society as a whole. Adaptation methods, which can negatively or positively affect resilience, are changes made to adjust to living in the new reality of a changed, or rapidly changing climate.³ A country can have instituted certain climate adaptation methods (for example the installation of levees and sea walls) but still have low climate resilience overall (are the individuals, community, and state able to prepare for and respond to a breach in those walls?). Another example is the increasing reliance on hydroelectric dams as a climate change adaptation method, the creation of which may have little impact on climate resilience if the energy infrastructure is otherwise fragile. In addition, these dams can have negative impacts on social resilience reflected in other pillars.⁴ This is why some countries' Environment-Ecology pillar score may be lower than anticipated, including the United States.

While there are many factors that go into the United States' score in this pillar, one of its lowest scoring sub-indicators is clean energy. There is good news for the US'

score for next year though, as the newly passed Inflation Reduction Act⁵ specifically looks to build climate resilience domestically. Importantly, this includes reducing United States' reliance on both foreign and domestic fossil fuels as well as increasing subsidies and access to clean energy.⁶ This will ideally signal a long-term overall increase in the United States' climate resilience.

As this is the first year of the SRI, the scores are indicative of a snapshot of a moment in time. Starting with next year's scores, the FFP will be able to start building an increasingly clear pattern of environmental and ecological resilience across the world. What countries do to build resilience now is of the utmost importance as we face a future of greater pressures, increasing frequency and intensity of disasters and shocks, and less predictable and dependable weather patterns.

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WOMEN AND STATE RESILIENCE

ELENA ORTIZ

Elena Ortiz is the Research Manager for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Index at GIWPS. She has assisted with multiple previous iterations of the WPS Index and brings research experience exploring the gender dimensions of humanitarian aid, social norms, forced displacement, financial inclusion, and peace processes.

Whether induced by armed conflict, climate change, economic shocks, or global pandemics, crises magnify existing social inequalities. Gender represents a core axis of inequality as women and girls are disproportionately impacted by instability due to both formal and informal barriers to their rights, opportunities, and wellbeing that heighten levels of vulnerability.

Women and girls are more likely to be poor and less likely to possess legal identification, have access to a bank account, own a cell phone, hold positions of power, and participate in education. All of these disadvantages translate to their reduced resilience and adaptive capacity in the aftermath of shocks. For example, a woman without legal identification may not be able to travel or cross international borders, hindering her freedom of movement. A woman with little education is at higher risk of poverty and is more likely to work in the informal labor force, restricting her access to social protection and steady income generation. In fragile and conflict-affected states, just 25 percent of women have access to their own bank account compared to 40 percent of men, making women in fragile settings less able to make their own

financial decisions. Access to bank accounts is as much an issue of economic inclusion as it is personal safety, as women are less able to leave abusive relationships when they are financially dependent on their spouse.

Crises also amplify risks of gender-based violence and severely disrupt the provision of sexual, reproductive, and maternal healthcare. The share of women who have experienced physical or sexual intimate partner violence in the past year is nearly twice as high in fragile settings as it is globally (20 percent vs. 12 percent), and 60 percent of preventable maternal deaths take place in fragile settings.

Gender inequality is fueled by both formal and informal institutions. All except 12 countries in the world have laws discriminating against women in terms of mobility, employment, pay, marriage, parenting, entrepreneurship, and asset ownership, creating legal justification for the marginalization of women. In both the private and public spheres, patriarchal gender norms grant men greater decision-making power. These same norms restrict women's agency within the home and exclude women's voices from larger-scale policymaking. Indeed, one in five men worldwide believe it is unacceptable for women to work outside the home and only about a quarter of parliamentary seats are held by women.

The marginalization of women harms everyone in society and has critical implications for state resilience. Evidence shows that when half of the population is systemically held back by persistent inequalities, communities cannot possibly achieve the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities to handle crises.

The Women, Peace and Security Index (WPSI) produced by Georgetown’s Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) multidimensionally measures and ranks women’s wellbeing in 170 countries. Index scores are calculated based on performance across 11 indicators classified under the dimensions of inclusion (economic, social, political); justice (formal laws and informal discrimination); and security (at the individual, community, and societal levels) (Figure 1).




Figure 1: The WPS Index captures three dimensions of women’s status in 11 indicators. Source: GIWPS and PRIO, Women, Peace and Security Index 2021/22.

The relationship between countries’ performance on the WPSI and the State Resilience Index (SRI) is remarkably strong, with a correlation coefficient of 0.90 (Figure 2). While correlation does not prove causation, this relationship nonetheless confirms that countries where women are doing well tend to be the same countries with high levels of resilience in terms of absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacity in the face of crises. This suggests that efforts to promote women’s rights and status can generate larger gains for state resilience.

As the graph shows, countries ranking at the very top and very bottom of each index are especially similar. Norway performs best in terms of both women’s wellbeing and state

resilience, while five other countries– Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland– also rank among the top ten performers on both indices. At the other end of the spectrum, both indices share seven of the bottom ten countries: Afghanistan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. In these countries, women on average have not completed more than primary school, at least 16 percent of women have suffered violence at the hands of their intimate partner in the past year, and no more than one in three women has access to her own bank account.




Figure 2: Rankings on the WPSI are strongly correlated with rankings on the SRI

The relationship between women’s wellbeing and state resilience is powerful and important, but not surprising given that the SRI’s seven pillars all have critical gender dimensions.

For example, civic space is not the same for men and women. Political violence against women is on the rise globally, disincentivizing women’s participation, and 15 percent of women around the world do not own a cell phone, limiting their access to information and ability to build networks. Inclusion is strongly influenced by gender equality in the law and women’s representation in national governments. If women are legally restrained from participating in the economy, making their own decisions, and managing their own assets, enduring cycles of exclusion will continue to disadvantage women and diminish their adaptive capacity. Eight of the bottom ten performers on the SRI’s inclusion pillar are also among the 15 countries with the most legal discrimination

against women. At the other end of the spectrum, nine of the top performers on this pillar are among the 25 countries with the least legal discrimination worldwide. Female representation in parliament also bolsters inclusion by giving women greater decision-making power and a platform to advocate for more equitable policies. When this translates to greater investments in women across areas such as public health and education, state capacity is bolstered.

At the individual level, discriminatory gender norms and perceptions of women jeopardize social cohesion. Indeed, in ten of the bottom 25 countries on the social cohesion pillar, at least one in four men believe it is unacceptable for women to work outside the home. Perceived threats and actual violence against women also erodes social cohesion. In 14 of these countries, less than half of women feel safe walking alone in their neighborhood and in 12, at least 15 percent of women have experienced intimate partner violence in the past year. Discriminatory norms and practices also exclude women from participating in the formal labor market, harming the economy as a whole. The World Bank estimates that global annual losses in human capital wealth due to gender inequality equate to \$160 trillion, roughly double the volume of the world's GDP. These high costs reflect gender disparities in individual capabilities, since women who are excluded from income-generating activities face higher risks of poverty, food insecurity, and barriers to health, and have less power in household financial management. Education also cuts across these pillars, as women with little or no formal schooling are disadvantaged in the job market and are more likely to work in the informal sector. Around the world women are more impacted by harm to the environment and ecology, as they are more likely to depend on natural resources for their livelihoods and face greater vulnerability during climate-induced crises.

Gender is a cross-cutting theme of all seven pillars, highlighting that women are not only more vulnerable to the impacts of crises, but are also essential agents of resilience

building. The deeply intertwined relationship between women's wellbeing and state resilience presents a compelling case to policymakers for routinely applying a gendered lens to efforts to bolster the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities of states. As the world continues to grapple with the overlapping crises of climate change, armed conflict, social inequalities, and the COVID-19 pandemic, advancing the status of women must be permanently prioritized as a vital and non-negotiable component of resilience building.

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HOW DATA ON RESILIENCE—AND FRAMING—CAN CHANGE PEACEBUILDING’S NARRATIVE

Elizabeth Hume and Nick Zuroski

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Nick Zuroski is a Manager for Communications, Campaigns, and Policy at AfP. His professional experience lies at the intersection of peace and stability, gender equality, and grassroots-oriented understandings of human security.

When analyzing conflict and violence, there is a tendency to focus on the grievances driving the conflict. But when examining conflict dynamics, resilience,¹ which is the extent to which a country can anticipate, manage, and recover from a crisis relative to the severity of that crisis, is just as critical in understanding why a country becomes either conflict affected and fragile or remains stable and peaceful. The peacebuilding field must use the new State Resilience Index (SRI) to help change the narrative by moving away from crisis messaging and what is wrong, to leveraging the data of what is working, how we message it, and how we scale it.

While ending violent conflict and state fragility is one of the greatest and most urgent challenges of our time, the peacebuilding field must avoid communicating about these complex challenges in a way that perpetuates them, which can burn people out due to fear and the perceived inability to do anything about it. Brain science and narrative research show that hope and solutions-based messaging is more effective than

fear-based messaging when communicating about social change. Fear-based messaging triggers the "downstairs" half of the brain—the amygdala—causing people to "go into a mode where they preserve their 'security' (supposedly) often to the exclusion of empathy and openness to others."² However, the "upstairs" of the brain is triggered by confidence, hope, abundance, and joy and increases empathy and openness to other people and complex problems. But even for the peacebuilding field, changing how we amplify solutions-based messaging instead of fear-based messaging is challenging.

Understanding the global threats to peace and security is critical, but it cannot be the most important focus. We know the world has been experiencing a 30-year high³ in violent conflict, which is being compounded by the war in Ukraine, climate change,⁴ food insecurity,⁵ and the COVID-19 pandemic.⁶ Today, more than 100 million people⁷ are displaced due to conflict and violence, and an estimated 313.5 million people⁸ need humanitarian assistance and protection—the highest figure in decades. The Fragile States Index 2022⁹ found "an erosion in public confidence in democratic institutions and an increase in social and political polarization" around the world. The OECD State of Fragility 2022¹⁰ report released at the start of UNGA77 found the total number of fragile contexts is the highest since the initial release of the States of Fragility report in 2007¹¹ and that 1.9 billion people live in fragile contexts—accounting for 24% of the world's population and 73% of the world's extreme poor.

In seeking to understand these trends, analysts fixate too much on grievances¹²—deep feelings of dissatisfaction

among society's members with how their society is organized and how it impacts their lives—and how they drive conflict. Additionally, they, including our own organization the Alliance for Peacebuilding, often fail to discuss positive stories of peacebuilding in action,¹³ including what is working and how we can build on it. But we are working to change that. The Alliance for Peacebuilding's new peace framing and narrative research,¹⁴ produced in partnership with PartnersGlobal,¹⁵ Humanity United,¹⁶ and The FrameWorks Institute,¹⁷ finds communication strategies emphasizing our interconnectedness and the ongoing, active nature of peace increase both public support and understanding of peacebuilding.

The SRI and its comprehensive data are vital new tools that will help us put into practice understanding and communicating about what practical resilience is. For instance, according to the SRI, the U.S.' lower social cohesion and environmental-ecology pillar scores show that decreasing social cohesion is increasing pressures that drive fragility. However, the U.S.' robust civic space and individual capacity pillar scores should be amplified and used to develop effective programs to leverage these positive resiliencies. For the Global Fragility Act¹⁸ (GFA), the U.S. government highlighted the Coastal West Africa region, including Ghana. The data shows Ghana faces significant environmental, ecological, and economic pressures. Still, it has relatively high social cohesion and civic space pillar scores, which is critical data to assist in developing the regional GFA strategy. Future peacebuilding strategy should thus focus on buttressing the known strengths of social cohesion and civic space in order to increase overall state resilience.

While global threats and crises are extraordinarily high, and it is easy to focus on what is driving conflict, Alliance for Peacebuilding's new narrative research and the SRI show the importance of focusing on what is working—and how to leverage and build on it. The SRI is a crucial tool to help change the narrative about peacebuilding and develop effective programs that reduce and prevent violent conflict and build sustainable peace. Shifting the narrative of peacebuilding will

not be easy. However, changing how the peacebuilding field focuses on positive resiliency and how we message it will help both the public and policymakers better understand what peacebuilding looks like in practice and why it should be a key policy and programming option.

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UNDERSTANDING THE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX

PILLARS

Inclusion

When people are socially, economically, or politically included, they have less exposure to risk and vulnerability, are represented in decision making, and have access to public resources to mitigate and respond to crisis and disasters.

Social Cohesion

In addition to inclusion, a sense of solidarity is key to a resilient society. Kinship ties, sociocentrism, as well as social and political capital can create opportunities for generosity and collaboration, which is necessary to overcome a major crisis.

State Capacity

When the government has effective systems, and the trust and confidence of the population to act in the interest of the public good, then it has the flexibility to persuade and mobilize collective action when faced with crisis.

Individual Capabilities

When the average person has a stock of education, health, income, and food security, then when a crisis hits they will not be immediately rendered destitute and reliant on social protection services or external intervention to survive.

Environment and Ecology

Stable, regenerative ecosystems, water access, and clean energy are vital to health and livelihoods, as the world faces increasingly frequent and intense threats from climate change and extreme weather events.

Economy

Diverse and innovative economies with access to capital are less vulnerable to price shocks and supply-chain disruptions, and they recover more quickly after a disaster. For longer term economic resilience, infrastructure and high-quality economic management are necessary to compete in a changing global economy.

Civic Space

A healthy public square enables robust consultation, debate, dialogue, and consensus building so that the needs and grievances of individuals and communities can be addressed constructively. When faced with crisis, countries that have a stable social contract will generate accountability for leaders and buy-in by the general population to a national strategy.



UNDERSTANDING THE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX

Pillar	Sub-pillar	Sub-pillar Description
Inclusion	Inclusion of Youth	When young people are included in the workforce and have control off their finances, they can contribute to their families and communities in times of economic distress. Youth inclusion in the workforce can also have a positive impact on a country's stability.
	Political Inclusion	When different demographic groups, including women, are politically included, policy can be informed by a wider range of perspectives, creating broad-based buy-in for decision-making. This can positively influence collaboration and engagement with a collective response to crisis.
	Access to Finance	When faced with a crisis, access to finance can keep businesses and households afloat until the situation stabilizes.
	Group-based Inclusion	When different demographic groups can participate fully in political, economic, and social life, inequality is reduced. The equitable access to vital services in times of crisis can also prevent social tension and influence collective response.
	Access to Economic Resources	When individuals and groups are able to participate fully in the economic system, they are better able to maintain sustainable livelihoods to support themselves and their communities. Widespread access to economic resources can also limit the reaches of inequality in a society.
	Access to Employment	When there is widespread and equitable access to employment in society, individuals share higher standards of living. This can provide sustainable support for families and communities in times of economic distress.
	Protection Against Precarity	When precarity is low and access to social protections are high, people are protected against vulnerability and better able to cope with crises.
Social Cohesion	Social Capital	Social capital refers to institutional and interpersonal trust measured against individualism. When disaster strikes, countries with high interpersonal trust and low individualism have a better chance of getting organized and working together.
	Social Relations	Social relations refers to horizontal networks that exist between individuals and groups. When people have a strong community support network, they are better equipped to handle crises and maintain community organization.
	Confidence in National Institutions	Confidence in government institutions is crucial for ensuring successful policy implementation. When citizens have confidence in government institutions, they are able and willing to access public services and engage in political, social, and economic processes.
State Capacity	Finances	Finances refers to the level of financial liabilities within a government's central economy. States with fewer liabilities, such as low debt-to-GDP ratios, stable domestic budgets, and low external debts, will be able to regulate the economy and manage economic shocks when they occur.
	Government Effectiveness	An effective government is able formulate and implement sound policies and provide public services. Effective governments gain credibility and confidence in institutions from citizens.
	Disaster Risk Reduction	States with effective disaster risk reduction have systematic efforts in place to analyze and reduce the causal factors of disasters. By doing so, states are able to prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk.
	Public Health	States with strong a public health system provide reliable access to qualified health professionals and safe, clean, and informed services. When public health services are strong, communities are able to prevent and respond to a range of diseases and other threats to health.
	Education Outcomes	When states are able to ensure affordable and equitable access to quality education -- ranging from primary to higher education -- individuals are able to acquire useful and necessary skills and knowledge that allow them to more meaningfully participate in society.
	Rule of Law	Rule of law is a set of established principles for ensuring a just and orderly society. States with strong rule of law are more equipped to enforce laws, bring perpetrators to justice, and empower citizens to hold their government accountable, as well.
	Freedom from Corruption	Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain and often is conducive to human rights abuses. States that uphold freedom from corruption will gain more credibility and trust from citizens, as well as be able to develop a more stable and equitable economy.



UNDERSTANDING THE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX

Pillar	Sub-pillar	Sub-pillar Description
Individual Capabilities	Food/Nutrition	When individuals have access to quality and affordable food and nutrition intake, their life expectancy is longer, their health is better, and they are more capable of participating actively in society.
	Education System	When individuals have access to affordable and quality education, they become more empowered to find better jobs, provide better lives for themselves and their communities, and have more agency to make life choices.
	Health	When individuals have access to affordable and quality health services and resources, they will have a higher life expectancy and be able to participate more fully in society and the economy.
	Wealth	When individuals have access to disposable income, they can better manage their money and savings, preparing them for times of economic distress.
Environment and Ecology	Pollution	Air pollution, exposure to chemicals, and hazardous waste can cause illness, devastate ecosystems, and make living conditions unsafe. When a country has low pollution levels, it improves public health, environmental quality, and the standard of living for the most vulnerable people.
	Ocean and Fisheries Health	When oceans and their ecosystems are healthy, they provide food, jobs, and are crucial for economic growth. Additionally, healthy oceans help regulate the climate and can protect coastal communities from floods and storms.
	Agricultural Productivity	The majority of the world's poor live in rural areas and work in agriculture. When a country's agricultural sector is productive, earnings rise, the most vulnerable people's livelihoods are enhanced, and food security improves.
	Ecosystem Health	Healthy terrestrial ecosystems are critical components of rural livelihoods, providing both subsistence and income. They are also essential for preserving biodiversity, regulating water and climate cycles, preventing erosion, controlling floods, and maintaining soil fertility.
	Biodiversity	Biodiversity indicates thriving ecological conditions, and provides natural environmental bulwarks mitigating climate change impacts.
	Long-term Climate Stability	Amidst worsening climate change, a state's ability to withstand turbulent weather forecasts are essential to a population's security.
	Clean Energy	Renewable energy sources lessen a state's dependence on fossil fuel, thereby reducing the population's exposure to emissions and pollution, potentially improving health.
	Water Availability	Sufficient water supplies ensure agricultural productivity, ensure a population's health and well-being, and suggest ecological health.
Economy	Diversification	Diverse trading partners, diverse specializations, and diverse exports improve states' product development, market penetration, and ability to withstand sector-specific shocks.
	Business Environment	A strong business environment within a fair regulatory framework is conducive to individuals recognizing new opportunities, mitigating potential threats, and forecasting developments across marketplace sectors.
	Dynamism/Innovation	Innovative economies generate productivity while applying new ideas and technologies that improve the quality of goods and services.
	Physical Infrastructure	Reliable infrastructure improves the productivity and quality of domestic life (stable electricity, etc.) while also easing transportation, overcoming physical barriers to economic exchange, and saving travel time.
	Capital Flows	Alongside remittances, direct foreign investment can impact growth positively through access to credit, small business development, and increased employment.
	Economic Management	States that practice informed economic management can manage economic shocks, maintain steady GDP growth and macroeconomic stability, and remain competitive in global markets.
Civic Space	Engagement	When citizens engage and take action in their societies, policies are likely to be more reflective of the people's needs and leaders are more likely to be accountable.
	Accountability	When governments are accountable to their citizens, they are likely to be more effective in their work.
	Democratic Structures	Democratic structures are most successful when they are composed of, managed by, and working for the people of the nation. When such structures are meticulously managed to offer each citizen an equal opportunity and an equal voice, there is a greater likelihood of adaptation and transformation from crisis.
	Human Rights and Civil Liberties	When populations enjoy freedom and their civil liberties are guaranteed, they are more likely to speak up when their governments and leaders aren't performing. Widen civic spaces encourage continuous improvement and make countries better prepared in times of crisis.
	Information Access	Access to technology and information from diverse sources prepares citizens for more constructive discourse. Easy access to communication and information technology can also improve transaction speeds, supporting businesses, livelihoods, and the economy as a whole.

FUND FOR PEACE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX 2022

Country	Total SRI Score	Civic Space	Economy	Environment / Ecology	Inclusion	Individual Capabilities	Social Cohesion	State Capacity
Norway	8.4	9.4	6.8	7.2	9.2	9.2	8.1	8.9
Sweden	8.3	9.5	7.6	7.0	9.0	9.0	7.8	8.4
Finland	8.3	9.3	7.2	6.8	9.0	9.2	7.7	8.7
Switzerland	8.3	9.1	7.7	6.5	9.0	9.3	7.4	8.8
Denmark	8.2	9.5	7.5	6.1	9.0	9.1	7.7	8.5
New Zealand	8.1	9.2	7.1	7.2	9.1	8.6	7.2	8.6
Austria	7.8	8.6	7.2	6.5	8.7	8.9	6.8	8.1
Germany	7.9	8.9	7.6	6.0	8.8	9.0	6.6	8.2
Netherlands	7.9	9.0	7.2	5.7	9.2	9.1	6.6	8.6
Australia	7.8	8.6	7.0	6.7	8.8	8.9	6.4	8.4
Canada	7.8	8.6	6.9	6.8	8.9	8.9	6.8	8.1
United Kingdom	7.7	8.7	7.4	6.3	8.4	8.8	6.2	8.2
Ireland	7.9	8.8	6.9	6.1	8.5	9.4	8.0	7.7
Japan	7.5	8.1	7.9	5.9	8.4	8.5	5.5	8.1
France	7.5	8.5	7.2	6.2	8.1	8.8	5.8	7.8
United States	7.4	8.2	7.8	5.8	7.8	8.7	5.8	7.6
Singapore	7.4	5.7	8.2	4.3	8.3	9.0	8.0	8.4
Estonia	7.4	8.7	6.4	6.2	8.2	8.4	5.7	8.2
South Korea	7.3	8.3	7.9	5.0	7.9	8.6	5.4	7.8
Belgium	7.5	8.7	7.0	5.5	8.3	8.8	5.9	8.1
Spain	7.3	8.6	6.5	6.0	7.6	8.4	5.9	7.8
Slovenia	7.3	8.0	6.4	6.6	8.2	8.7	5.3	7.6
Portugal	7.3	8.6	6.5	5.8	7.9	8.3	6.4	7.5
Costa Rica	7.1	8.9	5.4	6.5	6.8	7.7	7.4	7.2
Italy	7.0	8.6	6.6	5.6	7.5	8.4	5.2	7.1
Uruguay	7.1	8.7	5.1	5.8	7.3	7.8	7.6	7.5
Czechia	7.0	8.2	6.5	5.6	7.8	8.6	4.5	7.6
Lithuania	7.0	8.4	5.9	6.3	7.8	8.2	4.8	7.5
Latvia	6.9	8.1	5.8	6.4	7.7	8.1	4.7	7.4
Israel	6.8	7.9	7.4	4.3	7.5	8.4	4.9	7.5
Chile	6.9	8.2	5.7	6.2	6.6	8.1	5.5	7.8
Slovakia	6.8	8.2	5.9	6.0	7.5	8.0	5.0	7.0
Poland	6.7	7.2	6.0	5.6	7.5	8.3	5.0	7.1
Greece	6.7	8.2	5.7	5.7	7.1	8.2	4.8	6.9

FUND FOR PEACE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX 2022

Trinidad and Tobago	6.5	7.9	5.0	4.7	7.3	7.1	6.9	6.7
Panama	6.3	7.3	5.4	6.2	5.9	7.4	5.9	5.9
Croatia	6.5	7.6	5.9	6.3	7.0	8.0	4.6	6.3
Hungary	6.5	6.4	6.4	5.6	7.0	8.1	5.1	6.9
Mauritius	6.3	7.6	5.6	3.7	6.7	7.3	6.3	6.9
United Arab Emirates	6.4	4.0	6.6	5.0	6.5	7.8	7.7	7.1
Jamaica	6.4	7.8	5.3	4.7	6.9	7.0	7.2	6.0
Malaysia	6.3	6.1	6.5	5.3	6.2	7.3	6.1	6.8
Romania	6.3	7.4	5.6	6.3	6.5	7.6	4.6	6.1
Georgia	6.2	7.1	5.5	5.4	6.7	7.3	4.9	6.5
Brazil	6.2	7.0	5.3	6.5	6.2	7.0	5.3	5.9
Bulgaria	6.2	7.2	5.6	5.5	6.8	7.5	4.1	6.5
Argentina	6.2	7.8	4.9	5.2	6.4	7.6	5.3	6.0
Paraguay	6.0	6.5	4.5	6.8	5.3	6.7	6.6	5.7
Thailand	6.0	5.2	6.2	4.9	6.5	7.4	6.0	6.0
Colombia	5.9	6.6	5.0	6.4	5.3	7.1	4.6	6.5
Mongolia	6.1	7.2	4.2	5.4	7.2	7.3	5.3	5.8
Peru	6.0	7.5	5.1	6.0	5.9	7.1	4.1	6.3
China	6.0	2.9	6.7	4.1	6.6	7.7	7.4	6.4
Ecuador	6.0	6.9	4.5	6.3	5.9	7.0	5.5	5.8
Philippines	5.9	6.3	5.5	4.6	5.3	6.9	6.9	6.0
Armenia	5.9	7.0	5.2	4.8	6.1	7.6	4.7	5.9
Dominican Republic	5.9	7.0	5.2	4.9	5.4	6.9	6.2	5.6
Indonesia	5.9	6.6	5.3	4.8	5.4	6.6	6.7	6.1
Russia	5.9	4.6	5.4	5.6	6.7	7.9	5.3	6.0
Albania	5.9	6.8	5.1	5.9	6.0	7.2	4.7	5.2
Moldova	5.7	6.7	4.9	4.2	5.9	7.1	5.7	5.6
Ukraine	5.9	6.8	5.0	4.8	6.7	7.6	4.6	5.6
Kazakhstan	5.9	4.5	4.7	5.2	6.9	7.8	6.4	5.9
North Macedonia	5.9	6.8	5.1	5.1	6.2	7.2	4.9	6.0
Qatar	5.8	3.3	5.8	3.9	6.0	7.9	7.4	6.7
Namibia	5.8	7.0	4.4	5.8	5.4	5.6	6.3	6.3
Mexico	5.8	6.6	5.3	5.2	5.7	7.2	4.5	6.0
Kuwait	5.7	5.4	5.1	4.6	5.8	7.0	6.5	5.8
Sri Lanka	5.6	6.0	5.0	4.6	5.7	7.2	4.6	5.9

FUND FOR PEACE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX 2022

Belarus	5.9	4.2	4.7	5.1	7.3	8.1	5.5	6.0
El Salvador	5.5	6.6	5.3	4.6	4.9	6.7	5.7	5.1
Serbia	5.8	6.1	5.4	5.1	6.3	7.2	4.7	5.7
Vietnam	5.8	4.2	5.5	4.6	6.1	7.1	7.2	5.9
Ghana	5.7	7.5	4.2	4.9	5.7	5.1	7.0	5.6
Cuba	5.6	3.4	4.2	4.7	6.6	7.4	7.5	5.6
South Africa	5.7	7.6	5.3	4.5	5.3	5.7	5.2	6.2
Botswana	5.8	7.1	4.6	5.2	5.4	5.7	6.0	6.6
Tunisia	5.5	7.6	4.8	3.8	5.6	6.8	4.0	5.7
Bahrain	5.1	3.5	5.7	4.2	5.9	6.6	4.5	5.3
Nepal	5.3	6.2	4.6	5.7	5.8	5.3	3.8	5.7
Honduras	5.4	5.3	4.7	5.4	5.1	6.1	6.3	4.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.5	6.3	4.9	4.7	5.7	7.3	4.8	4.6
Senegal	5.3	7.1	4.4	4.7	5.3	4.2	6.1	5.6
Turkey	5.5	4.4	5.5	4.5	5.6	7.4	5.2	5.6
Oman	5.5	4.0	5.1	4.1	5.4	6.8	7.4	5.8
Kyrgyzstan	5.5	5.6	4.5	5.3	5.5	7.0	4.9	5.6
Kenya	5.4	6.1	4.8	4.9	5.9	5.2	5.3	5.3
Bolivia	5.5	6.2	4.4	6.2	5.9	6.2	4.5	5.2
Morocco	5.3	5.7	5.2	4.7	4.9	6.4	4.5	5.7
India	5.2	5.8	5.4	4.0	5.2	5.3	4.2	6.5
Tanzania	5.2	5.6	4.1	4.8	6.0	4.7	6.1	5.4
Saudi Arabia	5.0	2.8	5.4	4.1	5.2	6.8	4.3	6.4
Jordan	5.2	5.1	5.5	4.3	4.5	6.7	5.1	5.5
Uzbekistan	5.2	4.0	4.6	3.8	5.4	6.7	6.1	5.6
Guatemala	5.0	5.8	4.8	4.6	4.6	6.2	4.4	4.9
Algeria	5.0	4.8	3.8	3.8	5.4	7.0	4.7	5.8
Venezuela	4.8	3.9	3.1	5.8	5.2	6.2	4.6	4.7
Iran	5.0	3.7	4.1	3.9	5.1	7.2	5.9	5.2
Malawi	5.2	6.2	3.5	6.0	5.1	4.4	5.6	5.2
Nicaragua	5.0	4.2	4.5	5.6	5.0	6.5	4.5	4.8
Myanmar	4.9	5.2	3.4	5.0	4.7	5.7	5.3	5.0
Rwanda	4.8	3.9	4.7	4.9	5.6	5.0	3.7	5.8

FUND FOR PEACE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX 2022

Turkmeni- stan	4.8	2.5	4.2	3.8	5.2	6.3	6.7	5.1
Timor- Leste	5.7	6.9	5.8	5.1	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.7
Burkina Faso	4.9	6.1	3.5	5.0	5.2	3.6	5.9	5.2
Tajikistan	5.0	3.1	4.5	5.5	4.2	6.1	6.9	4.8
Gambia	5.1	5.8	4.1	4.1	5.1	4.3	7.2	5.3
Gabon	5.2	5.4	4.0	6.3	5.1	5.3	5.9	4.3
Sierra Leone	4.8	6.1	3.5	5.1	4.5	3.2	6.1	4.9
Zambia	4.9	5.5	3.5	6.3	4.7	4.3	5.6	4.7
Mozam- bique	4.7	5.4	3.4	5.6	5.1	3.3	5.2	4.7
Bangla- desh	5.0	5.0	4.6	4.1	4.7	5.9	5.7	4.8
Cambodia	4.8	4.0	4.5	5.2	4.8	5.2	5.4	4.7
Zimbabwe	4.9	4.8	3.2	5.1	5.6	5.5	5.1	4.9
Lebanon	4.9	5.8	4.9	3.6	4.6	7.2	3.7	4.2
Azerbaijan	4.9	3.6	4.7	4.4	4.6	6.7	5.9	4.5
Lesotho	5.1	6.6	3.7	4.6	5.0	4.5	6.2	5.0
Ethiopia	4.9	4.8	3.7	5.3	5.2	4.5	5.8	4.9
Uganda	4.8	5.3	4.0	5.8	5.1	4.5	4.0	4.7
Papua New Guinea	4.8	5.8	3.5	5.2	4.1	4.3	5.8	4.7
Egypt	4.6	3.8	4.9	4.2	4.3	6.5	3.8	5.1
Laos	4.7	2.9	4.1	5.8	5.2	5.6	4.5	4.6
Liberia	4.9	6.4	3.3	4.4	5.2	3.6	6.1	5.0
Pakistan	4.7	4.7	4.4	4.1	4.2	4.9	5.6	4.8
Madagas- car	4.7	5.6	3.6	4.3	4.8	4.2	6.3	4.4
Niger	4.6	5.6	3.9	5.2	5.1	3.1	4.8	4.2
Cote d'Iv- oire	4.6	5.6	4.3	4.5	4.8	4.1	4.2	4.7
Benin	4.9	5.7	4.0	4.7	5.0	3.4	6.1	5.2
Came- roon	4.4	4.6	4.0	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.8	4.1
Nigeria	4.4	5.8	3.5	4.6	4.1	3.5	4.9	4.6
Iraq	4.4	5.2	3.9	4.2	3.5	5.9	4.3	3.5
Angola	4.0	4.7	2.6	4.9	4.2	3.7	4.1	4.0
Mali	4.3	5.6	3.6	5.3	4.5	3.0	3.4	4.4
Togo	4.4	5.3	4.0	4.6	4.9	3.7	4.0	4.1

FUND FOR PEACE STATE RESILIENCE INDEX 2022

Mauritania	4.1	4.8	3.2	4.1	3.4	4.5	4.5	4.4
Eswatini	4.6	3.4	4.2	4.0	3.9	5.1	6.5	5.0
Guinea Bissau	4.3	5.4	3.2	4.8	4.7	2.7	5.9	3.6
Equatorial Guinea	4.0	3.0	4.1	5.6	3.6	3.4	4.9	3.5
Palestine	5.0	4.3	5.6	3.9	3.5	6.3	5.2	6.0
Guinea	3.9	4.5	3.0	5.2	4.2	3.0	3.2	3.9
Libya	4.0	3.9	3.2	2.9	4.5	5.4	4.5	3.7
Congo Republic	3.9	3.8	3.2	5.7	3.7	4.2	3.1	3.7
Burundi	3.9	3.0	3.3	5.2	4.7	3.5	4.2	3.9
Haiti	4.0	5.2	3.4	3.8	3.7	3.6	4.5	3.8
Congo Democratic Republic	3.7	3.9	2.9	5.9	3.8	3.2	2.8	3.1
Sudan	3.6	3.6	3.5	4.5	3.0	4.0	2.8	3.7
Central African Republic	3.6	4.0	3.3	6.7	3.4	2.0	2.9	3.0
Syria	3.3	2.3	3.8	2.9	3.1	4.8	2.1	4.1
Somalia	3.4	3.2	3.8	4.1	3.1	2.4	3.6	3.4
Chad	3.3	3.5	2.8	4.9	3.8	2.4	3.0	2.9
Afghanistan	3.4	4.4	3.8	3.8	3.0	3.5	1.7	3.9
Yemen	2.9	2.2	3.3	3.6	2.4	3.2	2.8	2.8
South Sudan	2.9	2.5	2.6	4.3	3.3	2.5	2.7	2.6



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